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Abstract
This thesis examines the properties of optimal scal policy in the long-run
and over the business cycle in general equilibrium models with agents that
di¤er with respect to their skills and with production processes embodying
capital-skill complementarity. To this end, the thesis is composed of four
chapters which asses di¤erent aspects of optimal scal policy under various
specications incorporating labour skill and production di¤erences as well
as di¤erent assumptions regarding the policy instruments available to the
government. The rst two chapters focus on the long-run, while the last two
concentrate on business cycle dynamics. The rst and third chapters examine
setups that allow households to di¤er with respect to their income and whose
position in the labour market with respect to their skill is exogenously de-
termined. In contrast, the second and fourth chapters consider setups where
the labour force belongs to a single household, which guarantees consump-
tion irrespective of skill level, and unskilled labour can endogenously acquire
skills to become skilled.
Chapter 1 presents a detailed numerical analysis of the e¤ects of op-
timal scal policy in an economy where the households are heterogeneous
with respect to their labour and capital income. The production structure
is characterised by a CES function allowing for capital, skilled and unskilled
labour. In this setup, optimal scal policy in the long-run implies a non-
zero and positive tax rate on capital income together with highly progressive
labour income taxes. Moreover, the level of the optimal tax rate on capital in-
come and the progressivity of labour income taxes are sensitive to the weight
placed on the skilled agents in the objective function of the government.
Chapter 2 analyses optimal factor income taxation when there are di¤er-
ent returns to skilled and unskilled workers, who belong to the same house-
hold, and to capital in structures and equipment, under capital-skill com-
plementarity and endogenous skill acquisition. We nd that when all factor
inputs are taxed at separate rates, both capital income taxes are zero in the
long-run, there is a subsidy to education and labour income taxes are pro-
gressive. The progressivity in labour income taxes is reduced if investment in
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education cannot be subsidised, whereas if the government can only impose
a single labour income tax, the tax on income from capital equipment will
be non-zero. These results remain valid even if the government is restricted
to satisfy a given level of debt to output ratio, although with welfare losses.
Finally, we show that the transitional dynamics of the scal instruments from
the exogenous to optimal taxation are not a¤ected by the restrictions to the
scal policy menu.
Chapter 3 examines how income taxes are optimally distributed over the
business cycle in a model with high, middle and low income households when
the government is restricted to balance its budget in each period. The nd-
ings of an empirically relevant model indicate that under optimal scal policy
the income tax rate of the high income households has the lowest volatility
and the income tax rate of the low income households exhibits the lowest
counter-cyclicality. If the scal policy menu also includes a consumption tax,
the progressivity of the income tax rates is even higher and the results re-
garding the volatilities of the income taxes are overturned. We further nd
that the progressivity of the income tax rates is optimally increased after an
output-enhancing shock.
Chapter 4 undertakes a normative investigation of the quantitative prop-
erties of optimal tax smoothing in a business cycle model with state con-
tingent debt, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill formation and
stochastic shocks to public consumption, as well as total factor and capital
equipment productivity. We also examine the properties of optimal taxation
under a restriction on the debt to output ratio. Our main nding is that, an
empirically relevant restriction which does not allow the relative supply of
skilled labour to adjust in response to aggregate shocks, signicantly changes
the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes. This result remains valid even
in the presence of a budget rule that restricts the debt to output ratio. We
show that the key to understanding this result is that the government nds
it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates to alter the average net returns
to skilled and unskilled labour hours.
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Preface
This thesis examines optimal scal policy in general equilibrium models with
agents that di¤er regarding their skills and with capital-skill complementar-
ity in the production process. The importance of the skill premium (wage
inequality) and capital-skill complementarity is well documented in the lit-
erature. For example, Goldin and Katz (2008) have emphasized that wage
inequality since 1980 has increased to levels not seen since 1910 and that
capital-skill complementarity is an accurate way to characterize production
over the 20th century (see also Hornstein et al. (2005) and Krusell et al.
(2000)). Each chapter aims to contribute to a particular question in the
optimal scal policy literature. Chapter 1 examines the optimal long-run
value of capital income tax in a model with capital-skill complementarity
and households that di¤er regarding their skill and their holdings of capi-
tal. Chapter 2 assesses optimal scal policy under restrictions to scal policy
menu when there is endogenous skill acquisition. Chapter 3 examines optimal
income taxation over the business cycle under an empirically relevant model
with three types of households and two types of labour. Finally, Chapter
4 introduces state contingent debt and endogenous skill formation to assess
optimal tax smoothing over the business cycle.
The rst chapter extends Judds (1985) model by assuming that house-
holds are heterogeneous regarding their labour skills, (i.e. there are skilled
and unskilled workers). Following Krusell et al. (2000), the production
function incorporates capital-skill complementarity. Although both types
of households can save, following the literature on income inequality (see e.g.
Aghion and Howitt, 1998) it is further assumed that capital market imperfec-
tions exist due to intermediation costs in capital transactions and that these
di¤er for the two types of households. This introduces an additional source
of heterogeneity between the two types of agents, in the form of di¤erences
in capital holdings.
We nd that under optimal scal policy a government that wants to
maximize the aggregate welfare of the economy should impose a positive
optimal capital income tax rate together with progressive labour income tax
1
rates. In this way, the government is able to redistribute income e¢ ciently.
We also nd that imperfect capital markets are the main driving force for
the positive optimal tax rate on capital income. However, when capital-skill
complementarity is present and the government cannot impose two di¤erent
labour income tax rates, the optimal capital income tax is positive even with
perfect capital markets. Since skilled labour and capital are complements, a
lower stock of capital, due to the positive capital income tax rate, reduces the
demand for skilled labour and so lowers their pre-tax wage rate. Also, since
unskilled labour are substitutes for capital and skilled labour, its wage rate
increases causing a reduction in income inequality. These results are in line
with the ndings in Correia (1996) which state that under an incomplete set
of tax instruments, the optimal capital income tax is non-zero in the long-
run. Moreover, the results of this chapter are also consistent with the results
of Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999) which show that when there
is an imperfection in capital and/or labour markets then the zero capital
income tax may not be obtained in the long-run.
The rst chapter complements the literature of optimal scal policy by
showing that when agents face di¤erent costs in accessing the capital market
and when capital-skill complementarity is present, the optimal tax rate on
capital income is positive and labour income taxation is progressive for a
reasonable calibration. In addition, optimal scal policy is Pareto e¢ cient,
leading to higher welfare for each type of agent compared with the exogenous
scal policy case. These results maintain when the government optimally
chooses the level of consumption together with the tax rates, as in Judd
(1985). Moreover, the optimal capital income tax rate remains non-zero
even if the government is not Utilitarian, as in Chari and Kehoe (1999).
In the second chapter, we examine optimal factor income taxation in an
environment with di¤erent skilled and unskilled labour services, endogenous
skill creation, and production exhibiting capital-skill complementarity. We
work with a representative agent framework, which allows us to focus on
aggregate e¢ ciency and abstract from potential equity considerations for op-
timal taxation. We assume that a representative household decides how to
allocate its investment in the two types of capital stock and in creating skilled
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labour within the same period. Moreover, the representative household de-
cides how to allocate its time endowment into leisure, labour supply in skilled
and unskilled jobs, and in creating skill labour. Therefore, the model allows
for endogenous skill acquisition. In this framework, we derive optimal tax
policy under di¤erent scenarios regarding the policy menu available to the
government and, in particular, which tax instruments are available as well as
whether there are restrictions on issuing debt.
Our ndings indicate that when the government can issue debt and can
tax the di¤erent types of labour and capital income, as well as investment
in education, at separate rates: (i) both capital income taxes are zero in the
long-run; and (ii) there is a subsidy to education; and (iii) labour income
taxation is progressive. This optimal policy results in a minor reduction in
the skill premium compared with the data average. These results remain
the same if the government can use a single tax for income from capital in
structures and equipment.
When scal policy menu is restricted with respect to access to an edu-
cation subsidy we nd that: (i) the progressivity in labour income taxation
falls relative to the benchmark case; and (ii) capital income taxation is still
zero. However, when the government has access to education subsidy but
cannot tax income from skilled and unskilled labour separately, we nd that
while the tax on income from structures remains zero in the long-run, there
is a small positive tax on equipment capital. Finally, if the government can
only implement a single labour income tax, without having access to educa-
tion subsidies, the equipment tax becomes again positive but at a lower rate
compared to the case with education subsidy and a single labour income tax.
The transition paths of the policy instruments from the exogenous scal
policy to optimal scal policy regime are qualitatively similar in each case
that we study. Our optimal policy ndings are also similar if we restrict
government debt by imposing a budget rule that requires that the debt to
output ratio remains xed at the data average. The restriction does imply,
however, a reduction in the progressivity of optimal labour income taxes.
In the third chapter we develop a model with three types of households
that are divided with respect to their income into low, middle and high. In
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addition, we have two labour markets, for skilled and unskilled labour, and
we further assume that there are barriers that prevent agents from partici-
pating in both labour markets. In particular, we assume that high income
households provide skilled labour, where skilled agents are those with a col-
lege degree or relevant professional qualication. The middle and low income
households are assumed to provide unskilled labour, i.e. those without a col-
lege degree. Following Katz and Murphy (1992) and Krusell et al. (2000), we
assume that the skill premium is driven by skill-biased technical change and
capital-skill complementarities. Specically, we assume that the production
process follows the technology specied in Krusell et al. (2000).
The assumed capital market imperfections in our model imply that house-
holds di¤er with respect to their participation in the asset markets. Following
the contributions of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and Galí
et al. (2007), we assume that a subset of the households does not have any
savings and thus earns only labour income, which it totally consumes. We
further assume that these households o¤er unskilled labour services, so that
the three types of households in the economy are dened as, high income
skilled agents who own assets, middle income unskilled agents who also own
assets and low income unskilled agents who do not have access to the capital
market.
Using an empirically relevant model we assess the properties of optimal
income tax rates over the business cycle. Moreover, we extend the set of
scal instruments by allowing the government to optimally choose a con-
sumption tax rate on top of the three income tax rates with the balanced
budget restriction. We nd that the cyclical properties of the income taxes
di¤er signicantly with each other and with those observed in the data. As
expected, given the balanced budget restriction and the instruments avail-
able to the government, the tax rates are generally more volatile and more
counter-cyclical than in the data. The overall counter-cyclicality of the taxes
is driven by the balanced budget restriction because under a negative shock
to the economy, output decreases and also capital and labour decrease, caus-
ing a reduction to labour and capital income and as a result the tax revenues
decrease. Thus, the government needs to increase taxation to be able to
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nance its expenditures.
However, there are also important di¤erences between the tax rates.
These result from the trade-o¤ that the government faces when deciding how
to distribute the distortions reected by the higher volatility and counter-
cyclicality of the three tax rates over the business cycle. We nd that optimal
policy resolves this trade-o¤ by keeping the lowest volatility for the tax rate
for skilled and the lowest counter-cyclicality for the hand-to-mouth house-
holds. In contrast, the middle income group, made up by unskilled house-
holds with savings, receives very volatile and very counter-cyclical taxes. For
the case where we also introduce the consumption tax we can see that most
of the aforementioned results are preserved apart from the volatility of the
income taxes. In this case we nd that the unskilled agents that are able to
save have the most volatile income tax, whereas the hand-to-mouth agents
have the smoothest income tax.
We further analyse the optimal distribution of the tax burden in the
short- and medium-run in response to temporary output-enhancing exoge-
nous shocks. The government nds it optimal to respond to an increase in
the productivity of capital equipment and to public spending cuts by in-
creasing the progressivity of income taxes. The response to a positive total
factor productivity (TFP) shock implies that the progressivity of the tax sys-
tem increases after about two years. Finally, the aforementioned results and
behaviour of the income taxes after a temporary shock remain unchanged
with the introduction of a consumption tax that is optimally chosen by the
government.
The fourth chapter contributes to the tax smoothing literature by fo-
cusing on an economy where the labour force is divided into skilled and
unskilled workers. In particular, we examine the importance of di¤erences in
the complementarity between capital and skilled and unskilled labour as well
as the endogenous determination of the relative skill supply for Ramsey tax
policy over the business cycle. In contrast to Werning (2007), we focus on
aggregate outcomes and abstract from redistribution incentives, by following
the literature that examines a division of the labour force into two types of
workers. To this end, we work with a representative household which guar-
5
antees its members the same level of consumption (see e.g. Arseneau and
Chugh (2012)). We thus stay as close as possible to the representative agent
Ramsey analysis of Chari et al. (1994) and extend their model to allow for
capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill formation.
The purpose of this chapter is to undertake a normative investigation of
the quantitative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour income,
as well as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks
to total factor productivity, capital equipment productivity and government
spending. We further assume complete asset markets. However, to capture
the importance of endogenous versus xed relative skill supply, we also con-
sider a labour market distortion that restricts the ratio of skilled to total
workers to remain constant. Moreover, in our setup, the government can
borrow by issuing state-contingent debt, tax skill acquisition expenditure,
capital, skilled and unskilled labour income separately, to nance exogenous
public spending.
Our main nding is that under capital-skill complementarity, a friction
that does not allow the relative supply of skill to adjust in response to aggre-
gate shocks, signicantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. In particular, we rst show that under endogenous relative skill sup-
ply, the optimal labour taxes for both skilled and unskilled labour income are
very smooth, with the volatility of the unskilled income tax being marginally
higher. We also nd that the skilled tax moves pro-cyclically with output
and the unskilled tax is mildly counter-cyclical.
However, when the relative skill supply is constrained to remain constant
over the business cycle, the prescriptions for optimal policy markedly change.
In particular, we nd that the volatility of taxes increases signicantly, so
that the standard deviation of the e¤ective average labour income tax is
about twelve times higher than the perfect labour markets case, while the
volatility of the skilled labour income tax is about two-and-a-half times higher
than that of the unskilled labour income tax. Moreover, both taxes become
strongly counter-cyclical. We show that these changes are driven from the
fact that the government nds it optimal to minimise the e¤ects of the rel-
ative labour supply distortion by keeping the marginal rates of substitution
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between leisure and consumption for the two types of labour at roughly the
same levels as under a fully exible labour market.
Our results further show that the skill heterogeneity considered, irrespec-
tive of the presence of the labour market friction, does not a¤ect the results
obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset taxes. We
also nd that the skill-acquisition tax is the least smooth of the non-asset
tax instruments when debt is state-contingent and uctuates nearly as much
as output. In addition, irrespective of the model variant examined, all of
the policy instruments, except for the ex post capital tax and the private
assets tax inherit the persistence properties of the shocks. Finally, we nd
that our main results are robust to the introduction of a budget rule, where
the government must satisfy a given level of debt to output ratio over the
business cycle.
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Chapter 1: Optimal scal policy under skill
heterogeneity and capital-skill complemen-
tarity
Abstract: This chapter presents a detailed discussion and empirical exami-
nation of the e¤ects of optimal scal policy in an economy where the agents
are heterogeneous with respect to their labour skills and capital holdings. It
is further assumed that capital-skill complementarity is present. The ndings
indicate that, under these characteristics, the optimal scal policy suggests
a non-zero and positive tax rate on capital income together with highly pro-
gressive labour income tax rates. By further analysing the model it is found
that the driving force of the positive optimal tax rate on capital income is
the heterogeneity in capital holdings. However, the e¤ectiveness of the pro-
gressive labour income tax rates in reducing income inequality depends on
the presence of capital-skill complementarity. In addition, we nd that these
results remain robust in the case where the government doesnt need to sat-
isfy a given level of consumption. Finally, we show that, under a Partisan
government, the level of the optimal tax rate on capital income is sensitive
to the weight placed on the skilled agents in the objective function of the
government and the progressivity of labour income tax rate is overturned. In
particular, the latter becomes regressive when the weight placed on skilled
agents exceeds a threshold value.
1.1 Introduction
The question of whether or not capital should be taxed in the long-run is
of great interest and has been the focal point of numerous studies in the
eld of optimal scal policy. Using a neoclassical growth model Judd (1985),
assuming two types of agents (capitalists and workers), and Chamley (1986),
in a representative agent setup, are the rst to show that under optimal
scal policy a government should not tax capital income in the long-run.
In particular, Judd (1985) shows that the zero capital income tax rate is
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independent of the weight attached to a certain group of agents from the
government in its objective function. Moreover, Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986) state that their result does not depend on the governments ability to
lend or borrow.
Following the seminal papers of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) there
has been a growing literature concentrating on identifying the assumptions
under which the result of zero optimal tax rate on capital income does not
hold. For instance, Judd (1997) adds imperfectly competitive product mar-
kets and he shows that, under this setup, the optimal tax rate on capital
income is negative. The government uses a subsidy on capital income to
compensate for the loss of output and capital in the economy from the mo-
nopolistic competition.
Guo and Lansing (1999) extend Judds work to include depreciation of
physical capital and a tax allowance together with endogenous government
expenditures. They show that the optimal capital income tax rate in this
case can take any sign.1 In another study, Conesa et al. (2009) nd a positive
optimal capital income tax rate using a model with endogenous labour supply
together with life-cycle elements that can generate a labour supply that varies
with age. They also show that the magnitude of the optimal tax rate on
capital income is mainly a¤ected by the elasticity of labour supply.2
Furthermore, optimal scal policy and its inuence on income redistri-
bution and welfare can depend on the presence of skill heterogeneity and
whether the production function exhibits capital-skill complementarities.3
In particular, Conesa et al. (2009) show that the presence of skill hetero-
geneity will lead to highly progressive labour income tax rates. Note that
1In particular, they show that the sign of the optimal capital income tax rate depends
on the degree of monopoly power, the tax rate on monopoly prots, the magnitude of
government expenditures and the magnitude of the depreciation allowance.
2It is also shown that under optimal scal policy, the capital income tax rate will be
non-zero in the long-run if the government is not able to commit to its policies (see e.g.
Klein et al., 2008). Also, Lansing (1999), using a similar model to Judd (1985) but with
logarithmic utility function, states that optimal capital income tax rate is non-zero. That
happens because due to the logarithmic utility function, agentssavings decisions are not
a¤ected by future policies promised by the government.
3In particular, it is assumed that skilled agents are those with at least a college degree
or a similar professional qualication.
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when capital-skill complementarity is present it is assumed that unskilled
agents are substitutes to both capital equipment and skilled agents, and that
skilled agents and capital equipment are complements of each other.
The capital-skill complementarity hypothesis has been shown in the liter-
ature (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al., 2000 and Hornstein
et al., 2005) to explain most of the movements in the skill premium in the
U.S. for the last three decades.4 Moreover, the capital-skill complementarity
assumption creates an additional channel through which the optimal scal
policy can redistribute income and increase overall welfare.
For instance, in the case where returns to skill are exogenously deter-
mined, the central planner can only redistribute income through higher tax-
ation of those agents in higher income brackets. When combined with the
fact that agents with higher labour return hold more capital, this model
shows that an increase in the tax rate of skilled agents will also result in a
reduction of capital accumulation. This has two knock-on e¤ects. Firstly,
there is an increase in the returns of unskilled agents and secondly the skill
premium declines. Under this setup, optimal scal policy is more e¤ective in
terms of income redistribution.
Taking the above into consideration, Judds (1985) model will be extended
in this chapter by assuming that agents are heterogeneous regarding their
labour skills.5 Moreover, building on Judd (1985), it is further assumed
that both types of agents can save and work. Then, following Krusell et
al. (2000), the production function will be extended to incorporate capital-
skill complementarity. This way the calibrated model can replicate the wage
premium and factor input elasticities suggested in the literature.
In addition, following the literature on income inequality (see e.g. Aghion
and Howitt, 1998) it is further assumed that capital market imperfections
are present due to di¤erent intermediation costs in capital transactions for
the two types of agents. This will introduce an additional source of hetero-
geneity between the two types of agents, the capital holdings heterogeneity.6
4The skill premium is dened as the ratio of the wage rate of skilled relative to unskilled
agents.
5Two types of agents will be assumed, skilled and unskilled agents.
6Note that it is also assumed that wealth and wage inequality always in the same
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Through this feature the model is able to generate heterogeneity in savings
as it is observed in the UK data. Thus, the model in this chapter is calibrated
to the UK economy.
After calibrating the model to replicate the key great-ratios as well as
the skill premium of the UK economy, the long-run solution is obtained by
initially assuming an exogenous scal policy. Afterwards, the assumption
of the exogenous scal policy is dropped and the steady-state results are
obtained in the case of an endogenously determined scal policy (optimal
scal policy), keeping the same calibration as in the exogenous case. The
results show that under optimal scal policy a government that wants to
maximize the aggregate welfare of the economy should impose a positive
optimal capital income tax rate together with progressive labour income tax
rates. In this way, the government is able to redistribute income e¢ ciently.
Various versions of the model are examined to understand the main
driving force(s) behind the positive optimal tax rate on capital income and
the increase in the progressive nature of labour income tax under this setup.
We nd that imperfect capital markets are the main driving force of the
positive optimal tax rate on capital income. However, when capital-skill
complementarity is present and the government cannot impose two di¤erent
labour income tax rates, the optimal tax rate on capital income will be pos-
itive even with perfect capital markets. This occurs because skilled agents
and capital are complements meaning that a lower stock of capital, due to
the positive capital income tax rate, will reduce the demand for skilled agents
and so lower their pre-tax wage rate. Also, since unskilled agents are sub-
stitutes for capital and skilled agents, their wage rate will increase causing a
reduction in income inequality.
These results are in line with the argument of Correia (1996) that under
an incomplete set of tax instruments, or in other words when there is not a
tax instrument for each input in the production process, the capital income
tax may be non-zero in the long-run under optimal scal policy. Moreover,
the results of this chapter verify the results of Judd (1997) and Guo and
direction. This is also suggested by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data that Garcia-
Mila et al. (2010) analyse.
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Lansing (1999) which show that when there is an imperfection in capital
and/or labour markets then the zero capital income tax may not be obtained.
A detailed analysis of the e¤ect of optimal scal policy on income redis-
tribution is provided as well as the interaction with various elements of the
model. The results suggest that the key characteristic of the model that al-
lows optimal scal policy to redistribute income e¢ ciently is the capital-skill
complementarity. In its absence, the optimal scal policy will increase skilled
agentsshare of total income and thus cause the income inequality to widen.
The e¤ect of capital-skill complementarity together with capital market
imperfection on optimal scal policy outcome has not been assessed before
in the literature in a systematic way. Therefore, this chapter complements
the literature of optimal scal policy in that when agents face di¤erent costs
in accessing the capital market and when capital-skill complementarity is
present the optimal tax rate on capital income will be positive, the labour
income taxes will be progressive and the government can redistribute income
e¢ ciently. In addition, under the current setup, the optimal scal policy will
be Pareto e¢ cient, leading to higher welfare for each type of agent compared
with the exogenous scal policy case.
The above results are robust even in the case where the government
doesnt need to choose its tax rates so as to satisfy a given level of con-
sumption/ expenditure, as in Judd (1985). Moreover, the optimal capital
income tax rate remains non-zero even if the government places more weight
to skilled agents, who are the majority of the population, as in Chari and
Kehoe (1999).
The chapter is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the
benchmark model. Section 3 describes the calibration of the parameters. Sec-
tion 4 shows the steady-state solution of the exogenous scal policy. Section
5 outlines the optimal scal problem and its solution. Section 6 compares
the results of the exogenous and optimal scal policy. Section 7 provides a
detailed assessment of optimal scal policy outcome. Section 8 provides a
welfare and income inequality analysis. Section 9 discuss the main results.
Sections 10 and 11 compare the models with and without capita-skill comple-
mentarity. Section 12 provides a discussion when government expenditures
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are endogenous. Section 13 contains a model comparison with respect to
income inequality. Section 14 includes a case study when government places
more weight to a certain group of agents. Section 15 provides the concluding
remarks of the chapter.
1.2 The model
The model economy has a large number of two types of innitely-lived identi-
cal households who own capital and rent it to rms. Each type of household
has either skilled workers or unskilled workers that are able to save. The
size of the overall population, N , is assumed to be constant. The popula-
tion of the identical skilled workers is Ns and the population of the unskilled
workers is Nu, such that N = Ns + Nu. For simplicity it is dened that the
share of skilled agents is ns = Ns=N , and the share of the unskilled agents
is nu = Nu=N , where 1 = ns + nu. In addition, there is a large number of
identical rms and a government. In each period, households are price takers
and make decisions regarding how much to consume, work and save. Firms
act competitively and use capital together with the two types of labour to
produce a homogeneous consumption good. Government, on the other hand,
runs a balanced budget and imposes capital and labour income tax rates. The
government uses the revenue from these taxes to nance public consumption,
which has a direct impact on householdsutility.
1.2.1 Firms
All rms produce a homogeneous consumption good, Yt, using labour and
capital, and act in perfectly competitive markets, taking prices and policy
variables as given:
t = Yt   ws;thfs;t   wu;thfu;t   req;tKeq;t   rst;tKst;t (1)
subject to Krusell et al. (2000) type of production function:
Yt = AtK
ac
st;t
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where
a; ;  2 (0; 1) ; ';  2 ( 1; 1) .
Also, hfs;t and hfu;t denote the hours worked by skilled and unskilled
labour respectively. Aeq;t denotes the e¢ ciency level of capital equipment
and At is total factor productivity. Kst;t and Keq;t denote the stock of capital
structures and capital equipment respectively at the beginning of period t.
The elasticity of substitution between unskilled labour and skilled labour
is equal to the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labour and capital
equipment, (1=(1   ')). Whereas, the elasticity of substitution between
skilled labour and capital equipment is (1=(1  )). In addition, the income
share of capital structures is c, while the income share of capital equipment,
skilled and unskilled labour is determined by  and .
Under this setup the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is present
only when ' > . If ' or  equals zero the CES production function will
simplied to a Cobb-Douglas representation.7
Using the above production function and the fact that factors are being
paid their marginal products (perfect competition), the skill premium can
be written as the ratio of the two marginal products of skilled workers over
unskilled workers as:
wst
wut
=
(1  )
(1  )



Aeq;tKeq;t
hfs;t

+ (1  )
(' )=
hfu;t
hfs;t
1 '
. (3)
If capital-skill complementarity hypothesis is present (' > ) an increase
in capital equipment, ceteris paribus, will increase the skill premium. This
is called, following Krusell et al. (2000), "the capital-skill complementarity
e¤ect". In addition, if the ratio of unskilled to skilled labour increases the skill
premium will increase as well, again assuming all the other factors remain
constant. This is called by Krusell et al. (2000) "the relative supply e¤ect".
Both of the productivity shocks, Aeq;t and At, are assumed to follow
7If ';  = 1 there is perfect substitutability and if ';  =  1 there is perfect comple-
mentarity.
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exogenous AR(1) processes with zero mean, constant variance and covariance
equal to zero.
The law of motion for aggregate capital stock for the two types of agents,
j = s; u where s and u denote skilled and unskilled agents respectively, is:
Kji;t+1 = (1  i)Kji;t + Iji;t (4)
note that i = st; eq, where st and eq denote capital structures and capital
equipment respectively. The depreciation rate is 0  i  1 and Iji;t is the
aggregate investment in new capital i for the agent of type j.
1.2.2 Households
The representative household j 2 fs; ug in each period maximizes its ex-
pected lifetime utility:
Uj = Et
1X
i=t
iu(Cj;i; lj;i) (5)
where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor and denotes the time preference
of the individual; Cj;i and lj;i are total e¤ective consumption and leisure
respectively at period i for the agent of type j; and u() is the utility function
that is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously di¤erentiable
with respect to its inputs.
Moreover, it is assumed that the e¤ective consumption has the following
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representation:
Cj;t =
h
aCj;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
i1=
(6)
where Cj;t is private consumption for agent of type j and
_
G
c
t is the aver-
age public consumption share of a representative agent (
_
G
c
t = G
c
t=N), which
households take as given. Also, a and 1   a are the share parameters on
e¤ective consumption (0 < a < 1) of private and public consumption re-
spectively and 1=(1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between public and
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private consumption.8
Utility function The utility function applied is the following non-separable
utility function:
u(Cj;t; lj;t) =
  
Cj;t

l1 j;t
(1 )
1   (7)
where   0 represents the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and , 1  
 ( 2 (0; 1)) are the relative shares on utility of e¤ective consumption
and leisure respectively. Moreover, 1= is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of e¤ective consumption in any two periods. Therefore, the
larger the elasticity, which means the smaller , the more willing is the
individual to substitute consumption for leisure over time.
Budget constraint Each type of household faces the following time con-
straint:
1 = lj;t + hj;t (8)
where hj;t is the amount worked in period t from agent of type j. The above
equation states the fact that in each period households split their endowment
of time between leisure and work. In this case it is normalized that the
endowment in each period is equal to one.
In addition, the two types of household j have the following budget con-
straint:
Cj;t + I
j
i;t = (1  wj;t)wj;thj;t    j
h 
Kjst;t
2
+
 
Kjeq;t
2i
+ (9)
+(1   rt )
 
rst;tK
j
st;t + req;tK
j
eq;t

where  j > 0 captures the transaction costs of holding capital for each type
of household. Therefore,  j can be interpreted as a form of imperfection in
capital markets and may be due to cost of information in legal issues or gov-
ernment regulations or even fees that need to be paid to intermediates. The
transaction costs are being introduced to capture the heterogeneity among
8Note that CES representation can be transformed to a linear specication if  = 1.
In the case where ! 0 it will be transformed into a Cobb-Douglas specication.
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the two types of agents in asset holdings, following Aghion and Howitt (1998).
In addition, wj;t and 
r
t are the tax rates on labour income for each type of
agent and on income from capital in period t.9 Therefore, the rst term on
the right-hand side of the above equation is the after tax return from labour
and the last two terms represent the cost of holding capital and the after tax
capital income.
1.2.3 The government budget constraint
The government runs a balanced budget in every period which is given by:
_
G
c
t = ns
 
ws;tws;thst

+ nu
 
wu;twu;thu;t

+ (10)
+ rt (rst;tKst;t + req;tKeq;t) .
The above equation assumes that the revenues from taxes are being used
to nance public consumption/expenditures. Under the exogenous scal pol-
icy regime, the governments policy instruments (tax rates on capital and
labour income) are calibrated and given for any period t. The long-run value
of government consumption,
_
G
c
t , follows residually after the realization of the
shocks.
1.2.4 Aggregate resource constraint and market clearing
It is further assumed that output can be used only for consumption (private
and public) and for investment. That gives the following aggregate resource
constraint:
NYt = N
_
G
c
t +NsCs;t +NuCu;t +Ns
 
Ists;t + I
eq
s;t

+Nu
 
Istu;t + I
eq
u;t

+
+Ns s
h 
Ksst;t
2
+
 
Kseq;t
2i
+Nu u
h 
Kust;t
2
+
 
Kueq;t
2i
9It is assumed that capital is owned by households and is rented out to rms. This
assumption makes the rms maximization problem static and as a result much easier to
deal with.
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or after replacing equation (4):
Yt = ns
 
Ksst;t+1   (1  st)Ksst;t +Kseq;t+1   (1  eq)Kseq;t

+ (11)
+nsCs;t + nuCu;t +
_
G
c
t +
+nu
 
Kust;t+1   (1  st)Kust;t +Kueq;t+1   (1  eq)Kueq;t

+
+ns s
h 
Ksst;t
2
+
 
Kseq;t
2i
+ nu u
h 
Kust;t
2
+
 
Kueq;t
2i
Also, it should be noted that the following market clearing conditions
exist in the labour market:
hfs = nshs (12)
hfu = nuhu (13)
and in the capital market:
Ki;t = nsK
s
i;t + nuK
u
i;t (14)
where Ns=N = ns and Nu=N = nu are the relevant shares of population of
skilled and unskilled agents respectively.
The labour market clearing conditions show that the labour demanded
by rms is equal to the labour supplied by households. Also, the capital
market clearing condition shows that the stock of capital structures and
capital equipment rented by rms is held entirely by skilled and unskilled
agents.
1.3 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given an initial level of capital stock for structures (Kst;0) and equipment
(Keq;0), the three policy instruments (ws;t, 
w
u;t, 
r
t ) and the exogenously set
of stationary AR processes, the DCE system of equations is characterized
by a sequence of allocations fCj;t; hj;t; Kjst;t+1; Kjeq;t+1; Ytg1t=0, prices fwj;t;
rst;t; req;tg1t=0, and the remaining policy instrument f
_
G
c
tg1t=0 such that: (i)
households maximize their welfare and rms their prots, taking policy and
prices as given; (ii) government budget constraint is satised in each time
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period; (iii) all markets clear.10
1.4 Calibration
The model is calibrated according to the UK economy for the period 1960-
2010. The sources that have been used to obtain the data for the UK economy
are: the OECD, ECFIN, World Bank, Labour Force Survey and the O¢ ce
for National Statistics.
Initially, following the data obtained from the Labour Force Survey (Quar-
ter 4, 2010), we make the assumption that 60% of the population is skilled,
which means that they have obtained at least a college degree or similar
professional qualication. Therefore, the share of skilled agents, ns, is set
equal to 0.6 and the relevant share of unskilled agents, nu, is set equal to
0.4. Moreover, the model assumes that skilled agents earn on average more
income than the unskilled agents. As a result, following the Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings from the O¢ ce for National Statistics, the ratio of
the income of the upper 60% of the population over the income of the lower
40% of the population for the UK economy is equal to 1.41. But since it is
assumed that the agents with higher wealth are the skilled agents, it can be
stated that the skill premium, which is determined as the ratio of the skilled
agentswage rate to the unskilled agentswage rate, is also equal to 1.41.
This is consistent with other studies that also report the skill premium of
the UK (see e.g. Machin, 1996 and Angelopoulos et al., 2012a).
The cost of capital holdings for the unskilled agents,  u, is set two times
higher than the relevant cost for the skilled agents,  s, to replicate the wealth
distribution observed in the data. This way the high-income agents (skilled
agents) can hold two times more capital than the low-income agents (un-
skilled agents). This result is also consistent with the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) data, as Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) report. Note that the
magnitude of the cost of capital holdings is calibrated so that the capital to
output ratio observed in the data can be replicated, given the value of the
depreciation rate and the rate of time preference.
10The DCE system of equations can be found in the Appendix A.
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The parameters of the production function, ac, , ',  and  a¤ect the
level of the skill premium through the returns to capital equipment, capital
structures, skilled and unskilled labour, together with the complementarity
between the four factors. For the calibration of those parameters we follow
the works of Krusell et al. (2000) and Lindquist (2004) and as a result the
elasticity of capital equipment to skilled labour, 1=(1   ), is set equal to
0.67 and the elasticity of capital equipment to unskilled labour, 1=(1   '),
is set equal to 1.67.11 Meaning that  = 0:401 and  =  0:495 and also
that skilled agents are more complementary with capital equipment than
the unskilled agents. Moreover, the income share of capital structures, ac,
is set equal to 0.118 and the relevant shares of composite input, , and
capital equipment at the composite input, , are set equal to 0.7 and 0.595
respectively. These parameters are consistent and within the boundaries that
the literature suggests (see Hornstein et al. (2005) for a review).
The total factor productivity parameter, At, is set equal to 1.5 with per-
sistence parameter, A, that is calibrated using data from the O¢ ce for
National Statistics (from 1998-2009) and taking into account the assumed
AR(1) process. The persistence parameter is found to be A = 0:92 (signif-
icant at 1% level) with a standard deviation equal to 0.05. The e¢ ciency
level of capital equipment is normalised to unity and data are not available
to calibrate accordingly its persistence and standard deviation.
Regarding the calibration of tax rates the OECD Statistics for the period
1970-2010 have been used and it is concluded that the average capital income
tax rate,  r, is equal to 0.44 and that the average labour income tax rate is
equal to 0.26. Since the e¤ective labour income tax rate needs to be equal to
the weighted average of the two labour income tax rates (skilled and unskilled
labour income tax rates), the skilled labour income tax rate, ws , is set equal
to 0.3, and the unskilled labour income tax rate, wu , equal to 0.2.
12
The value of the private to public consumption elasticity, , is set equal
to 0.6, which means that private and public consumption are substitutes.
11Note that Krusell et al. (2000) estimates the parameters of the production function
using a two-step version of simulated pseudo-maximum likelihood.
12Thus, 0:26 = nsws +nu
w
u , where ns and nu are the relevant shares of the population
for the skilled and unskilled agents respectively.
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Furthermore, the relative weight of private consumption, , in the compos-
ite consumption is set equal to 0.9, following the work of Baier and Glomm
(2001). The depreciation rates are calibrated so as for the model to replicate
the data average of the overall investment to output ratio for the UK. There-
fore, the depreciation rate of capital structures, s, is set equal to 0.035 and
the depreciation rate of capital equipment, e, is set equal to 0.07.
Regarding the weight of the composite consumption in utility the work
of Kydland (1995) has been followed and  is set equal to 0.34. This is equal
to the ratio of total hours of work over the total number of hours available
for either work or leisure, as obtained from the OECD database. Finally, the
value of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1=) is set equal to 0.5
( = 2) which is common in the literature.
Table 1.1: Calibration
Param. Denitions Values
s depreciation rate of capital structures 0.035
e depreciation rate of capital equipment 0.070
 time discount factor 0.976
 e¤ective consumption weight in utility 0.340
a private consumption weight on e¤ective cons. 0.900
1
1  private to public consumption elasticity 2.500
 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2.000
 s cost of holding capital (skilled) .0035
 u cost of holding capital (unskilled) 0.007
ns population share of skilled agents 0.600
nu population share of unskilled agents 0.400
c income share of capital structures 0.118
1
1  capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity 0.670
1
1 ' capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity 1.670
 income share of composite input to output 0.700
 income share of capital eq. to composite input 0.595
_

w
s average wage tax rate for skilled agents 0.300_

w
u average wage tax rate for unskilled agents 0.200_

r average tax rate on capital income 0.440
_
A constant parameter productivity 1.500
_
Aeq e¢ ciency level of capital equipment 1.000
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1.5 Exogenous scal policy
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the steady-state results when the scal policy is
exogenously determined.
Table 1.2: Exogenous steady-state results
Param. Denitions Exogen.
Ksst cap. structures skilled agents hold 0.54
Kseq cap. equipment skilled agents hold 0.85
Kust cap str. holdings of unskilled agents 0.27
Kueq cap. eq. holdings of unskilled agents 0.43
hs working time by skilled workers 0.28
hu working time by unskilled workers 0.29
Cs consumption of skilled agents 0.23
Cu consumption of unskilled agents 0.18
Y output 0.42
_
G
c
government spending 0.14
 r tax rate of returns on capital 0.44
ws wage tax rate of skilled agents 0.30
wu wage tax rate of unskilled agents 0.20
rst pre-tax returns on capital structures 0.11
req pre-tax returns on capital equipment 0.18
ws pre-tax wage rate of skilled agents 0.96
wu pre-tax wage rate of unskilled agents 0.68
ws=wu pre-tax skill premium 1.41
(1 ws )ws
(1 wu )wu after-tax skill premium 1.23
Table 1.4 includes the results from the data averages and the relevant
results from the calibrated model for the great ratios. The calibrated model
is able to replicate with accuracy the capital to output ratio and the skill
premium. Also, at the same time the model is able to match the data for
the UK for the investment to output ratio and government expenditures to
output ratio.
1.6 Optimal scal policy
Under optimal scal policy the policy instruments are no longer exogenously
determined. The government chooses optimally the level of labour and cap-
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Table 1.3: Great ratios and welfare
Param. Denitions Exogen.
Ksst=Y K
s
st over output 0.78
Kseq=Y K
s
eq over output 1.22
Kust=Y K
u
st over output 0.26
Kueq=Y K
u
eq over output 0.41
Cs=Y cons. of skilled ag. over output 0.33
Cu=Y cons. of unskilled ag. over output 0.17
_
G
c
=Y government spending over output 0.34
Isst=Y investment on K
s
st over Y 0.03
Iseq=Y investment on K
s
eq over Y 0.09
Iust=Y investment on K
u
st over Y 0.01
Iueq=Y investment on K
u
eq over Y 0.03
U average lifetime welfare13 -90.01
U s s.s. welfare of skilled agent -86.88
Uu s.s. welfare of unskilled agent -94.71
Table 1.4: Great ratios and skill premium
Param. Denitions Data Model
K=Y capital to output 2.67 2.67
C=Y consumption to output 0.62 0.51
I=Y investment to output 0.15 0.15
G=Y government cons. to output 0.38 0.34
ws=wu pre-tax skill premium 1.41 1.41
ital income tax rates to achieve a maximum aggregate welfare of the two
types of agents. Early studies, such as Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986),
have shown that under optimal scal policy capital income tax rate should
be zero in the long-run. To obtain these results government must commit
to its policies and not re-optimise in the future, otherwise the equilibrium
outcome from the optimal scal policy is not sustainable.14
Therefore, in this section it is assumed that the government choose and
commits to a policy at t = 0 and it does not re-optimise in the future. Then
the agents and rms form their decisions taking into account governments
14Note that the assumptions made in the previous section regarding the agents, rms,
governments budget constraint and market clearing conditions continue to apply in this
section.
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policy. As a result, the government will take its decision of optimal taxation
by taking into account the DCE system of equations, as it has been presented
in the previous section and it is outlined in the Appendix A.
It is assumed that the government wants to maximize the aggregate wel-
fare of the lifetime utility of the two types of agents choosing f kt ; ws;t; wu;tgt=0
to nance its consumption, which is assumed to be constant and equal to the
exogenously determined scal policy, having the following objective function:
max
1X
t=0
t
 
nsUs
 
Cs;t; hs;t

+ nuUu
 
Cu;t; hu;t

(15)
subject to the DCE system of equations
Taking into consideration the setup of the model, as it has been outlined
earlier, the government chooses optimally the following variables Cs;t; Cu;t;
hs;t; hu;t; K
s
st;t+1; K
s
eq;t+1; K
u
st;t+1; K
u
eq;t+1; ws;t; wu;t; rst;t; req;t; Yt, plus the
three tax rates f rt ; ws;t; wu;tg.15 Note that government consumption / ex-
penditures is being targeted to be the same as in the exogenous case study.
Therefore, it is assumed that the government needs to nance its expendi-
tures through taxation without being able to borrow. This way the results
of the model are comparable with the literature (see e.g. Garcia-Mila et al.,
2010).
The dual approach is applied for obtaining the steady-state results (see
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 in the next section), taking into account the calibrated
parameters as presented in the previous section.
In addition, following Lucas (1990) the welfare gains from adopting the
optimal scal policy instead of the exogenous scal policy are being esti-
mated. Thus, we calculate the percentage of consumption that the agent
would be willing to give up while he/she is under the optimal scal policy in
order to be indi¤erent between exogenous and optimal scal policy. There-
fore, a positive value indicates that the agent is better o¤ under the optimal
15This is the dual approach of optimal scal policy and it is presented in the Appendix
A.
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scal policy.
i = 1 
 
LUEi;ss
LURi;ss
! 1
(1 )
(16)
where, i = a; s; u for aggregate economy, skilled and unskilled agents respec-
tively and ss indicates that the lifetime utility is calculated at the steady
state. Also, LU represents the lifetime welfare at the steady state. The su-
perscript on the lifetime welfare indicates the scal policy regime. So, it is
either E for the exogenous scal policy or R for optimal scal policy.16
1.7 Exogenous vs. optimal scal policy
1.7.1 Steady-state
The results from the exogenous and Ramsey policy in the long-run are given
in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. Comparing the two policies it can be seen that under
optimal scal policy the capital income tax rate is reduced. Also, the skilled
labour income tax rate has increased to balance the budget constraint and
the unskilled labour income tax rate remained relatively stable.17 Therefore,
under the current setup of the model, with capital-skill complementarity
and capital market imperfection, the optimal capital income tax rate will be
positive and equal to 6%. This result contradicts the early studies of Judd
(1985) and Chamley (1986) that suggested a zero optimal tax rate on capital
income. But as it will become clear in the next session, the positive optimal
tax rate on capital income is present under current setup due to the capital
market imperfections, as in Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999).
The systematic assessment of how optimal scal policy is a¤ected when
the economy exhibits capital market imperfection, in the form of di¤erent cost
of capital holdings, and capital-skill complementarity, is worth noting in this
chapter and contributes the related literature. Therefore, in the next section
we examine how the long-run optimal scal policy changes when there is
16Appendix A shows the derivation of equation (16).
17Note that this result is a¤ected from the assumed calibration. For instance, if unskilled
labour is less substitutable with capital then their wage tax rate will be higher than the
exogenous case, but still very close to the exogenous case.
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no capital market imperfection and/or no capital-skill complementarity and
compare these results with the literature.
It is also important to note that the assumed skill heterogeneity leads
to optimally progressive labour income tax system. As Conesa et al. (2009)
suggest, skill heterogeneity leads to higher progressivity of the labour income
tax rate. But also, under the current setup of the model, the government
can a¤ect optimally the after-tax skill premium and as a consequence labour
income inequality. Thus, the government takes into account the e¤ect of its
policies on the returns to skill and income inequality and then forms the
optimal progressive labour income tax rate.
The capital-skill complementarity assumption creates an additional chan-
nel through which the optimal scal policy can redistribute income and in-
crease overall welfare. For instance, in the case that the returns to skill are
endogenously determined and agents with higher labour return hold more
capital, an increase in the tax rate of capital income will also result in a
reduction of capital accumulation. The decrease of capital stock levels will
result in an increase of the returns to unskilled agents and also skill premium
will decline as a consequence. As a result, under this setup, optimal scal
policy is more e¤ective in terms of income redistribution.
In addition, skilled agents will keep working less than the unskilled agents
but this gap will increase and both will work less in comparison to the ex-
ogenous case due to the increase in capital holdings for both agents.
Under optimal scal policy, skilled agents will choose similar amount of
consumption as in the exogenous case and their capital holdings will increase.
On the other hand, the unskilled agents will increase both their consumption
and capital holdings. In particular, skilled agents hold the 66.7% of capital
as it was expected from the imposed calibration. Thus the capital income
distribution will remain the same as it was in the exogenous case.
Moreover, the after-tax skill premium will decrease under optimal scal
policy. This result occurs because the e¤ect from the higher progressivity of
the labour income taxes is larger than the e¤ect of the higher pre-tax wage
rates. Since the capital income distribution remains constant, due to the
exogenously determined cost of capital holdings, the change in the after-tax
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wage rates will be the main determinant of income inequality.
Therefore, now that the progressivity of labour income tax rates is endoge-
nously determined the government will choose to impose a more progressive
labour tax system to reduce income inequality.
Table 1.5: Steady-state results of exogenous and optimal scal policy
Param. Denitions Exogen. Opt. Policy
Ksst cap. structures skilled agents hold 0.54 1.00
Kseq cap. equipment skilled agents hold 0.85 1.55
Kust cap str. holdings of unskilled agents 0.27 0.50
Kueq cap. eq. holdings of unskilled agents 0.43 0.68
hs working time by skilled workers 0.28 0.25
hu working time by unskilled workers 0.29 0.28
Cs consumption of skilled agents 0.23 0.24
Cu consumption of unskilled agents 0.18 0.21
Y output 0.42 0.48
_
G
c
government spending 0.14 0.14
 r tax rate of returns on capital 0.44 0.06
ws wage tax rate of skilled agents 0.30 0.52
wu wage tax rate of unskilled agents 0.20 0.19
rst pre-tax returns on capital structures 0.11 0.07
req pre-tax returns on capital equipment 0.18 0.11
ws pre-tax wage rate of skilled agents 0.96 1.41
wu pre-tax wage rate of unskilled agents 0.68 0.78
ws=wu skill premium 1.41 1.81
(1 ws )ws
(1 wu )wu after-tax skill premium 1.23 1.06
Therefore, the reduction of the capital income tax rate causes an increase
in the total stock of capital through an increase in investment. The increase
in the stock of capital will have a positive e¤ect on output. Moreover, since it
has been assumed that skilled agents are more complementary with capital
equipment than the unskilled agents, the increase in the stock of capital
equipment will cause an increase in the demand for skilled labour. This in
turn will cause an increase in the pre-tax wage rate for skilled agents and
as a result there will be greater disparity between the skilled and unskilled
agentspre-tax wage rates. This is the reason for obtaining a higher pre-tax
skill premium under the optimal scal policy case study than the exogenous
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Table 1.6: Great ratios and welfare under exogenous and optimal scal policy
Param. Denitions Exogen. Opt. policy
Ksst=Y K
s
st over output 0.78 1.24
Kseq=Y K
s
eq over output 1.22 1.68
Kust=Y K
u
st over output 0.26 0.41
Kueq=Y K
u
eq over output 0.41 0.56
Cs=Y cons. of skilled ag. over output 0.33 0.30
Cu=Y cons. of unskilled ag. over output 0.17 0.18
_
G
c
=Y government spending over output 0.34 0.30
Isst=Y investment on K
s
st over Y 0.03 0.04
Iseq=Y investment on K
s
eq over Y 0.09 0.12
Iust=Y investment on K
u
st over Y 0.01 0.02
Iueq=Y investment on K
u
eq over Y 0.03 0.04
W aggregate lifetime welfare -90.01 -85.73
W s s.s. welfare of skilled agent -86.88 -83.60
W u s.s. welfare of unskilled agent -94.71 -88.93
a - - 13.34%
s - - 10.69%
u - - 16.90%
scal policy case study.
1.8 Comparison of welfare and income inequality
The welfare for both types of agents will increase under optimal scal policy
due to the increase in consumption and the decrease in working hours for
both agents. Therefore, the optimal scal policy under this setup is Pareto
improving since both agents are better o¤ than the exogenous case.
The last three rows of Table 1.6 report the percentage of consumption that
the agent would be willing to give up under the optimal scal policy in order
to be indi¤erent between the two policies. The results report that skilled
agents are willing to give up 10.7% of their consumption before returning
to the exogenous scal policy. Unskilled agents, on the other hand, are
willing to give up 16.9% of their consumption. Both percentages are positive
meaning that both agents are better o¤under optimal scal policy. Also, the
optimal scal policy regime is more benecial for the unskilled agents than
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the skilled agents because they are willing to give up almost 6% more from
their consumption than the skilled agents so as to be indi¤erent between the
two policy regimes (u > s).
Moreover, it can be examined how income inequality is a¤ected between
the two cases. For the income inequality analysis the two representative
agents are being used and it is examined how the available income is split
among them. In the exogenous case the representative skilled agents share
of total after-tax income is 58.5%.18
This can be split to labour income share and capital income share. Note
that both agents have the same returns to capital and the same capital income
tax rate. Since capital holdings for skilled agents are twice as much as the
unskilled agents, due to the exogenous cost of capital holdings, the after-tax
capital income ratio between skilled and unskilled agents will always be equal
to 2. Meaning that skilled agents will always hold 2/3 of total capital income.
This result will hold for both the exogenous scal policy and optimal scal
policy.
Therefore, the after-tax labour income share (which is equivalent to the
after-tax skill premium) will be the important factor for determining the
overall income share of skilled and unskilled agents. The after-tax skill pre-
mium in the exogenous case study is 1.24 and under optimal scal policy it
declines to 1.06.
Since the after-tax capital income share remained una¤ected and the
after-tax skill premium decreased, the overall income share of skilled agents
has decreased as well. That means that under optimal scal policy the gov-
ernment manages to redistribute income more equally among the agents. In
particular, under optimal scal policy the after-tax income share of the rep-
resentative unskilled agent is 42.9%, which is 1.4% higher than the exogenous
case.
The above analysis indicates that when both agents hold capital at con-
stant rates and also have the same returns from capital, the only way that
18The income of the representative agent is calculated as the after tax income from
labour plus the after tax income from capital holdings: (1  wj )wjhj + (1   r)(rstKjst +
reqKjeq) where, the subscript j = s; u denotes the type of agent.
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government can redistribute income e¢ ciently is through the progressive tax
rates of labour income.
As a result, under this setup, the optimal scal policy can be Pareto
improving and also reduce income inequality in the economy.
1.9 Analysis of the results
The model presented in the previous section includes the following elements:
(i) capital-skill complementarity, (ii) capital market imperfections through
the cost of capital holdings  i > 0, for i = s; u, (iii) two di¤erent labour
tax rates for the two types of agents, (iv) the aggregate economy is being
discussed instead of a simple representative agent model, and (v) the pro-
ductivity of the two types of agents is being set to be equal and only the
capital-skill complementarity drives the skill premium to increase.
To understand and isolate the main driving forces of the main ndings: (i)
the non-zero optimal capital income tax rate and its magnitude and (ii) the
progressivity of the labour income tax rate; several versions of the benchmark
model will be considered.19 Table 1.7 summarizes the results of the optimal
scal policy when several of the elements mentioned earlier are not present.20
The rst column in the table takes into account the fact that the produc-
tion function exhibits capital-skill complementarities. In the case that this
element is not present the Cobb-Douglas production function, with constant
returns to scale, is being used instead where the two types of agents are as-
sumed to have the same share in the production process. The second column
takes into account the presence of capital market imperfections. When this
imperfection is not present it is assumed that only skilled agents have access
to perfect capital market ( s = 0).
21
19The progressivity of labour income tax rate is determined as the di¤erence between
the skilled agentslabour income tax rate and the unskilled agentslabour income tax rate
(ws   wu ).
20Note that in every model the parameters that are re-calibrated to match the great
ratios are in the production function and within the boundaries suggested in the literature.
21Note that when both agents have access to perfect capital markets,  s =  u = 0, the
DCE system doesnt have a unique solution.
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Moreover, when the representative agents are being used instead of the
aggregate economy, the element presented in the third column is not present.
When the elements in fourth column and fth column are not present the
agents have di¤erent productivity and they face the same labour income tax
rate respectively.
The main ndings from the analysis are: First, the capital-skill comple-
mentarity is an important element for the progressivity of the labour income
tax rate and not for the non-zero optimal capital income tax rate. Second,
the capital market imperfection is the main driving force of the positive op-
timal capital income tax rate. Third, the di¤erent labour income tax rate
among the two types of agents, besides being the essential factor of the
labour income tax rate progressivity, is also a key element for the optimal
capital income tax rate when the production function exhibits capital-skill
complementarity. Fourth, the productivity of the two types of agents and
the aggregate economy a¤ect only the level of the after-tax skill premium.
1.10 The model without capital-skill complementarity
In the case without capital-skill complementarity the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function is being used instead. This case is helpful for reproducing the
results of Judd (1985). The model in row M1 is a replication of Judds model
with a representative capitalist and worker, perfectly competitive markets
and a single labour income tax rate. Therefore, the model in that row can
replicate the result of zero optimal capital income tax rate.
Note that the model in row M1 makes the assumption that both agents
can save and work. But in order for the model to have a unique solution is
being assumed that only the capitalist (which is assumed to be the skilled
agent) has access to perfect capital market ( s = 0), whereas the worker
(which is assumed to be the unskilled agent) needs to pay a cost of holding
capital. However, in this case the optimal solution indicates that the worker
will choose not to hold capital at all.
This result can be shown taking into account the two Euler equations for
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capital structures (A33, A37) of the two agents at the steady state:22
1

= rst(1   r) + (1  st)  2 sKsst
and
1

= rst(1   r) + (1  st)  2 uKust
since the left hand side of the above equations is identical, the right hand
side of the two equations should be equal:
rst(1   r) + (1  st)  2 sKsst = rst(1   r) + (1  st)  2 uKust
taking into account the fact that  s = 0:
rst(1   r) + (1  st) = rst(1   r) + (1  st)  2 uKu
2 uK
u
st = 0
and since,  u > 0, the unskilled agents will not hold any capital at all no
matter how large is the value of  u:
Kust = 0
Therefore, setting  i = 0, for i = s; or i = u, will always result to the
capitalist and worker economy where only the capitalist holds capital.
Taking the above into consideration, Judds (1985) theorem 4 is reinforced
because even if only one of the two types of agents has access to perfect capital
markets the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Specically, when
either of the two agents has no cost of holding capital the other agent will
decide not to hold capital at all and the economy will be populated with
capitalists that work and save and workers that only work.
When the production function doesnt exhibit capital-skill complemen-
tarities the zero optimal tax rate on capital income will remain valid even
22It makes no di¤erence if the Euler equations for capital equipment are being chosen
instead.
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if the government can tax di¤erently the labour income of capitalists and
workers as the model in row M5. But in this case the government will choose
to increase the progressivity of the labour income tax rate by taxing more the
labour income of the agents that hold capital. As a result the after-tax skill
premium is lower than the exogenous case which means that the government
redistributes income to workers (the agents that do not hold capital) through
labour income taxes.
As a result, with a single labour tax rate for both agents and no cost
of capital holdings for the skilled agents (no capital market imperfection),
the optimal policy suggests that capital income tax rate will be zero and
the labour income tax rate will increase to balance the budget constraint.
Thus the level of government consumption will remain constant, as in the
exogenous scal policy case. But in the case where the government can
impose two di¤erent wage tax rates, it will choose progressive labour income
tax rates.
The di¤erence in the productivity between skilled and unskilled agents
a¤ects only the progressivity of the labour income tax rate and as a conse-
quence the after-tax skill premium (see the di¤erence between the models in
rows M5 and M6).
The progressivity that a model without capital-skill complementarity re-
ports is at the range of 0.11-0.14 with an exemption of 0.24 for the case where
all elements are present (model in row M4). The progressivity reported from
these models is lower than what it is observed in the data, apart from the
case where it is equal to 0.24.23
When the model assumes that both types of agents have access to im-
perfect capital markets ( s and  u are positive but  s <  u) the optimal
tax rate on capital income becomes positive. This positive result on capital
income tax rate is not a¤ected from any of the other elements considered
earlier (see models in rows M3, M4, M7 and M8).
Therefore, for the case without capital-skill complementarity the neces-
23The data from the UK government in 2012 report that the progressivity of income
tax rate between the high income earners and the rest of the population is approximately
equal to 30%.
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sary condition of a non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income is that both
agents have a positive cost of capital holdings. This result indicates that
the main driving force of the non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income,
under no capital-skill complementarity, is the imperfection in capital markets
through the cost of holding capital.
1.11 The model with capital-skill complementarity
When the model exhibits capital-skill complementarity the lower optimal
capital income tax rate will benet more the skilled agents (all the models
in rows M9-M19). That happens because the increase in the stock of capi-
tal, due to the lower capital income tax rate, will also increase the demand
for skilled agents and their wage rate, driving the pre-tax skill premium to
increase.
In the case with a single labour tax rate the government will not be able
to redistribute e¢ ciently the income among the agents (see model in rows
M9, M11, M12 and M14) and as a result the after-tax skill premium will
remain high.
In the models where only the skilled agents have access to perfect capital
market ( s = 0 and  u > 0), the model collapses to the capitalist and
worker situation, as it has been discussed in the previous subsection (see
models in rows M12-M15). However, when capital-skill complementarity is
present, the result of optimal tax rate on capital income is di¤erent than the
Cobb-Douglas specication. In the case where the government cannot tax
di¤erently the labour income of the two types of agents, the optimal tax rate
on capital income will be positive, as the models in rows M12 and M14. This
result is valid even when a representative agent model is being solved or even
when the productivity is di¤erent among the two types of agents.24
The intuition of this result is that in the case with capital-skill comple-
mentarity the government can redistribute income e¢ ciently from skilled to
unskilled agents through the tax rate on capital income when there is only a
24Also, Conesa et al. (2009) obtain a similar result. Using a life cycle model they show
that when the government cannot impose a labour income tax rate that will depend on
age, the optimal capital income tax will become positive.
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single labour income tax rate. This result is di¤erent than the Cobb-Douglas
case, presented in the previous section, because now skilled agents are com-
plementary with capital. Thus, a lower stock of capital, due to the positive
capital income tax rate, will also reduce the demand for skilled agents lower-
ing their pre-tax wage rate. In addition, since unskilled agents are substitutes
with capital and skilled agents, their wage rate will increase. As a result, in
the case of capital-skill complementarity, if the government cannot impose
two di¤erent labour income tax rates, it can still redistribute income through
the taxation of capital income.
But when the government has access to two di¤erent labour income tax
rates, as the models in rows M13 and M15, and when only skilled agents have
access to perfect capital markets, the government will prefer to redistribute
income e¢ ciently by increasing the progressivity of the labour income tax
rate. Therefore, in these models the optimal capital income tax rate is zero,
as in the Cobb-Douglas cases. However, with capital-skill complementarity
the progressivity of the labour income tax rate is much higher than the Cobb-
Douglas case studies and it can replicate the progressivity observed in the
UK economy. In addition, because of the higher labour income tax rate
progressivity the after-tax skill premium is much lower than the previous
case.
The result of high labour income progressivity is similar to Conesa et al.
(2009) result. In a life cycle model with heterogeneous agents, with respect to
labour productivity, they show that capital income tax rate will be positive
and the government will choose to redistribute income through increasing
the labour income tax rate progressivity.
In the case where both agents have access to imperfect capital markets
( s and  u are positive but with  s <  u), as in models in rows M9-M11,
the government will always impose a positive capital income tax rate. This
result is not a¤ected from the other elements of the model.
To summarize, the above analysis indicates that the main driving force
of the non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income is the imperfection in
capital markets, as in Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999). In addition,
there is a case study where the non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income
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can be obtained even with perfect capital markets. That happens when
the government cannot impose two di¤erent labour income tax rates, which
veries the argument of Correia (1996). In this case, the government can still
redistribute income through capital income taxation due to the presence of
capital-skill complementarity.
1.12 Optimally chosen government consumption
The models in rows M16-M19 make the additional assumption that the gov-
ernment can also choose optimally the level of government consumption. In
this case the qualitative results remain the same as before. However, pro-
gressivity of labour income tax rate is even higher when the government has
access to two di¤erent labour income tax rates. Also, the unskilled labour
income tax rate becomes negative (subsidy) and the optimal capital income
tax rate remains positive but lower than the benchmark case (models in rows
M16-M17).
Under this setup the level of government consumption that will be chosen
depends on its weight in the e¤ective consumption. This is denoted with the
parameter  in Figure 1.1.25 indicates how the government consumption,
capital and labour income tax rates change as the share of government con-
sumption to the e¤ective consumption increases. The model presented and
analysed in the gure is the model in row M17 from Table 1.7, where all the
elements of the model are present.
25At the benchmark case the weight of the government consumption to the e¤ective
consumption is: 1    = 1   0:9 = 0:1. So as  decreases the weight of the government
consumption on the e¤ective consumption increases.
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When the share of government consumption on the e¤ective consumption,
(1   a), decreases so does the level of government consumption, all the tax
rates and the after-tax skill premium. However, even though the labour
income tax rates for both types of agents decrease the progressivity of the
labour taxes increases. That occurs because when the tax rate on capital
income decreases the government relies more on the labour income tax rates
for income redistribution.
1.13 Assessing income inequality
Table 1.8 summarizes the results of income inequality under optimal scal
policy for various versions of the model. The last two columns of the table
compare the overall after-tax income share of the skilled agent. If this share
declines, when the optimal scal policy is in place, it means that unskilled
agents have higher share of the overall after-tax income and as a result income
inequality is reduced.
Note that the table does not include a column for the change in the after-
tax capital income because the capital income share of each type of agent
is assumed to be xed. In particular, skilled agents will always hold two
times more capital stock than the unskilled agents due to the assumed cost
of capital holdings. This will result in the skilled agents having two times
higher capital income than the unskilled agents, given that the returns to
capital and capital income tax rate is the same for both types of agents.
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Taking the above into consideration the important factor that will reduce
income inequality is labour income tax rates. The government will not be
able to reduce income inequality unless it has access to two di¤erent labour
income tax rates. In fact, optimal scal policy with a single wage tax rate
will increase income inequality between the two types of agents (see models
in rows L3, L4, L6 and L7).
The capital market imperfection element is a¤ecting the level of income
inequality and income distribution among the two types of agents. When
there is no capital market imperfection (meaning that only skilled agents have
access to perfect capital markets,  s = 0 and  u > 0, and as a result only
skilled agents will hold capital) the optimal scal policy will result in even
higher income inequality. Also, skilled agents will hold a larger proportion of
total after-tax income when the same model is compared with the case where
capital market imperfection is present (see models in rows L1-L2, L3-L4 and
L6-L7).
When capital-skill complementarity is not present, the optimal scal pol-
icy cannot redistribute income e¢ ciently. As a result skilled agents share
of income increases when the optimal scal policy is in place (see models
in rows L1-L4). But when capital-skill complementarity is present and the
government has access to two di¤erent labour income tax rates for each type
of agent, the skilled agentsshare of total after-tax income in the economy
decreases but they still hold the majority of the available after-tax income.
1.14 Partisan policy
Throughout the analysis so far it has been assumed that under optimal s-
cal policy the government wants to maximize the aggregate welfare in the
economy. Under this assumption the central authority does not show any
preference towards a certain type of agents. This means that in the objective
function (17) the weight parameter for skilled agents will be equal to their
share in the economy.26
26Therefore, under the calibration provided in a previous section: ! = ns = 0:6. As a
result the relevant weight in the objective function for the unskilled agents is: (1  !) =
nu = 0:4.
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This section will re-assess the optimal scal policy outcome for the case
where the central authority places more weight to one of the two types of
agents. The only di¤erence with the analysis provided in the optimal scal
policy is that the objective function of the government will become:
max
1X
t=0
t
 
!  Us
 
Cs;t; hs;t

+ (1  !) Uu
 
Cu;t; hu;t

(17)
subject to the same DCE system of equations as presented in the Appendix
A for the optimal scal policy.
The procedure is identical to the optimal scal policy presented earlier
with the only di¤erence that here the variable that determines the weight the
government places to a specic type of agents is not equal to the share of each
type of agent. In this subsection the variable, !, can take any value between
0 and 1. For example, when this value exceeds 0.6 the government places
more weight to skilled agents, since at the calibration subsection earlier on
we assumed that skilled agents are 60% of the population. As a result, the
assumption of a Benthamite government, where ! = 0:6, will be dropped
and a Partisan government will be assumed instead.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 present how the tax rates, income inequality and main
macroeconomic variables react as the variable ! increases when the Partisan
government sets the optimal scal policy.
In particular, Figure 1.2 shows that as the weight placed to skilled agents
increases the optimal tax rate on capital income declines. But when ! ' 0:76
the optimal tax rate on capital income reaches the lowest value of 5%. After
that point optimal capital income tax rate increases again. Therefore, under
the assumed setup and calibration the optimal tax rate on capital income will
be positive irrespectively of the weight the government places to a certain
group of agents.
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The upper middle graph in Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of labour tax
progressivity (dened as ws;t   wu;t). For very low values of the variable !
progressivity shows a slight increase but once it exceeds the value of 0.13 it
starts to decline. The labour tax progressivity will become negative, which
means that ws < 
w
u , when the weight placed to skilled agents exceeds the
value of 0.75.
The upper right hand side graph and the middle left hand side graph of
Figure 1.2 show the evolution of after-tax skill premium and after-tax share
of skilled agents on total income respectively. Both of these variables are
positively correlated with the weight placed to skilled workers. In particular,
the skilled agents will hold the majority of the after-tax income when !
becomes higher than 0.45.
The other two graphs in the middle row show the evolution of the wage
tax rates for both agents. For skilled agents the wage tax rate decreases
at a relative constant rate as variable ! increases. On the other hand, the
unskilled wage tax rate decreases for low values of the variable ! and it starts
to increase when the weight exceeds the value of 0.2.
The bottom row in Figure 1.2 shows the e¤ects on the aggregate, skilled
and unskilled agentswelfare. Regarding aggregate welfare the graph shows
that it increases at an increasing rate as ! increases, with the exception of
the range 0:2   0:4 where aggregate welfare increases at a decreasing rate.
Skilled agentswelfare has a positive relationship with !. But the welfare of
unskilled agents increases until the variable ! reaches the value of 0.3 and
then it starts to decrease. The welfare of skilled and unskilled agents becomes
equal when the government places a weight of 45% to skilled agents in the
objective function.
Figure 1.3 includes graphs that show the evolution of the stock of capital
held from each type of agent. The results are very similar between the two
types of agents and the two types of capital (capital equipment and capital
structures). Specically, as the variable ! increases the stock of capital in-
creases as well until the point where the optimal tax rate on capital income
starts to increase again. That happens when ! exceeds the value of 0.75 for
capital structures and 0.81 for capital equipment.
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The graphs for the evolution of skilled consumption and skilled labour
supply are positively correlated with !. Whereas, the evolution of unskilled
agentsconsumption increases for small values of ! but when it exceeds 0.3
declines. The level of labour supply of the unskilled agents exhibits a negative
correlation with !. Finally, output follows the same pattern as the stock of
capital, it increases as ! increase but it starts to decline when ! is higher
than 0.78.
The main conclusions from the above analysis are: (i) the non-zero result
of the optimal tax rate on capital income is not a¤ected from the weight the
government places to a certain group of agents, but the magnitude of the
optimal capital income tax rate is a¤ected; (ii) the progressivity of labour
income tax rate turns negative, which means that ws < 
w
u , when the weight
placed to skilled agents exceeds the value of 0.75; (iii) aggregate welfare has a
positive relationship with the weight the government places to skilled agents;
(iv) as the optimal tax rate on capital income decreases the stock of capital
increases and, due to the presence of capital-skill complementarity, skilled
labour increases as well.
1.15 Concluding remarks
This chapter studied the outcome of optimal scal policy under skills and
capital holdings heterogeneity. It is further assumed that the production
function exhibits capital-skill complementarities. This way the model is able
to reproduce the wage premium and factor input elasticities suggested in the
literature.
The results suggested that under optimal scal policy a benevolent gov-
ernment will not choose to eliminate the tax rate on capital income, as Judd
(1985) and Chamley (1986) suggest. The analysis showed that the main
driving force of the non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income is the imper-
fection in capital markets, which is in line with the results of Judd (1997) and
Guo and Lansing (1999). However, in the case where the government cannot
impose two di¤erent labour income tax rates, the positive optimal tax rate
on capital income will appear even if there is no capital market imperfection,
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verifying the argument of Correia (1996). In this case the government will
redistribute income through capital income taxation due to the presence of
capital-skill complementarity. But when capital-skill complementarity is not
present the non-zero optimal tax rate on capital income will appear only if
the capital market imperfection is present.
Another important result is the progressivity of labour income tax rates
under optimal scal policy. In particular, when capital-skill complementarity
is present and the government has access to two di¤erent labour income tax
rates, income inequality will be reduced through the lower after-tax skill
premium. But the government cannot reduce income inequality when capital-
skill complementarity is not present. Therefore, under optimal scal policy
the government is able to reduce income inequality and improve the welfare
for both types of agents making the outcome Pareto e¢ cient only when
capital-skill complementarity is present.
These results remain valid even if the government doesnt need to satisfy a
given level of consumption and as a result can optimally choose the tax rates
and the level of government consumption. Finally, the conclusions remain
valid even when the government places more weight to a certain group of
agents, as in Chari and Kehoe (1999).
Finally, when we drop the assumption of the Benthamite planner and
we allow for a partisan government, then we found that the non-zero result
of the optimal tax rate on capital income is not a¤ected from the weight
the government places to skilled (or equivalently unskilled) agents. However,
the level of the optimal tax rate on capital income is sensitive to the weight
of the skilled agents in the objective function of the Partisan government.
Moreover, the progressivity of labour income tax rate is overturned (it be-
come regressive) when the weight placed to skilled agents exceeds the value of
75%. Also, aggregate welfare exhibits a positive relationship with the weight
the government places to skilled agents.
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Appendix A
A Chapter 1
A.1 First order conditions
A.1.1 Households
In period t households solve the following maximization problem:
max
Cj;t;hj;t;Kt+1
E0
1X
t=0
t
  
Cj;t

l1 j;t
(1 )
1  
where, lj;t = 1   hj;t and Cj;t =
h
aCj;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
i1=
, subject to their
budget constraint depending on the type of the agent:
Cj;t + I
j
st;t + I
j
eq;t = (1  wj;t)wj;thj;t + (1   rt )
 
rst;tK
j
st;t + req;tK
j
eq;t
 
  j
h 
Kjst;t
2
+
 
Kjeq;t
2i
or if we replace the capital evolution equations:
(1  wj;t)wj;thj;t + (1   rt )
 
rst;tK
j
st;t + req;tK
j
eq;t
 
  j
h 
Kjst;t
2
+
 
Kjeq;t
2i
= Cj;t +K
j
st;t+1   (1  st)Kjst;t +Kjeq;t+1   (1  eq)Kjeq;t
Cj;t +K
j
st;t+1 +K
j
eq;t+1 = (1  wj;t)wj;thj;t + (A1)
+ [(1   rt )rst;t + (1  st)]Kjst;t +
+ [(1   rt )req;t + (1  eq)]Kjeq;t  
  j
h 
Kjst;t
2
+
 
Kjeq;t
2i
.
Also we should note that the stock of capital structures and capital equip-
ment in period t are known and as a result households want to maximize the
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two types of capital in period t+ 1. In addition, E0 is the conditional expec-
tation in the initial period given the available information in that period.
If it assumed that t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget
constraint, equation (A1), the following Lagrange equation is obtained:
L = max
Ct;ht;Kt+1
E0
1X
i=0
i
(
h
aCj;t+i + (1  a)
_
G
c
t+i
i=
(1  hj;t+i)1 )1 
1  
+t+i((1  wj;t)wj;t+ihj;t+i + (A2)
+

(1   rt+i)rst;t+i + (1  st)

Kjst;t+i +
+

(1   rt+i)req;t+i + (1  eq)

Kjeq;t+i  
  j
h 
Kjst;t+i
2
+
 
Kjeq;t+i
2i  Cj;t+i  Kjst;t+i+1  Kjeq;t+i+1).
Since the aim is for the maximization problem to be solved for a period
s  t it would be easier, for the derivations later on, to write equation (A2)
as:
E0f
s t 1X
i=0
i[
(
h
aCj;t+i + (1  a)
_
G
c
t+i
i=
(1  hj;t+i)1 )1 
1   +
+t+i( (1  wj;t+i)wj;t+ihj;t+i +
+

(1   rt+i)rst;t+i + (1  st)

Kjst;t+i  
  j
h 
Kjst;t+i
2
+
 
Kjeq;t+i
2i
+
+

(1   rt+i)req;t+i + (1  eq)

Kjeq;t+i  
 Cj;t+i  Kjst;t+i+1  Kjeq;t+i+1)] +
+s t[
(
h
aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
i=
(1  hj:s)1 )1 
1   +
+s((1  wj;s)wj;shj;s    j
h 
Kjst;s
2
+
 
Kjeq;s
2i
+
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+ [(1   rs)rst;s + (1  st)]Kjst;s   Cj;s  Kjst;s+1  Kjeq;s+1) +
+ [(1   rs)req;s + (1  eq)]Kjeq;s] +
+s t+1[
(
h
aCj;s+1 + (1  a)
_
G
c
s+1
i=
(1  hj;s+i)1 )1 
1   +
+
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
(1  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
Kjst;t+i +
+

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h 
Kjst;t+i
2
+
 
Kjeq;t+i
2i  Cj;t+i  Kjst;t+i+1  Kjeq;t+i+1)]g :
Next the rst-order conditions are presented at time s  t:27
Private consumption in period s:
@L
@Cj;s
=
@fs t[ (
h
aCj;s+(1 a)
_
G
c
s
i=
(1 hj;s)1 )1 
1    sCj;s]g
@Cj;s
= 0
0 = s t[
 (1  ) aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
1   
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )   s]
0 = s t[aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1

(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )   s].
since 0 <  < 1 and as a result it cannot be zero:
aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 ) = s (A3)
27For simplicity all the factors that do not a¤ect the derivations are removed from the
rst-order conditions.
50
Labour in period s:
@L
@hj;s
= 0
0 =
@
@hs
fs t[
(
h
aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
i=
(1  hs)1 )1 
1   +
+Ess(wj;s(1  wj;s)hj;s]g
0 = s t[
( 1) (1  ) (1  )

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 )
1   
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 ) 1 + Ess(wj;s(1  wj;s))]
(1  )

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 )
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 ) 1
= Ess(wj;s(1  wj;s)) (A4)
Capital structures in period s+ 1:
@L
@Kjst;s+1
=
@fs t( sKjst;s+1)g
@Kjst;s+1
+
+
@fs t+1Ess+1[((1 rs+1)rst;s+1+(1 st))Kjst;s+1  j(Kjst;s+1)
2
]g
@Kjst;s+1
= 0
 s ts + s t+1Es[s+1
 
rst;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  st)  2 jKjst;s+1

] = 0
 s + Es[s+1
 
rst;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  st)  2 jKjst;s+1

] = 0
s = Es[s+1
 
rst;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  st)  2 jKjst;s+1

] (A5)
Capital equipment in period s+ 1:
@L
@Kjeq;s+1
=
@fs t( sKjeq;s+1)g
@Kjeq;s+1
+
+
@fs t+1Es[s+1
h
[(1 rs+1)req;s+1+(1 eq)]Kjeq;s+1  j(Kjeq;s+1)
2
i
g
@Kjeq;s+1
= 0
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 s ts + s t+1Es[s+1
 
req;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  eq)  2 jKjeq;s+1

] = 0
 s + Es[s+1
 
req;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  eq)  2 jKjeq;s+1

] = 0
s = Es[s+1
 
req;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  eq)  2 jKjeq;s+1

] (A6)
Now, since we know that:
@u ()
@Cj;s
= aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )
equation (A3) can be written as:
@u ()
@Cj;s
= s (A7)
By using equation (A7) for period s and for one period ahead (s + 1)
equations (A5) and (A6) will become:
aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )
= Es[(aC
 1
j;s+1

aCj;s+1 + (1  a)
_
G
c
s+1
(=)(1 ) 1

(1  hj;s+1)(1 )(1 ))
 
rst;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  st)  2 jKjst;s+1

]
@u ()
@Cj;s
= Es[
@u ()
@Cj;s+1
 
rst;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  st)  2 jKjst;s+1

] (A8)
and
aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )
= Es[(aC
 1
j;s+1

aCj;s+1 + (1  a)
_
G
c
s+1
(=)(1 ) 1

(1  hj;s+1)(1 )(1 ))
 
req;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  eq)  2 jKjeq;s+1

]
@u ()
@Cj;s
= Es[
@u ()
@Cj;s+1
 
req;s+1(1   rs+1) + (1  eq)  2 jKjeq;s+1

] (A9)
The above equation is the well-known Euler equation and denes the
consumption-savings optimality condition. Sets the marginal return of sub-
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stitution between present and future consumption equal to the after tax
returns on savings. Households equate the cost from saving one additional
unit of todays consumption to the benet of obtaining more consumption to-
morrow. Therefore, the above Euler equation describes the optimal trade-o¤
between current and future consumption.
Dividing equation (A4) by equation (A3) gives:
(1  )

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 )
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 ) 1
aC 1j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hj;s)(1 )(1 )
=
Ess(wj;s(1  wj;s))
s
@u ()
@hj;s
=
@u ()
@Cj;s
Es(wj;s(1  ws )) (A10)
Which is the consumption-leisure optimality condition. Under that con-
dition the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption
equals the after tax wage rate. Shows that the agent (worker) equates the
marginal utility from a marginal increase in leisure to the utility from working
an equal amount and getting more consumption.
In addition to the above the transversality condition needs to be added:
lim
t!1
t
@ut ()
@Cj;t
Kji;t+1 = 0
The intuition of the above condition is that in an optimal path, the val-
ues of capital stock for a given period far enough into the future have zero
weight to the maximization problem. In addition, the transversality condi-
tion states that the utility gains from accumulating capital eventually grow
slower than 1=. This condition is crucial in order for the economy to reach a
stationary state equilibrium, otherwise it would be optimal for the individual
to postpone consumption forever.
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A.1.2 The rm
Firms select the quantity of each type of labour that they are going to hire
and the amount of capital (both structures and equipment) that they are
going to rent in order to maximize their prots:
t = max
hs;t;hu;t;Kst;tKeq;t
AtK
ac
st;t[
 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+
+ (1  )h'fu;t]
1 ac
'   ws;thfs;t  
 wu;thfu;t   rst;tKst;t   req;tKeq;t.
The relevant rst-order conditions for period t are:
For the skilled agent:
@s
@hfs;t
= 0
0 =  (1  )

1  ac
'

'

h 1fs;tAtK
ac
st;t 
[   (Aeq;tKeq;t) + (1  )hfs;t'= +
+ (1  )h'fu;t]
1 ac
'
 1   ws;t :
ws;t =  (1  ) (1  ac)h 1fs;tAtKacst;t 

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
:
ws;t =  (1  ) (1  ac)h 1fs;tAtKacst;t  (A12)

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
.
For the unskilled agent:
@s
@hfu;t
= 0
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0 = (1  )

1  ac
'

'h' 1fu;tAtK
ac
st;t 
[   (Aeq;tKeq;t) + (1  )hfs;t'= +
+ (1  )h'fu;t]
1 ac
'
 1   wu;t :
wu;t = (1  ) (1  ac)h' 1fu;tAtKacst;t 

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
:
wu;t = (1  ) (1  ac)h' 1fu;tAtKacst;t  (A13)

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
.
For capital structures:
@s
@Kst;s
= 0
0 =
h

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
' 
acAtKac 1st;t   rst;t :
rst;t = a
cAtK
ac 1
st;t  (A14)

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
.
For capital equipment:
@s
@Keq;s
= 0
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0 = 

1  ac
'

'

Aeq;tK
 1
eq;t AtK
ac
st;t 

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
  req;t .
req;t =  (1  ac)Aeq;tK 1eq;t AtKacst;t  (A15)

"

 
 (Aeq;tKeq;t)
 + (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
# 1 ac
'
 1
.
Where under the assumptions of homogeneous of degree one production
function, perfect competition and free entry of new rms into the market,
rms that already exist in the market make zero prots and as a result we
have:
Yt = ws;thfs;t + wu;thfu;t + rst;tKst;t + req;tKeq;t (A16)
A.2 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
This section presents the solution of the decentralized competitive equilib-
rium (DCE) where households maximize their welfare and rms their prots,
also all constraints mentioned above should be satised, including the market
clearing conditions.
Therefore, given an initial level of capital stock for structures and equip-
ment (Ks;0) and (Ke;0), and given the exogenous processes At, Aeq;t, a com-
petitive equilibrium is characterized by the sequence: fCs;t; Cu;t; hs;t; hu;t;
Ksst;t+1; K
s
eq;t+1; K
u
st;t+1; K
u
eq;t+1; ws;t; wu;t; rst;t; req;t;
_
G
c
t ; Ytg1t=0satisfying the
following conditions:
A.2.1 The rst-order conditions of skilled households
@u ()
@Cs;t
= Es[
@u ()
@Cs;t+1
 
rst;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  st)  2 sKsst;t+1

] (A17)
@u ()
@Cs;t
= Es[
@u ()
@Cs;t+1
 
req;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  eq)  2 sKseq;t+1

] (A18)
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(1  )

aCs;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 )
(1  hs;t)(1 )(1 ) 1
aC 1s;t

aCs;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hs;t)(1 )(1 )
= Et(ws;t(1  ws;t)) (A19)
A.2.2 Budget constraint of skilled agents
Cs;t +K
s
st;t+1 +K
s
eq;t+1 = (1  ws;t)ws;ths;t + (A20)
+ [(1   rt )rst;t + (1  st)]Ksst;t +
+ [(1   rt )req;t + (1  eq)]Kseq;t  
  s
h 
Ksst;t
2
+
 
Kseq;t
2i
.
A.2.3 The rst-order conditions of unskilled households
@u ()
@Cu;t
= Es[
@u ()
@Cu;t+1
 
rst;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  st)  2 uKust;t+1

] (A21)
@u ()
@Cu;t
= Es[
@u ()
@Cu;t+1
 
req;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  eq)  2 uKueq;t+1

] (A22)
(1  )

aCu;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 )
(1  hu;t)(1 )(1 ) 1
aC 1u;t

aCu;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hu;t)(1 )(1 )
= Et(wu;t(1  wu;t)) . (A23)
A.2.4 Firmsrst-order conditions
ws;t =  (1  ) (1  ac)nsh 1s;t At

Kfst;t
ac
 (A24)

24  Aeq;t Kfeq;t+ (1  )nshs;t'= +
+ (1  )n'uh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
:
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wu;t = (1  ) (1  ac)n'uh' 1u;t At

Kfst;t
ac
 (A25)

24  Aeq;t Kfeq;t+ (1  )nshs;t'= +
+ (1  )n'uh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
:
rst;t = a
cAtA
ac
st;t

Kfst;t
ac 1
 (A26)

24  Aeq;t Kfeq;t+ (1  )Ahs;tnshs;t'= +
+ (1  )A'hu;tn'uh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
:
req;t =  (1  ac)Aeq;t

Kfeq;t
 1
At

Kfst;t
ac
 (A27)

24  Aeq;t Kfeq;t+ (1  )nshs;t'= +
+ (1  )n'uh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
:
where Kfi;t = nsK
s
i;t + nuK
u
i;t for i = st; eq.
A.2.5 The behaviour of the exogenous processes
log(At) = (1  A) log(A0) + A log(At 1) + "At (A28)
log(Aeq;t) =
 
1  Aeq

log(Aeq;0) + Aeq log(Aeq;t 1) + "Aeq;t (A29)
A.2.6 Governments budget constraint
_
G
c
t = ns
 
ws;tws;thst

+ nu
 
wu;twu;thu;t

+ (A30)
+ rt
 
rst;t(nsK
s
st;t + nuK
u
st;t) + req;t(nsK
s
eq;t + nuK
u
eq;t)

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A.2.7 The aggregate resource constraint
Yt = ns
 
Ksst;t+1   (1  st)Ksst;t +Kseq;t+1   (1  eq)Kseq;t

+
+nsCs;t + nuCu;t +
_
G
c
t + (A31)
+nu
 
Kust;t+1   (1  st)Kust;t +Kueq;t+1   (1  eq)Kueq;t

+
+ns s
h 
Ksst;t
2
+
 
Kseq;t
2i
+ nu u
h 
Kust;t
2
+
 
Kueq;t
2i
.
A.2.8 The production function
Yt = At(nsK
s
st;t + nuK
u
st;t)
ac  (A32)
f    Ae;t(nsKseq;t + nuKueq;t)+ (1  )nshs;t'= +
+ (1  )n's h's;tg
1 ac
' .
Thus, there is a system of fourteen equations with fourteen unknowns
which describes the DCE: Cs;t; Cu;t; hs;t; hu;t; Ksst;t+1; K
s
eq;t+1; K
u
st;t+1; K
u
eq;t+1;
ws;t; wu;t; rst;t; req;t;
_
G
c
t ; Yt; together with 2 exogenous processes fAt; Aeq;tg.28
A.2.9 The steady-state
The equations that describe the equilibrium of the economy are nonlinear
and as a result it may not permit analytical solutions. Such systems are
usually solved using a log-linear approximation around the steady state and
then solving the resulting log-linear system of equations. Therefore, the
behaviour of the system will be determined in the steady-state. The steady-
state value of any variable will be presented with a bar above the variable
and by dropping the time index (i.e. Kt = Kt+1 =
_
K). The deterministic
steady-state is dened when all the errors of the AR(1) processes are equal
to zero and all of the variables in equations (A17-A32) are constant.
Under these assumptions the steady-state conditions include the follow-
ing.
28Where: @u()@Cj;s = aC
 1
j;s

aCj;s + (1  a)
_
G
c
s
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hs)(1 )(1 )
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The rst-order conditions of the skilled household:
1

=
 _
rst(1 
_

r
) + (1  st)  2 sKsst

(A33)
1

=
 _
req(1 
_

r
) + (1  eq)  2 sKseq

(A34)
(1  )

a
_
C

s + (1  a)
_
G
c
a
_
C
 1
s (1 
_
hs)
=
_
ws(1 
_

w
s ) (A35)
The budget constraint of the skilled agents:
_
Cs =

(1  _ rt )
_
rst   s
 _
K
s
s +

(1  _ rt )
_
req   eq
 _
K
s
eq + (A36)
+(1  _ws )
_
ws
_
hs    s
 _
K
s
st
2
+
 _
K
s
eq
2
The rst-order conditions of the unskilled household:
1

=

_
rst(1 
_

r
) + (1  s)  2 u
_
K
u
st

(A37)
1

=

_
req(1 
_

r
) + (1  e)  2 u
_
K
u
eq

(A38)
(1  )

a
_
C

u + (1  a)
_
G
c
a
_
C
 1
u (1 
_
hu)
=
_
wu(1 
_

w
u ) (A39)
The rmsrst-order conditions:
_
ws =  (1  ) (1  ac)ns
_
h
 1
s
_
A
_
K
ac
st  (A40)

24  _Aeq _Keq+ (1  )ns_hs'= +
+ (1  )

nu
_
hu
'
35
1 ac
'
 1
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_
wu = (1  ) (1  ac)n'u
_
h
' 1
u
_
A
_
K
ac
st  (A41)

24  _Aet _Keq+ (1  )ns_hs'= +
+ (1  )

nu
_
hu
'
35
1 ac
'
 1
_
rst = a
c
_
A
_
K
ac 1
st  (A42)

24  _Aeq _Keq+ (1  )ns_hs'= +
+ (1  )

nu
_
hu
'
35
1 ac
'
_
req =  (1  ac)
_
A

eq
_
K
 1
eq
_
A
_
K
ac
st  (A43)

24  _Aeq _Keq+ (1  )ns_hs'= +
+ (1  )

nu
_
hu
'
35
1 ac
'
 1
where Ki = nsKsi + nuK
u
i for i = st; eq.
The behaviour of the exogenous processes:
log(
_
A) = (1  A) log(A0) + A log(
_
A) (A44)
log(
_
Aeq) =
 
1  Aeq

log(Aeq;0) + Aeq log(
_
Aeq) (A45)
Government budget constraint:
_
G
c
= ns

_

w
s
_
ws
_
hs

+ nu

_

w
u
_
wu
_
hu

+
_

r

_
rst
_
Kst +
_
req
_
Keq

(A46)
The market clearing condition:
_
Y t = ns
_
Cs + nu
_
Cu + ns

st
_
K
s
st + eq
_
K
s
eq

+ nu

st
_
K
u
st + eq
_
K
u
eq

+
+ns s
 _
K
s
st
2
+
 _
K
s
eq
2
+ nu u
 _
K
u
st
2
+
 _
K
u
eq
2
(A47)
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The production function:
_
Y t =
_
A

ns
_
K
s
st + nu
_
K
u
st
ac


24 _Aeq ns _Kseq + nu _Kueq + (1  )ns_hs'=
+ (1  )n'u
_
h
'
u
35
1 ac
'
(A48)
All the exogenous processes can be simplied even further. For example
consider equation (A44):
log(
_
A) = (1  A) log(A0) + A log(
_
A),
log(
_
A) = log(A0)
which means that the steady-state of neutral technology shock (
_
A) depends
on its long-run value(A0). The long-run value of neutral technology a¤ects
only the scale of the economy (see King and Rebelo (1999)) and hence is
normalize to be equal to:
_
A = A0 = 1:5
Moreover, the exogenous process of the capital equipment e¢ ciency be-
comes:
log(
_
Aeq) = log(Aeq;0)
which also means that its steady state depends on the long-run value.29
A.3 Optimal scal policy
The competitive equilibrium using the dual approach of the optimal scal pol-
icy is presented from the Euler equations of the representative skilled agent,
the skilled agent budget constraint, the Euler equations of the representative
unskilled agent, rmsrst-order conditions, governments budget constraint,
aggregate resource constraint and the production function, as presented in
29The long-run values of the exogenous processes are presented at the calibration sub-
section.
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the decentralized competitive equilibrium section previously.
Government will choose: Cs;t; Cu;t; hs;t; hu;t; Ksst;t+1; K
s
eq;t+1; K
u
st;t+1;
Kueq;t+1; ws;t; wu;t; rst;t; req;t; Yt; 
r
t ; 
w
s;t; 
w
u;t to maximize equation (15) subject
to the DCE system of equations. The associated Lagrange equation is:
1X
t=0
t
 
nsUs
 
Cs;t; hs;t

+ nuUu
 
Cu;t; hu;t

+
+1t ([
@u ()
@Cs;t+1
 
rs;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  s)  2 sKss;t+1

]  @u ()
@Cs;t
) +
+2t ([
@u ()
@Cs;t+1
 
re;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  e)  2 sKse;t+1

]  @u ()
@Cs;t
) +
+3t (ws;t(1  ws;t) 
 
(1  )

aCs;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 )
(1  hs;t)(1 )(1 ) 1
aC 1s;t

aCs;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hs;t)(1 )(1 )
)+
+4t ((1  ws;t)ws;ths;t + [(1   rt )rs;t + (1  s)]Kss;t +
+ [(1   rt )re;t + (1  e)]Kse;t  
  s
h 
Kss;t
2
+
 
Kse;t
2i  Cs;t  Kss;t+1  Kse;t+1) +
+5t ([
@u ()
@Cu;t+1
 
rs;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  s)  2 uKus;t+1

]  @u ()
@Cu;t
) +
+6t ([
@u ()
@Cu;t+1
 
re;t+1(1   rt+1) + (1  e)  2 uKue;t+1

]  @u ()
@Cu;t
) +
+7t (wu;t(1  wu;t) 
 
(1  )

aCu;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 )
(1  hu;t)(1 )(1 ) 1
aC 1u;t

aCu;t + (1  a)
_
G
c
t
(=)(1 ) 1
(1  hu;t)(1 )(1 )
) +
+8t (ws;t    (1  ) (1  ac)h 1fs;tAtKa
c
s;t 

h

 

 
Ae;tK

e;t

+ (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
'
 1
) +
+9t (wu;t   (1  ) (1  ac)h' 1fu;tAtKa
c
s;t
63

h

 

 
Ae;tK

e;t

+ (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
'
 1
) +
+10t (rs;t   (acYt=Ks;t)) +
+11t (re;t    (1  ac)Ae;tK 1e;t AtKa
c
s;t 

h

 

 
Ae;tK

e;t

+ (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
'
 1
) +
+12t (
_
G
c
t   ns
 
ws;tws;thst
  nu  wu;twu;thu;t 

h

 

 
Ae;tK

e;t

+ (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
'
 1
) +
+12t (
_
G
c
t   ns
 
ws;tws;thst
  nu  wu;twu;thu;t 
  rt (rs;tKs;t + re;tKe;t)) +
+13t (Yt  
_
G
c
t   ns
 
Kss;t+1   (1  s)Kss;t +Kse;t+1   (1  e)Kse;t
 
 nu
 
Kus;t+1   (1  s)Kus;t +Kue;t+1   (1  e)Kue;t
  nsCs;t   nuCu;t  
 ns s
h 
Kss;t
2
+
 
Kse;t
2i  nu u h Kus;t2 +  Kue;t2i) +
+14t (Yt   AtKa
c
s;t 

h

 

 
Ae;tK

e;t

+ (1  )hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'fu;t
i 1 ac
'
).
The above procedure is known as the dual approach. One important
step that is necessary to be taken into account using that approach is that
the above set up needs to include besides periods t and t + 1 for all of the
constraints, as in the exogenous case in the previous section, also period
t   1 in order to include all the appropriate variables when the rst-order
conditions are being calculated.
Then the system of equations is numerically solved using Matlab and
the unique steady-state or long-run solution of the optimal scal policy is
presented in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 in the main text.
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A.4 Welfare gains between policy regimes
In order for the welfare gains to be estimated the following equation is used,
as in Lucas (1990):30
i = 1 
 
LUEi;ss
LURi;ss
! 1
(1 )
The value of i gives the compensating consumption supplement moving
from the optimal scal policy regime to the exogenous scal policy regime.
Therefore, a positive value of i indicates that the agent i is better o¤ under
the optimal taxation regime and the welfare improvement is measured in
terms of consumption.
To get the above equation we have initially assumed that we want to
calculate what percentage of their consumption the agents are willing to give
up to be indi¤erent between the two policies, exogenous and optimal scal
policy. Therefore, we use the following equation:
1X
t=0
t
 
URi
 
(1  i)Ci;t; hi;t

=
1X
t=0
t
 
UEi
 
Ci;t; hi;t

where i = s; u determines if the agent is skilled or unskilled.
It can be shown that the above equation can be written as:
(1  i)(1 )i LURi = LUEi
where LUi is the lifetime welfare of the agent of type i.
(1  i)(1 ) =
LUEi
LURi
i = 1 

LUEi
LURi
 1
(1 )
(A49)
which is the equation that we have used to calculate the consumption that
the agent is willing to give up so as to be indi¤erent between the two policies.
30Note that the superscript E stands for the exogenous scal policy case, while the
superscript R denotes the optimal scal policy.
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Chapter 2: Optimal factor income taxation
with endogenous skill supply
Abstract: In this chapter we analyse optimal factor income taxation when
there are di¤erent returns to skilled and unskilled labour as well as to capital
in structures and equipment. In a setup employing capital-skill complemen-
tarity and endogenous skill acquisition, we consider restrictions on the tax
policy menu, and on the debt to output ratio under exogenous spending
policy. We nd that when all factor inputs, as well as investment in skill
acquisition, can be taxed at separate rates, both capital income taxes are
zero in the long run. Moreover, there is a subsidy to education and the tax
rate on skilled labour is higher than the tax rate on unskilled labour. The
progressivity in labour income taxes is reduced if investment in education
cannot be subsidised. If the government cannot tax income from skilled and
unskilled labour separately, the tax on income from structures remains zero
in the long-run, but there is a small positive tax on equipment capital. These
results are not qualitatively a¤ected by a budget rule that restricts debt to
output, although the latter implies welfare losses. Finally, the transitional
dynamics of the scal instruments from the exogenous to optimal taxation
are not a¤ected by the restrictions to the scal policy menu.
2.1 Introduction
The literature on optimal taxation has extensively examined the question of
which factor of production should be taxed, assuming that the policy-maker
wishes to maximise aggregate welfare under commitment and has access to
distortionary taxation only. The prescriptions for optimal taxation are gen-
erally shown to depend on the underlying market structure and policy imper-
fections (see e.g. Mankiw et al. (2009) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012)
for an evaluation of this literature).
A particular focus of research in this area has been the taxation of capi-
tal, following the seminal contributions of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986),
which showed that in the benchmark neoclassical model, although initially
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the tax rate on capital income can be very high, in the long-run it should
be zero. Extensions to the benchmark neoclassical model have established
the importance of market failures and restrictions on the policy menu. For
instance, Judd (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1999) have shown that when
markets are not fully competitive the optimal tax rate on capital income in
the long-run will be non-zero. Moreover, Correia (1996) has shown that when
there is an incomplete set of tax instruments, the optimal taxation on capital
income will be non-zero to compensate for the missing tax instrument.
A second focus of research is the taxation of labour income when labour
supply decisions have intertemporal implications. For instance, when labour
income taxation has implications for the accumulation of labour augmenting
technology in the form of human capital, there is an incentive for the govern-
ment to use taxes to encourage human capital accumulation (see e.g. Jones
et al. (1997)).
In this chapter, we revisit optimal factor income taxation in an environ-
ment where there are di¤erent skilled and unskilled labour services, endoge-
nous skill creation, and production exhibits capital-skill complementarity. In
particular, we consider the production technology in Krusell et al. (2000),
also used in e.g. Lindqvist (2004), He and Liu (2008) and Pourpourides
(2011), since this has been shown to match the data on the skill premium
very well. In this framework, there are two types of labour services, capturing
skilled and unskilled labour supply, and two types of capital stock, on struc-
tures and equipment, the latter of which complements skilled labour more
than unskilled so that changes in its accumulation are skill biased. As is well
documented in the literature (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Hornstein
et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011)), this economic environment
will lead to a wage premium accruing to skilled labour.
In this economic structure, new questions naturally develop within the
two focal points in the literature, namely the optimal tax on capital and
labour income. In particular, regarding capital income taxes, are both capital
taxes optimally zero in the long-run? And, if there is an incomplete tax
instrument set, which tax rate di¤ers from zero? How does wage inequality
due to capital-skill complementarity a¤ect relative labour income taxation?
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And, what implications does endogenous skill creation have for labour income
taxation (perhaps under incomplete taxation)? We aim to answer these
questions.
We work with a representative agent framework, which allows us to focus
on aggregate e¢ ciency and abstract from potential equity considerations for
optimal taxation. Hence, our results regarding the optimal factor income
taxation are directly comparable to the representative agent literature dis-
cussed above. We build on and extend the model in He and Liu (2008) to
capture capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill acquisition in the
same economic environment.31 In particular, we assume that a representative
household decides how to allocate its investment in the two types of capi-
tal stock and in creating skilled labour within the same period. Moreover,
it decides how to allocate its time endowment into leisure, labour supply
in skilled and unskilled jobs, and in creating skill labour. Therefore, the
model allows for endogenous skill acquisition. The production side is mod-
elled as in Krusell et al. (2000). In this framework, we derive optimal tax
policy under di¤erent scenarios regarding the policy menu available to the
government and, in particular, which tax instruments are available as well as
whether there are restrictions on issuing debt. We assume commitment and
an exogenous spending policy.
In other recent work, Angelopoulos et al. (2014), we analyse optimal
tax smoothing under skill heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity,
when the government has access to state-contingent debt and a complete
set of state-contingent tax instruments, in a stochastic environment with
endogenous and exogenous skill supply by di¤erent workers. In contrast, our
interest here is in the long-run and transitional implications of optimal factor
return taxation in a deterministic environment with a representative worker,
allowing for capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill accumulation.
We calibrate the model under exogenous policy to data averages for the
US and calculate optimal tax policy for di¤erent options regarding the tax
31The model in He and Liu (2008) provides a convenient framework. However, He and
Liu (2008) do not examine optimal policy. Since our aim here is to analyse optimal policy,
we modify the model in He and Liu (2008) to allow for an endogenous labour-leisure choice,
which is important when examining optimal labour taxes.
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menu available to the government. We nd that when the government can
issue debt and can tax the di¤erent types of labour and capital income, as
well as investment in education, at separate rates: (i) both capital income
taxes are zero in the long-run; and (ii) there is a subsidy to education and
progressive labour income taxation. This optimal policy results in a minor
reduction in the skill premium compared with the data average. These results
remain the same if the government can use a single tax for income from capital
in structures and equipment.
However, when the policy menu is restricted with respect to access to
an education subsidy and/or di¤erential labour income taxation, the above
results change. In particular, considering rst the case where investment in
education cannot be taxed/subsidised: (i) the progressivity in labour income
taxation decreases relative to the benchmark case; (ii) capital income taxa-
tion is still zero. When the government cannot encourage skill acquisition by
providing education subsidies, taxation of skilled labour income needs to be
lowered relative to unskilled labour income to provide increased benets to
skill supply.
Next, considering the case where the government has access to the edu-
cation subsidy but cannot tax income from skilled and unskilled labour sep-
arately, we nd that while the tax on income from structures remains zero
in the long-run, there is a small positive tax on equipment capital. Since
equipment capital complements skilled labour, this tax on equipment capital
allows the government to implement indirectly a higher tax burden on skilled
labour supply, relative to unskilled, which is optimal as discussed above given
the education subsidy. The economic structure considered here therefore pro-
vides an example where the two intertemporal wedges di¤er qualitatively in
the long-run.
Finally, if the government can only implement a single labour income
tax, without having access to education subsidies, the equipment tax becomes
again positive but at a lower rate compared to the case with education subsidy
and a single labour income tax. A relatively lower tax on equipment capital,
which is complementing skilled labour, allows the government to implement
indirectly a lower tax burden on skilled labour supply, relative to unskilled.
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The transition paths of the policy instruments from the exogenous scal
policy to optimal scal policy regime are qualitatively similar in each case we
study and reect the broad patterns obtained in the literature. In particular,
there is a very high initial capital taxation, which facilitates the accumulation
of assets, followed by quick reductions towards their steady-state values. Our
optimal policy ndings are similar if we restrict government debt by imposing
a budget rule that requires that the debt to output ratio remains xed at
the data average. This restriction is motivated by the experience of the last
decades in advanced economics and results in welfare losses of about half a
percentage point over the lifetime relative to the absence of the budget rule.
However, the results regarding optimal taxation in the long-run and in the
transition are not a¤ected qualitatively. The restriction does imply, however,
a reduction in the progressivity of optimal labour income taxes.
The rest of the chapter is set out as follows. Section 2 provides a de-
scription of the model. Section 3 describes the calibration of the parameters
under exogenous scal policy. In Section 4 we present and discuss the main
results for optimal policy, together with the transition paths of the policy
instruments. Finally, section 5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 The model
The economy is populated by a representative household which supplies
skilled and unskilled labour services. Following He and Liu (2008) skilled
labour supply requires the creation of skill, which is determined by time and
goods. There is also a representative rm that uses two types of capital,
structures and equipment, along with skilled and unskilled labour for the
production of a homogeneous product. Following Krusell et al. (2000) and
Hornstein et al. (2005), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary
to capital equipment than unskilled labour. Thus, capital equipment accu-
mulation leads to higher skill premium, dened as the ratio of skilled wage
rate over the unskilled wage rate. In contrast, increases in the relative supply
of skilled labour tend to reduce the skill premium. Finally, the government
nances exogenous public spending by issuing debt and taxing investment in
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skill creation and all sources of income.
2.2.1 The representative rm
The representative rm produces a homogeneous consumption good, Yt, using
labour and capital, acting in a perfectly competitive market, taking prices
and policy variables as given:
t = Yt   ws;tehs;t   wu;tehu;t   req;t eKeq;t   rst;t eKst;t (18)
subject to a Krusell et al. (2000) type production function:
Yt = At
 eKacst;t






Aeq;t eKeq;t+ (1  )ehs;t'= + (1  )eh'u;t 1 a
c
' (19)
where
a; ;  2 (0; 1) ; ';  2 ( 1; 1)
and ehs;t and ehu;t denote skilled and unskilled hours worked respectively; Aeq;t
is the e¢ ciency level of capital equipment and At is the total factor pro-
ductivity; eKst;t and eKeq;t denote the stock of capital structures and capital
equipment respectively at the beginning of period t;32 ws;t and wu;t are the
returns to skilled and unskilled labour; and req;t and rst;t are the returns to
capital holdings in equipment and structures respectively.
First-order conditions Firms select the quantity of each type of labour
that they hire and the amount of capital (both structures and equipment)
that they rent in order to maximize their prots:
t = maxAt
 eKst;tac [ Aeq;t eKeq;t + (1  )ehs;t'= + (20)
+ (1  )eh'u;t] 1 ac'   ws;tehs;t   wu;tehu;t   rst;t eKst;t   req;t eKeq;t
32For example, capital structures comprise buildings; and capital equipment scientic
and professional equipment and machinery.
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yielding the following rst-order conditions:
ehs;t:
ws;t =  (1  ) (1  ac)eh 1s;t At  eKst;tac  (21)

24  Aeq;t eKeq;t + (1  )ehs;t'=
+ (1  )eh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
ehu;t:
wu;t = (1  ) (1  ac)eh' 1u;t At  eKst;tac  (22)

24  Aeq;t eKeq;t + (1  )ehs;t'=
+ (1  )eh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
eKst;t :
rst;t = a
cAt eKac 1st;t  (23)

24  Aeq;t eKeq;t + (1  )ehs;t'=
+ (1  )eh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
eKut;t :
req;t =  (1  ac)Aeq;t eK 1eq;t At  eKst;tac  (24)

24  Aeq;t eKeq;t + (1  )ehs;t'=
+ (1  )eh'u;t
35 1 a
c
'
 1
.
Where under the assumptions of: homogeneity of degree one production
function, perfectly competitive markets and free entry of new rms into the
market, rms that already exist into the market make zero prots giving:
Yt = ws;tehs;t + wu;tehu;t + rst;t eKst;t + req;t eKeq;t (25)
72
2.2.2 The representative household
The lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:
U =
1X
t=0
tu(Ct; lt) (26)
where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor and denotes the time preference
of the individual; Ct and lt are total consumption and leisure for the represen-
tative household respectively at period t; and u() is the neoclassical utility
function that is increasing, strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable.
The assumed utility function is the following:
u(Ct; lt) =
 
Ct l
1 
t
1 1
1  1 (27)
where (1; ) > 0 represent the preference parameters of the representative
household. Specically,  determines the weight given to consumption, and
1 is the risk aversion coe¢ cient.
The representative household has the following time constraint:
1 = lt + hs;t + hu;t + et (28)
where hs;t and hu;t denote skilled and unskilled labour work time respectively
in period t and et is time invested in education or other training for skills
acquisition in period t. The above equation states that in each period the rep-
resentative household splits its time endowment between leisure, education
and work. The endowment of the representative household in each period is
normalised to one.
The skill creation equation is similar to He and Liu (2008) and is given
by:
hs;t = f(Ih;t; et) = B

(Ih;t)
 (et)
1  (29)
where Ih;t > 0 determines the investment of goods in creating skills. The
shares of goods and time in the creation of skills are given by  and 1   
respectively, with  2 (0; 1). The parameter B > 0 determines the e¢ ciency
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of the skill-creation process. Finally,  > 0 is a measure of the returns to scale
and should be less than one to ensure that the model has a unique solution
(see also e.g. He and Liu (2008)).
The law of motion for the two types of capital stock , i = st; eq, where st
and eq denote capital structures and capital equipment respectively, is given
by:

Ki;t+1 = (1  i)

Ki;t + Ii;t (30)
where, the depreciation rate is 0  i  1 and Ii;t is the investment in new
capital i at period t.
In addition, the household has the following budget constraint:
Ct + Ist;t + Ieq;t +
 
1  ht

Ih;t +
bt+1
rbt
= (1   st)ws;ths;t + (1  ut )wu;thu;t+
+ (1   rst;t)rst;tKst;t + (1   req;t)req;tKeq;t + bt (31)
where, bt+1 is the payout value of bonds bought by the household at period t;
rbt is the return to bonds; 
s
t ; 
u
t ; 
r
st;t and 
r
eq;t are the tax rates on skilled and
unskilled labour income and on income from capital structures and capital
equipment in period t respectively. Moreover, ht is a subsidy for investment
in goods for skills acquisition. Therefore, the rst and second terms on the
right-hand side of equation (31) give the after tax return from labour, the
following two terms represent the after tax capital income and the last term
denotes the revenues from bonds bought in the previous period.
The representative household chooses fCt; hs;t; hu;t; et; Ih;t; Kst;t+1; Keq;t+1;
bt+1g1t=0 given prices and taxes so as to maximize equation (26) subject to
equations (27) - (31).
First order conditions Assuming that t and Mt are Lagrange multi-
pliers associated with the budget constraint and the skill creation equation
respectively, the rst-order conditions for the problem of the household are
74
given by the following Lagrange equation:
L = max
1X
i=0
i
  
Ct+i
l1 t+i
1 1
1  1
!
+ (32)
+ t+i(Ct+i +
 
1  ht

Ih;t   (1   st+i)ws;t+ihs;t+i 
  (1  ut+i)wu;t+ihu;t+i +
bt+i+1
rbt+i
  bt+i 
  (1   rst;t+i)rst;t+i + (1  st)Kst;t+i +Kst;t+i+1 
  (1   req;t+i)req;t+i + (1  eq)Keq;t+i +Keq;t+i+1)+
+Mt+i

hs;t+i  B

(Ih;t+i)
 (et+i)
1 h .
Maximisation implies:
Ct:
UCt =  t (33)
hs;t:
Uhs;t +Mt   t(1   st)ws;t = 0 (34)
hu;t:
Uhu;t   t(1  ut )wu;t = 0 (35)
Kst;t+1:
t = [t+1
 
rst;t+1(1   rst;t+1) + (1  st)

] (36)
Keq;t+1:
t = [t+1(req;t+1(1   req;t+1) + (1  eq)] (37)
et:
Uet  Mtfet = 0 (38)
Ih;t:
t
 
1  ht
 MtfIh;t = 0 (39)
bt+1:
t
1
rbt
= t+1 (40)
where Ux is the derivative of the utility function with respect to the variable
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x.
Equation (38) implies that: Mt = Uet=fet . By substituting equations (33)
and (38) to (34-40) we obtain:
0 = Uhs;t +
Uet
fet
+ UCt(1   st)ws;t (41)
0 = Uhs;t + UCt(1  ut )wu;t (42)
UCt= [UCt+1
 
rst;t+1(1   rst;t+1) + (1  st)

] (43)
UCt= [UCt+1
 
req;t+1(1   req;t+1) + (1  eq)

] (44)
UCt(1  ht )+
Uet ()
fet
fIh;t= 0 (45)
rbt =
UCt
UCt+1
(46)
where 43 and 44 are the two Euler equations for capital structures and capital
equipment respectively and demonstrate the e¤ect of the two intertemporal
wedges,  rst;t+1, and 
r
eq;t+1.
Combining equations 43, 44 and 46 we get the following equations:
rbt = rst;t+1(1   rst;t+1) + (1  st) (47)
rbt = req;t+1(1   req;t+1) + (1  eq) (48)
which dene the no-arbritrage conditions for capital and bonds ensuring that
the three assets have the same rate of return in equilibrium.
The following transversality conditions are also added for i = st; eq:
lim
t!1
tUCt
bt+1
rbt
= 0 (49)
lim
t!1
tUCtKi;t+1 = 0 (50)
The intuition of the above conditions is that on an optimal path, the
values of capital stock and bond holdings for a period far enough into the
future have zero weight to the maximization problem. Therefore, the utility
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gains from accumulating capital and bonds eventually grow slower than 1=.
This condition is crucial for the economy to reach a stationary equilibrium,
otherwise it would be optimal for the household to postpone consumption
forever.
2.2.3 The government budget constraint
The government needs to satisfy the following budget constraint in each
period:
Gct + 
h
t Ih;t + bt = 
s
tws;thst + 
u
twu;thu;t +
bt+1
rbt
+ (51)
+  rst;trst;tKst;t + 
r
eq;treq;tKeq;t:
The revenues from taxes and debt are being used to nance public con-
sumption expenditures, a subsidy to investment in education and repayments
on existing debt. The level of Gct is calibrated to obtain a debt to output
ratio equal to 53%. Under optimal scal policy we keep the level of Gct xed
over time to the value obtained under the exogenous scal policy and we let
the government choose optimally the tax rates and the level of debt.
2.2.4 Aggregate resource constraint and market clearing condi-
tions
Output can be used for consumption (private and public) and for investment.
That gives the following aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = G
c + Ct + Ist;t + Ieq;t + Ih;t: (52)
In addition, the following market clearing conditions for the input markets
are always satised: eKst;t = Kst;t (53)eKeq;t = Keq;t (54)ehs;t = hs;t (55)
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ehu;t = hu;t: (56)
2.2.5 Competitive equilibrium with exogenous scal policy
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) with exogenous policy is
summarized by a sequence of allocations fCt; Kst;t+1; Keq;t+1; hs;t; hu;t; et;
Ih;t; bt+1; eKst;t; eKeq;t; ehs;t; ehu;tg1t=0, prices fws;t; wu;t; rst;t; req;tg1t=0 and one
residual policy instrument fGctg1t=0, such that the representative household
solves its optimisation problem and the rm maximizes prots, taking prices
and tax rates as given; the government budget constraint is satised and all
markets clear. The DCE system of equations is presented in the Appendix
B.
2.3 Calibration
We calibrate the model under exogenous scal policy to match the key great-
ratios of the annual data of the US economy for the period 1970-2011. Table
2.1 below reports the models quantitative parameters. Starting with the
share of leisure in utility, (1   ), we calibrate it to 0:65 so that, in the
steady-state, the household devotes about one third of its time to labour
and education. The relative risk aversion parameter,  = 2 is commonly
employed in the literature.
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and
between unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have been estimated
by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g. Lindquist (2004),
and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates, to set ' = 0:401 and
 =  0:495. Moreover, the income share of capital structures, ac, is set equal
to 0.12, as in Lindquist (2004). The remaining parameters in the production
function are calibrated to ensure that the steady-state predictions of the
model in asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. In more
detail, the unskilled labour weight in composite input share, (1  ) = 0:3,
is calibrated to obtain a skilled to unskilled labour of about 79% and the
capital equipment weight share in composite input,  = 0:47, is calibrated to
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obtain a skill premium of about 1:64.33 We also normalize the steady-state
values of TFP and capital equipment e¢ ciency to unity (i.e. A = Aeq = 1).
The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment, st =
0:08 and eq = 0:1, are calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio
of about 1:94, which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA
on capital stocks.34 In addition, those values are in line with the works of
Greenwood et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000). The time discount factor,
 = 0:96, is set to obtain a post-tax post-depreciation annual real rate of
return on capital of roughly 4:17%, which coheres with the 4:19% obtained
in the data from the World Bank.35
Regarding the endogenous skill acquisition equation, the returns to scale,
, is calibrated to be equal to 0.425, so as to obtain an investment in edu-
cation to output ratio of about 1.8% which is similar to the average private
expenditure on education in the US.36 The weight on time investment, 1 ,
is set equal to 0.45 to get an average time in education as a share of total non-
leisure time of about 5%.37 Finally, the e¢ ciency of skills transformation, B,
is normalised to unity.38
33The target value for the skill premium is obtained from U.S. Census data and the
skilled to unskilled labour is obtained from the Acemoglu and Autor (2011) dataset for
the past 20 years.
34Specically, the BEA Table 1.1 on xed-assets has been used to obtain the time series
for capital stock for 1970-2011.
35The data refers to the annual real interest rate from World Bank Indicators database
for the period 1970-2011 (i.e. FR.INR.RINR).
36Using annual data from U.S. National Center for Education Statistics,Digest of Edu-
cation Statistics, for the period 1970-2011 the relevant share to output is about 2%.
37To obtain this value we assume that the total time spent in higher education is on
average 4 years. Note that the average working period is 35 years. Therefore, the per-
centage of time spent in education is 435 = 0:1143. Taking into account that on average in
the U.S. 40-45% of the overall population are college educated (see Table 4 of the Census
Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation), we get that: 435  0:45 = 0:0514.
Therefore, in the U.S. the average time spent in higher education is about 5.1% of the
labour force.
38These parameters are within the boundaries suggested in the related literature a (i.e.
Heckman, 1976 and Stokey,1996) although in a di¤erent setup.
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Table 2.1: Calibration
Param. Denitions Values
s depreciation rate of capital structures 0.080
e depreciation rate of capital equipment 0.100
 time discount factor 0.960
 weight attached to consumption in utility 0.350
1 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2.000
 weight on goods inv. for skills creation 0.550
B e¢ ciency of skills transformation procedure 1.000
 returns to scale in skills creation 0.425
c income share of capital structures 0.120
1
1  capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity 0.670
1
1 ' capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity 1.670
 income share of composite input to output 0.700
 income share of capital eq. to composite input 0.470
 s skilled labour income tax rate 0.250
u unskilled labour income tax rate 0.200
 rst tax rate on capital structures income 0.310
 req tax rate on capital equipment income 0.310
h subsidy for goods invest. in skills creation 0.000
_
A constant parameter productivity 1.000
_
Aeq e¢ ciency level of capital equipment 1.000
Finally, we use the ECFIN e¤ective capital and labour tax rates from
Martinez-Mongay (2000) to obtain an average tax rate for capital and labour.39
Therefore, we set the tax rate for both capital income  rst = 
r
eq = 0:31 and
the two labour income tax rates u = 0:20 and  s = 0:25.40 Given that it
39In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for e¤ective average labour and capital
taxes respectively from 1970-2011, as they treat self-employed income as capital income
in the calculations.
40Note that the calculation of the e¤ective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22.
But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed di¤erently we
decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so as the weighted average
of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
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is di¢ cult to obtain data for the education investment subsidy, h, we set
it to zero under the exogenous scal policy. We nally set the value of gov-
ernment expenditures, Gc = 0:0320, to obtain a steady-state debt to output
ratio, b=Y = 53%, which is equal to the average debt to GDP ratio obtained
in the data.41
2.4 Exogenous steady-state
Under exogenous scal policy we solve the decentralized competitive equilib-
rium system of equations, as it is outlined in the Appendix B, keeping the
tax rates at their calibrated values. Table.2.2 presents the steady-state re-
sults of the exogenous scal policy model together with the US data averages
for 1970-2011. We also present a more detailed set of results regarding the
exogenous scal policy in Table.2.3.
Table 2.2: Steady state of exogenous scal policy
model data
C=Y 0:5631 0:6397
K=Y 1:9461 1:8951
I=Y 0:1810 0:1462
Ih=Y 0:0177 0:0212
b=Y 0:5281 0:5300
hs=hu 0:7953 0:7633
Gc=Y 0:2382 0:2031
ws=wu 1:6431 1:6590
rnet 0:0417 0:0419
e
hs+hu+e
0:0530 0:0514
2.5 Optimal scal policy
In this section we discuss the Ramsey solution of optimal taxation, where it is
assumed that the government chooses the series of taxes and debt to nance
41The source of that time series is: FRED Economic Data on Gross Federal Debt as a
percentage of GDP, 1970-2011.
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exogenously determined public spending, with the objective to maximise
the welfare of the household. The government, in other words, wishes to
minimise the welfare costs of taxation. The optimisation is subject to the set
of equations that characterize the DCE. To obtain the second best allocations,
it is assumed that the government has access to a commitment technology
in order not to re-optimize in the future.
To solve the optimal scal policy problem we follow the primal approach.
Therefore, initially we derive the present discount value of the households
lifetime budget constraint using the transversality conditions for bonds and
the two types of capital, presented earlier, and the Arrow-Debreu price of
the bond. The next step of the primal approach is to substitute out of the
present discount value of the budget constraint prices and taxes using the
rst order conditions as they have been presented in equations (41) - (46)
and, in the Appendix B, in equations (21) - (24). These substitutions lead
to the implementability constraint. The implementability constraint and
the aggregate resource constraint are the restrictions to the maximisation
problem of the government.
2.5.1 Implementability constraint
The implementability constraint is derived from the present value of the
households lifetime budget constraint. Starting from t = 0 and by adding
future budget constraints for the household, taking the transversality condi-
tions into account, we get:
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
rbi
 1  
Ct +
 
1  ht

Ih;t

=
=
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
rbi
 1 f(1   st)ws;ths;t+ [(1  ut ]wu;t)hu;tg+
+b0 +

(1   rst;0)rst;0 + (1  st)
	
Kst;0+
+

(1   req;0)req;0 + (1  eq)
	
Keq;0:
(57)
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) we set the Arrow-Debreu price
as: q0t =
t 1Q
i=0
 
rbi
 1
, 8t  1, with q00 = 1, and we re-write the above equation
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as: 1P
t=0
q0t
 
Ct +
 
1  ht

Ih;t

=
=
1P
t=0
q0t f(1   st)ws;ths;t+ [(1  ut ]wu;t)hu;tg+
+b0 +

(1   rst;0)rst;0 + (1  st)
	
Kst;0+
+

(1   req;0)req;0 + (1  eq)
	
Keq;0
(58)
Then if we use equations (41) - (46) to substitute out prices and taxes,
we can write the households lifetime budget constraint as:
1X
t=0
t

UC;tCt  

Uet
fet
fIh;t

Ih;t +

Uhs;t +
Uet
fet

hs;t + Uhu;thu;t

= A0 (59)
where,
A0= UC;0
(
b0+

(1   rst;0)rst;0 + 1  st

Kst;0+
+

(1   req;0)req;0 + 1  eq

Keq;0
)
Equation (59) is the implementability constraint.
2.5.2 The primal approach
Under the primal approach the government maximises the following objective
function:
max
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et) (60)
subject to the implementability constraint (59), the skill creation equation
(29) and the aggregate resource constraint (52), by choosing: fCt; hs;t; hu;t;
Kst;t+1; Keq;t+1; et; Ihs;tg1t=0, given fb0;  req;0;  rst;0; Kst;0; Keq;0g.42
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) we initially determine a pseudo-
value function and assuming that  is the Lagrange multiplier with respect
42We do not examine the problem of initial taxation and thus not allow the government
to choose optimally the capital income taxes at t = 0.
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to the implementability constraint we dene:
V (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; )=U (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et) +fUC;tCt 

Uet
fet
fIh;t

Ih;t+
+

Uhs;t +
Uet
fet

hs;t+Uhu;thu;tg: (61)
Now we can write the Lagrangian equation for the optimal taxation under
the primal approach:
J =
1X
t=0
tV (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; ) + (62)
+ t[Yt  Gct   Ct   Ih;t  Kst;t+1+
+ (1  st)Kst;t  Keq;t+1 + (1  eq)Keq;t]+
+ t [hs;t   f(Ih;t; et)]  A0
where
Yt= At
 
Ka
c
st;t
 h

 

 
Aeq;tK

eq;t

+ (1  )hs;t
'=
+ (1  )h'u;t
i 1 ac
'
and t; t  0 8t, is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers with respect to the
aggregate resource constraint and the skill creation constraint respectively.
Given the initial values of capital taxes, debt and the two stocks of capital,
equation J is maximised with respect to fCt; hs;t; hu;t; Kst;t+1; Keq;t+1; et;
Ihs;tg1t=1 and for t = 0 equation J is maximised with respect to fC0; hs;0; hu;0;
e0; Ihs;0g. This means that at t = 0 the rst order conditions are di¤erent
from t  1:
VC;t = t ; t  1 (63)
Vhs;t =  tYhs;t   t ; t  1 (64)
Vhu;t =  tYhu;t ; t  1 (65)
Ve;t = t fe;t; t  1 (66)
VIh;t = t + t fIh;t ; t  0 (67)
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t = t+1 [YKst;t+1 + 1  st] ; t  0 (68)
t = t+1

YKeq ;t+1 + 1  eq

; t  0 (69)
VC;0 = 0 + AC (70)
Vhs;0 =  0Yhs;0   0 + Ahs (71)
Vhu;0 =  0Yhu;0 + Ahu (72)
Ve;0 = 0 fe;0 + Ae (73)
where Yx;t is the derivative of Yt, presented above, with respect to variable x
at time t.
Therefore, the rst order conditions for the governments problem are:
 for t = 0:
Vhs;0 =  (VC;0   AC)Yhs;0   0 + Ahs (74)
Vhu;0 =  (VC;0   AC)Yhu;0 + Ahu (75)
Ve;0 = 0 fe;0 + Ae (76)
VIh;0 = 0 fIh;0 + VC;0   AC (77)
VC;0   AC = VC;1 [YKst;1 + 1  st] (78)
VC;0   AC = VC;1

YKeq ;1 + 1  eq

(79)
Y0 = G
c + C0 + Ih;0 +Kst;1   (1  st)Kst;0+ (80)
+Keq;1 + (1  eq)Keq;0
hs;0 = f(Ih;0; e0) (81)
 for t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1:
Vhs;t =  VC;tYhs;t   t (82)
Vhu;t =  VC;tYhu;t (83)
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Ve;t = t fe;t (84)
VIh;t = VC;t + t fIh;t (85)
VC;t = VC;t+1 [YKst;t+1 + 1  st] (86)
VC;t = VC;t+1

YKeq ;t+1 + 1  eq

(87)
Yt = G
c + Ct + Ih;t +Kst;t+1   (1  st)Kst;t+ (88)
+Keq;t+1 + (1  eq)Keq;t
hs;t = f(Ih;t; et) (89)
 for t = T :
Vhs;T =  VC;TYhs;T   T (90)
Vhu;T =  VC;TYhu;T (91)
Ve;T = T fe;T (92)
VIh;T = VC;T + T fIh;T (93)
1 =  [YKst;T + 1  st] (94)
1 = 

YKeq ;T + 1  eq

(95)
YT = G
c + CT + Ih;T + stKst;T + eqKeq;T (96)
hs;T = f(Ih;T ; eT ) (97)
To solve this system, we initially guess a value for  and solve equations
(74)-(97) for an allocation fCt; hs;t; hu;t; Kst;t+1; Keq;t+1; et; Ihs;t; tg1t=0. The
system has [(8 T ) + 1] equations and it is solved using standard non-linear
numerical methods (see, e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010), Adjemian et al.
(2011)). Then we test if the implementability constraint (59) is binding and
we increase or decrease accordingly the value of  until the implementabil-
ity constraint is satised. We set the initial conditions for debt, the two
stocks of capital and the two capital income taxes equal to their exogenous
steady-state, to calculate the dynamic transition path from the exogenous
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to optimal scal policy steady-state. To ensure that the variables converge
to the optimal scal policy steady-state, we set the value of T = 250. The
results indicate that in model convergence has been achieved after the initial
150 periods.
2.5.3 Flexible debt: steady-state and lifetime welfare
We rst present results from the case where no additional restrictions are
placed on government debt, other than (59). Table 2.3 presents the results
for the steady-state and for lifetime welfare for optimal scal policy together
with the relevant steady-state of the exogenous scal policy for di¤erent
assumptions regarding the policy menu set. In the penultimate row of the
table we present the lifetime welfare in each case study by taking into account
the transitional dynamics from the exogenous scal policy to optimal taxation
(these will be examined below in more detail). The last row presents the
compensating consumption supplement,  ,for each model compared to the
benchmark specication under a full instrument set in the second column.
As a result, a negative value of  indicates that the lifetime welfare, taking
into account the transitional dynamics, is lower under that restriction in the
policy instrument set compared to the benchmark specication.43
The optimal policy results in the steady-state are consistent with the
related literature (see e.g. Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2012) ch. 16 for a review of the literature). Therefore, as it is
expected from the literature, under a complete set of scal instruments and
shown in column 2 in Table 2.3, the optimal tax rate on capital income is
zero in the long-run. In our case study we nd that this is true for both
capital taxes and remains true even if we do not tax di¤erently the returns
from capital structures and capital equipment.44 Compared to the exogenous
scal policy at the steady-state of optimal scal policy capital accumulation
is higher due to the elimination of the intertemporal wedges.
The optimal labour income taxation is progressive in our setup, with a
43The calculation of the compensating consumption supplement is presented in the Ap-
pendix B.
44These results are not shown here to save on space but are available on request.
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larger di¤erence between the two labour income taxes compared to exogenous
scal policy. The increase in the returns to skilled labour, brought about by
the skill biased increase in the capital equipment stock (in turn achieved by
the elimination of the capital taxes) allows the government to tax skilled
labour income more than unskilled, without reducing skilled hours. Indeed,
under optimal scal policy, skilled hours are slightly higher than the unskilled
hours, compared to the exogenous scal policy. This is further encouraged
by a subsidy to spending in education. Therefore, skilled hours rise more
relative to unskilled, and the representative household decides to invest more
in skill creation, mainly through goods investment because of the subsidy in
the investment of goods for skill acquisition. The increase in skilled hours
reduces the skill premium compared with the exogenous scal policy case
study, despite the rise in skill-biased equipment capital.
Next we restrict the choice of scal policy instruments for the govern-
ment. First, we do not allow the government to use two di¤erent labour
income tax rates, i.e. we impose that  st = 
u
t ; this is Model 1.
45 This allows
us to examine the long-run optimal capital income tax and specically we
can assess if one of the two capital income tax rates will become non-zero in
order to compensate for the missing labour income tax. In other words, un-
der this specication we can examine optimal capital income taxation under
incomplete set of scal instruments.
Then, as an alternative specication, we impose a di¤erent restriction
to the set of scal policy instruments by not allowing the government to
use a subsidy to goods investment for skill creation (Model 2). This is an
interesting case study because we can examine under this setup how the
government will incentivise the skill acquisition and what happens to the
progressivity of the labour taxes.
Finally, we restrict even further the set of scal instruments by combining
the previous restrictions (Model 4). In this extension of Model 2 we can
investigate the e¤ects on the optimal capital income tax rates.
45Note that we have also examined the case where the government is not able to impose
two di¤erent capital income taxes. In this case the results are identical to our benchmark
model and the government still optimally sets a zero capital income tax.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of steady state optimal tax results
Param. Exogenous Opt. policy Opt. Policy Opt. policy Opt. policy
policy endog. b=Y endog. b=Y endog. b=Y endog. b=Y
with  s= u and h= 0  s= u
and h= 0
(Benchmark) (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
Y 0.1342 0.1692 0.1678 0.1644 0.1640
C 0.0756 0.0899 0.0889 0.0882 0.0877
Kst 0.0913 0.1669 0.1655 0.1622 0.1618
Keq 0.1698 0.2891 0.2866 0.2802 0.2794
hs 0.1177 0.1351 0.1397 0.1305 0.1329
hu 0.1480 0.1337 0.1236 0.1316 0.1268
e 0.0149 0.0145 0.0167 0.0177 0.0185
Ih=Y 0.0177 0.0297 0.0301 0.0200 0.0209
Kst=Y 0.6805 0.9863 0.9863 0.9863 0.9863
Keq=Y 1.2656 1.7088 1.7076 1.7040 1.7036_
G
c
0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320
C=Y 0.5631 0.5315 0..5298 0.5363 0.5350
_
G
c
=Y 0.2382 0.1890 0.1905 0.1944 0.1949
b=Y 0.5281 -0.4958 -0.5333 -0.5686 -0.5691
I=Y 0.1987 0.2498 0.2497 0.2493 0.2493
 rst 0.3100 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 req 0.3100 0.0000 0.0240 0.0000 0.0116
 s 0.2500 0.3182 0.2762 0.2827 0.2663
u 0.2000 0.2331 0.2762 0.2460 0.2663
h 0.0000 0.4509 0.3783 - -
ws=wu 1.6431 1.6408 1.5117 1.6609 1.5961
LU -75.4549 -75.0366 -75.0744 -75.1884 -75.2002
 - - -0.1440% -0.5790% -0.6241%
We start with the case where we reduce the available set of scal policy in-
struments by assuming that the government can only impose a single labour
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income tax rate for both types of labour, keeping the subsidy in the invest-
ment of goods for skills creation (Model 1). In this case we observe that the
tax rate on capital equipment is not zero in the long-run. This result cohere
with the argument of Correia (1996) that if there is a factor of production
that cannot be taxed then the long-run value of the optimal capital income
tax is not zero. However, in our case we have two di¤erent capital income
tax rates, one for capital equipment and one for capital structures. There-
fore, it is not obvious which of those scal instruments the central planner
will use in order to compensate for the missing labour income tax. Under
the current setup we can see that the optimal taxation in the long-run sug-
gests that the tax rate on the returns to capital equipment will be non-zero
and positive, while the tax on structures remains zero. Equipment capital
complements skilled labour, thus the tax on equipment capital allows the
government to implement indirectly a higher tax burden on skilled labour
supply, relative to unskilled, which is optimal as discussed above given the
increase in skill-biased capital.
Moreover, in Model 1 the unskilled labour income tax rate is higher rela-
tive to the benchmark case working as an incentive for the unskilled agents
to create skills and as a result there is no need for the skill premium to be
high to enhance that incentive. Thus, in this case we observe a lower skill
premium compared to the benchmark model.
Since in our current setup we assume that there is a representative house-
hold, we cannot examine the e¤ects of optimal scal policy on income in-
equality. However, we can evaluate the aggregate welfare losses associated
with policy restrictions. In particular, we can see in Table 2.3 that when
the government has a more restricted set of policy instruments, i.e. compar-
ing Model 1 to the Ramsey case, the lifetime welfare of the representative
household is lower compared to the benchmark case with a full set of scal
policy instruments. This is expected since the government is restricted from
using two di¤erent labour income taxes. Therefore, it is expected that as
the restrictions to the set of scal policy menu increase, the compensating
consumption supplement should get larger in absolute magnitude, but with
a negative sign.
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We then move to the case where we restrict the set of policy instruments
by not allowing the government to use a subsidy to goods investment for
skills acquisition (Model 2). We can see that we still obtain the optimal zero
capital income tax in long-run. Moreover, the progressivity of the labour
income taxes remains, although the unskilled labour income tax is higher
and the skilled labour income tax lower compared to the benchmark case.
Thus, when the government cannot encourage skill creation by providing
education subsidies, taxation of skilled labour income needs to be decreased
relative to unskilled labour income, to provide higher benets to skill supply.
Specically, the skill labour income tax is almost three percentage points
lower then the previous case, whereas the unskilled labour income tax has
increased by one percentage point. In addition, in this case the lifetime
welfare of the household has decreased compared to the benchmark case and
compared to Model 1. This means that the use of education subsidy is an
important tool for the government.
Finally, we reduce even further the set of scal policy instruments. In
this case (Model 3), the central planner can only impose two di¤erent capital
income tax rates and a single labour income tax. Therefore, now the planner
doesnt have the subsidy to skill acquisition and the two di¤erent labour
income taxes at its disposal. In this case we nd again the result of non-zero
optimal capital equipment income tax rate at the steady-state but this time
the tax rate is lower than in Model 1. This implies that the tax on the returns
to capital equipment will be the scal instrument that will compensate for
the loss of the two di¤erent labour income taxes from the scal policy menu.
Interestingly, even in this case the optimal tax rate on the income from capital
structures remains zero. Thus, when there is a restricted scal policy menu
the government nds it optimal to always use the tax rate on the returns
from capital equipment accordingly so as to compensate for the missing scal
policy instrument. Regarding the skill premium we can see that in this case
it is lower compared to the benchmark case but higher compared to Model
1. This is observed because in this case the skilled labour income tax is the
lowest compared to the benchmark and the other models and it is used as an
incentive mechanism for skills acquisition instead of a high skill premium.
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2.5.4 Transition path
Figure 2.1 presents the transition path associated with the optimal taxation
for our benchmark model.46 We present the dynamic paths implied by op-
timal policy for the capital structures tax, capital equipment tax, debt to
output ratio, the two labour income taxes and the subsidy to investment in
education as the economy transitions from the exogenous scal policy steady-
state to the optimal taxation steady-state. The rst row of Figure 2.1 shows
that in the rst period skilled and unskilled labour income are subsidised at
rates 10.4% and 24.9% respectively. The subsidy to the investment in skill
acquisition is equal to 5.3% in the rst period. In the second period the
skilled tax labour income tax increases to almost 35.7% and then it gradu-
ally decreases to its long-run steady-state reported in Table 2.3 (benchmark
model). The unskilled labour income tax in the second period is equal to
25.5% and then it gradually converges to its long-run value under optimal
taxation. The subsidy to the investment in skill acquisition becomes 45% in
the second period and then follows the same pattern as the labour income
taxes.
The second row of Figure 2.1 shows that in the rst period, since capital
is already in place (predetermined), the two capital income tax rates reach
a conscatory rate of about 268% and 245% for capital structures and cap-
ital equipment respectively. In the second period, the two tax rates become
1.3% and 0.48% for capital structures and equipment respectively and then
slowly converge to zero. The high capital taxation in the rst period allows
the government to create a rst period stock of assets via lending to house-
holds. Then in the second period the government assets decrease due to the
sharp decrease in capital income taxes and then they slowly increase again
mainly due to the decrease in the subsidy for skill acquisition. The income
from assets is used to subsidise investment in goods for skill creation and to
compensate for the zero capital income taxes, without the need to resort to
signicantly high labour income taxes.
46Note that we do not present the transition paths for every model presented in Table
2.3 since they are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.
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Figure 2.1: Transition path of the policy instruments
2.5.5 Budget rule
Table 2.4 presents the steady-state results under optimal scal policy under
a budget rule. In particular, we assume that the government is required to
keep a xed debt to output ratio when choosing optimal taxation. This is an
empirically relevant restriction since in recent years most advanced economies
had debt targets to respect. Table 2.4 includes in the rst column the results
from the Ramsey case and this is followed by the results under the budget
rule under the full set of tax instruments. The remaining columns present
results obtained by imposing the same restrictions on the instrument set as
in Table 2.3, for the case of budget rules.
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Under a compete tax instrument set and a restriction that the govern-
ment needs to keep a xed debt to output ratio equal to the average debt
to output ratio observed in the annual US data for the period 1970-2011 we
have the results in the second column, under the label of Model 4. In this
case we observe that both labour income taxes are higher and the subsidy is
lower compared to the benchmark case in order for the government to be able
to satisfy a given level of debt to output ratio. However, we still observe that
the progressivity of the labour income taxes is present although the di¤erence
between the two labour income taxes has decreased compared to the bench-
mark case. Specically, the skilled labour income tax is almost 1.5 percentage
points higher and the unskilled labour income tax almost 3 percentage points
higher than the benchmark case study. The optimal capital income taxes are
again zero in this case. Finally, the compensating consumption supplement
is negative 0.28% which means that the representative household is worse o¤
under this setup compared to the benchmark case. This is expected since
the government is restricted from issuing debt. Therefore, again we expect
to see that as the restrictions to the set of scal policy menu increase, the
compensating consumption supplement should get larger in absolute terms
but with a negative sign. In addition, it is expected that the lifetime welfare
under a xed debt to output ratio should be lower compared to the cases
where the government was able to issue debt.
In Model 5 we restrict the government from issuing two di¤erent labour
income taxes, under the budget rule. In this case we observe that the optimal
tax rate on capital equipment is non-zero, similarly to Model 1. Specically,
in this case the optimal tax on capital equipment is equal to 1.86%, which
is lower compared to the 2.4% under Model 1. Therefore, the result that
under an incomplete set of scal instruments the government is using the tax
rate on capital equipment, and not that on capital structures, to compensate
for the missing scal instrument remains even with a xed debt to output
ratio. Similarly to Model 1, the skill premium is being reduced compared
to the benchmark and the exogenous scal policy model. That happens
because in Model 5 the unskilled labour income tax rate is higher relative to
Model 4 case study, working as an incentive for the unskilled agents to create
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skills and there is no need for the skill premium to be high so as to enhance
that incentive. In particular, in this case the unskilled labour income tax is
almost 3.7 percentage points higher than in Model 4, and the skilled labour
income tax is almost 3.5 percentage points lower than in Model 4 with a full
set of scal instruments but without exible debt. In addition, we can see
that in Model 5 the lifetime welfare of the representative household is lower
compared to Model 4 and compared to the benchmark case with a full set of
scal policy instruments.
In the case where we restrict the government from issuing a subsidy to
goods investment for skills acquisition (Model 6) we observe that the optimal
tax rate on both capitals is zero. In addition, the progressivity of the labour
income taxes is still present although it has decreased compared to Model 4.
Specically, the labour income tax has increased by 1.5 percentage points and
the skilled labour income tax has decreased by almost 3 percentage points
compared to Model 4. Thus, similarly to Model 2, when the government
cannot encourage skill creation by providing a subsidy to education, taxation
of skilled labour income needs to be decreased more relative to unskilled
labour income tax, so as to provide incentives for skills acquisition. Finally,
the lifetime welfare of the household has decreased even further compared to
the benchmark case and compared to Model 4.
In Model 7 we restrict even further the set of scal policy instruments.
In this case the government cannot issue two di¤erent labour income taxes
and also cannot impose a subsidy to the investment in education. Under
this specication we get a non-zero tax on capital equipment which is lower
compared to Model 5, at 0.88%. Regarding the level of the labour income
taxes we observe that it is marginally lower than Model 5, similarly with the
case studies where the government was able to issue debt (Models 1 and 3).
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Table 2.4: Comparison of steady state optimal taxation results with xed
debt to output ratio
Param. Opt. policy Opt. policy Opt. policy Opt. policy Opt. policy
endog. b=Y xed b=Y xed b=Y xed b=Y xed b=Y
with  s=u and h= 0  s= u
and h= 0
(Ramsey) (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7)
Y 0.1692 0.1653 0.1642 0.1613 0.1610
C 0.0899 0.0876 0.0867 0.0859 0.0856
Kst 0.1669 0.1630 0.1619 0.1590 0.1588
Keq 0.2891 0.2828 0.2812 0.2754 0.2751
hs 0.1351 0.1323 0.1362 0.1285 0.1306
hu 0.1337 0.1300 0.1214 0.1278 0.1238
e 0.0145 0.0147 0.0166 0.0173 0.0180
Ih=Y 0.0297 0.0269 0.0270 0.0193 0.0200
Kst=Y 0.9863 0.9863 0.9863 0.9863 0.9863
Keq=Y 1.7088 1.7108 1.7125 1.7077 1.7088
_
G
c
0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320 0.0320
C=Y 0.5315 0.5297 0.5281 0.5327 0.5316
_
G
c
=Y 0.1890 0.1934 0.1947 0.1983 0.1986
b=Y -0.4958 0.5281 0.5281 0.5281 0.5281
I=Y 0.2498 0.2500 0.2502 0.2497 0.2498
 rst 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 req 0.0000 0.0000 0.0186 0.0000 0.0088
 s 0.3182 0.3338 0.2983 0.3058 0.2924
u 0.2331 0.2619 0.2983 0.2757 0.2924
h 0.4509 0.3934 0.3199 - -
ws=wu 1.6408 1.6329 1.5222 1.6454 1.5909
LU -75.0366 -75.1101 -75.1550 -75.2752 -75.2888
 - -0.2801% -0.4513% -0.9112% -0.9632%
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2.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we analysed optimal factor income taxation when there are
di¤erent returns to skilled and unskilled labour and capital in structures and
equipment, under capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill acqui-
sition. We worked with a representative agent framework, which allowed
us to focus on aggregate e¢ ciency and abstract from potential equity con-
siderations for optimal taxation. In the model considered, a representative
household decides how to allocate its investment in the two types of capi-
tal stock and in creating skill labour. Moreover, it decides how to allocate
its time endowment into leisure, labour supply in skilled and unskilled jobs,
and in creating skill labour through education time. Therefore, the model
allows for endogenous skill acquisition, which is modelled following He and
Liu (2008). The production side is modelled as in Krusell et al. (2000). In
this framework, we derived optimal tax policy under commitment and ex-
ogenous spending policy, by considering various assumptions regarding the
availability of tax instruments and debt to the policy-maker.
We found that when all factor inputs, as well as investment in skill acqui-
sition, can be taxed at separate rates, both capital income taxes are zero in
the long-run, there is a subsidy to education and the labour income taxes are
progressive. However, if the government has access to the education subsidy
but cannot tax income from skilled and unskilled labour separately, while
the tax on income from structures remains zero in the long run, there is a
small positive tax on equipment capital. If the government can only imple-
ment a single income tax, without having access to education subsidies, the
equipment tax is again positive but with lower magnitude. Moreover, we
found that the restrictions to scal policy menu do not change the result of
progressive labour income taxes qualitatively, however, more restricted pol-
icy, in the form of unavailability of education subsidies and budget rules, is
associated with decreases in progressivity.
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Appendix B
B Chapter 2
B.1 DCE system of equations
Here we present the equations of the exogenous decentralized competitive
equilibrium:
0 = Uhs;t +
Uet
fet
+ UCt(1   st)ws;t (B1)
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ut )wu;t (B2)
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B.2 Compensating consumption supplement
In order for the welfare gains to be estimated the compensating consumption
supplement will be calculated, following Lucas (1990):
V B(C; l) = V A((1   )C; l) (B15)
where V B is the lifetime welfare of the representative household under the
Benchmark model and under optimal scal policy and V A is the lifetime
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welfare of the representative household under optimal scal policy and under
several restrictions to scal policy menu. Note that in both regimes we
calculate the lifetime welfare by taking into account the transition period
from the exogenous to optimal scal policy. The lifetime welfare is calculated
as:
V B(C; l) =
1X
t=0
t
 
UA (Ct; lt)

and
V A((1   )C; l) =
1X
t=0
t
 
UA ((1   )Ct; lt)

where UB and UA represent the within period welfare.
Therefore, equation (B15) will become:
1X
t=0
t
 
UB (Ct; lt)

=
1X
t=0
t
 
UA ((1   )Ct; lt)

V B (Ct; lt) =
1X
t=0
t
 
(1   )Ctl1 t
1 1
1  1
V B (Ct; lt) =
1X
t=0
t(1   )(1 1)
 
Ct
l1 t
1 1
1  1
V B (Ct; lt) = (1   )(1 1)
1X
t=0
t
 
Ct
l1 t
1 1
1  1
V B (Ct; lt) = (1   )(1 1)V A
(1   )(1 1) =
 
V B

(V A)
 = 1 

V B
V A
 1
(1 1)
where we multiply by 100 to obtain a percentage rate:
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Chapter 3: Optimal income taxation over
the business cycle
Abstract: This chapter examines how income taxes are optimally distrib-
uted over the business cycle in a model with high, middle and low income
agents when the government is restricted to balance its budget in each pe-
riod. The model incorporates capital-skill complementarity and the agents
are assumed to have di¤erent access to labour and capital markets. This
allows us to develop an empirically relevant model that is able to match
the cyclical characteristics of the US economy. The optimal scal policy re-
sults indicate that the income tax rate of the high income agents has the
lowest volatility and the income tax rate of the low income agents exhibits
the lowest counter-cyclicality. Moreover, the optimal income tax rate of the
middle income agents is found to be very volatile and counter-cyclical. We
also examine the e¤ects on optimal income taxation under a di¤erent scal
policy menu that also includes a consumption tax. In this case we nd that
the progressivity of the income tax rates is even higher and that the results
regarding the volatilities of the income taxes are overturned. We further nd
that, in both of the case studies, the progressivity of the income tax rates is
optimally increased immediately after a positive shock to capital equipment
e¢ ciency and a reduction to government expenditures, whereas it optimally
increases after two years with a positive shock to total factor productivity.47
3.1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that examines the characteristics of optimal
taxation over the business cycle (i.e. Chari et al. (1994) and Arseneau and
Chugh (2012)). The optimal taxation literature acknowledges the fact that
the set of scal policy instruments and the imperfections in capital and labour
markets are essential for the behaviour of optimal scal policy. For instance,
while in a frictionless labour market the labour income tax should optimally
47The CESifo 2013 working paper (4468) by Angelopoulos, Asimakopoulos and Malley
entitled "The Optimal Distribution of the Tax Burden over the Business Cycle" is based
on this Chapter.
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not vary much over the business cycle and remain a-cyclical, Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) show that under search frictions in the labour market, the
optimal labour income tax becomes very volatile and counter-cyclical. More-
over, Stockman (2001) shows that a balanced-budget restriction leads to an
increase of the optimal volatility of the labour relative to capital taxes.
In a di¤erent literature, Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) provide empirical evidence that the capital-skill complementarity in
the production process drives the growing wage inequality observed in the
data. Moreover, Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000) and Galí et
al. (2007) show that the existence of a subset of the population that doesnt
have access to capital markets, "hand-to-mouth" agents, is essential for shap-
ing the economic policy under uncertainty. Despite the aforementioned re-
search, the optimal taxation literature has not yet examined optimal income
taxes over the business cycle under imperfections that limit the participation
of households in markets for skilled labour and capital.
Income taxation has naturally been a focal point for the research on
economic policy under income inequality (see e.g. the work reviewed and
analysed in Kocherlakota (2010)). This is because, on one hand, progres-
sive income taxation can be used to reduce income inequality and promote a
fairer distribution of income. On the other hand, the disincentives associated
with taxation and, in particular, with progressive taxation, need to be taken
into account. In light of this, the normative properties relating to the pro-
gressivity of the tax system have been extensively analysed (see e.g. Mankiw
et al. (2009) for an assessment of this literature). However, the response of
optimal income taxes in business cycle frequencies to exogenous productivity
and government spending shocks, under a balanced budget and both wage
and asset inequalities, has not been examined. This is particularly relevant
given the presence of these inequalities and the current economic reality that
severely limits the use of debt to respond to economic uctuations in most
advanced economies. In such an environment, the revenue requirements for
governments that are faced with exogenous aggregate shocks need to be -
nanced by unpleasant taxes, so that a pertinent question for policymaking
becomes how to distribute the tax burden over the business cycle to min-
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imise the negative e¤ect of distorting taxes. In addition, it is important to
understand how optimal income taxation behaves when there is a richer set
of scal instruments. For that reason we extend the scal policy menu of the
government by introducing a consumption tax and we re-assess the reaction
of the optimal taxation over the business cycle.
In a related literature, Aiyagari (1994) examines the e¤ects of idiosyn-
cratic shocks on income inequality. Specically, he assumes that agents
are ex-ante homogeneous but ex-post heterogeneous due to the idiosyncratic
shocks. As a result agents tend to accumulate capital via a precautionary
motive. This capital acts as self-insurance against potential future negative
shocks. Moreover, Aiyagari (1994) examines only the steady state equilib-
rium and there are no aggregate shocks to the economy.
The New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF) literature extends Aiyagari-
Bewley model by assuming that agents are privately informed about their
skills and productivity. This way optimal taxation depends on income, risk
aversion and distribution of skills, and provides a trade-o¤ for the govern-
ment between incentives to labour and equality among the agents. Kocher-
lakota (2006) challenges the argument of Chamley (1986), that government
can impose only linear taxes, because in practice governments are able to
use nonlinear taxes. Thus, Kocherlakota (2006), following Mirrlees (1971),
introduced nonlinear taxation in an economy populated with heterogeneous
agents in terms of labour productivity. As in Mirrlees (1971), NDPF makes
the assumption that people di¤er in their skills, which are private informa-
tion, and also skills change stochastically over time.
Therefore, under the NDPF theory the government pre-commits to a tax
schedule that can only depend on income and not skills. This way the gov-
ernment has an unrealistically large set of policy instruments at its disposal
which is very di¢ cult to monitor at each point in time.48 Moreover, due to
the large complexity of the model it is not feasible to be calibrated to cap-
ture some key characteristics of the economy and a static analysis is usually
performed.
Taking the above into consideration, in this chapter we analyse the op-
48Note that in our model the government can observe the skills of the agents.
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timal income taxation over the business cycle when the government runs a
balanced budget. To this end, we develop a model that is able to replicate the
cyclical properties of the economy and the empirical observations on wealth
and wage inequality (skill premium).49 Therefore, we build a model where
the production process exhibits capital-skill complementarities, the labour
market is fragmented regarding the skill supply and the agents have di¤erent
access to asset markets with a subset of the population being excluded from
holding assets.
Thus, the model has three types of households that are divided with
respect to their income into low, middle and high. In addition, we have
two labour markets, for skilled and unskilled labour and we further assume
that there are barriers that prevent agents from participating in both labour
markets. In particular, we assume that the high income households pro-
vide skilled labour, where skilled agents are those with a college degree or
relevant professional qualication. The middle and low income households
are assumed to provide unskilled labour, which means that are those with-
out a college degree. The production structure implies that there are two
wage rates in the model, skilled and unskilled wage rate, leading to a skill
premium.50 Following the contributions of Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Krusell et al. (2000), we assume that the skill premium is driven by skill-
biased technical change and capital-skill complementarities. In particular,
we assume that the production process follows the technology specied in
Krusell et al. (2000) which has received empirical support and has been
shown to match the behaviour of the skill premium in the data.
Capital market imperfections imply that households in our model di¤er
with respect to their participation in the asset markets. In particular, fol-
lowing the contributions of Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000)
and Galí et al. (2007), we assume that a subset of the households does not
have any savings and is thus earning only labour income, which it totally
consumes. We further assume that these households o¤er unskilled labour
49The skill premium is dened as the ratio of the wage rate of the skilled agent over the
wage rate of the unskilled agent.
50In our setup we assume that skills are endowed, so taxes do not a¤ect skill acquisition.
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services, so that the three types of households in the economy are dened as,
high income skilled agents who own assets, middle income unskilled agents
who also own assets and low income unskilled agents who do not have access
to the capital market.
Our work on this chapter deviates from the representative agent litera-
ture on optimal taxation, such as Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001),
by emphasizing on the importance of skill and asset market imperfections
that generate wealth and wage inequality, as well as the balanced budget
restriction on the behaviour of optimal taxation. Compared with the litera-
ture of optimal taxation with heterogeneous agents (i.e. Kocherlakota (2010)
and references therein), our modeling emphasizes on wage inequalities that
are generated by capital-skill complementarities together with the inequal-
ity from the asset market participation and focuses on the business cycle
properties of income taxes.51
We calibrate a version of the model with exogenous tax policy to the U.S.
quarterly data and nd that the model ts the data very well with respect
to key long-run stylized facts as well as the cyclical properties of the data,
including the empirical ndings that the skill premium is e¤ectively a-cyclical
and not volatile (see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)). Hav-
ing established the empirical relevance of the model, we then characterize
optimal policy, by letting the government choose the income tax rates opti-
mally over the business cycle to maximise aggregate welfare given its revenue
requirements. Moreover, we extend the set of scal instruments by allowing
the government to choose optimally a consumption tax rate on top of the
three income tax rates with the balanced budget restriction.
We nd that the cyclical properties of the income tax rates di¤er signif-
icantly with each other and with those observed in the data. As expected,
given the balanced budget restriction and the instruments available to the
government, the tax rates are generally more volatile and more counter-
cyclical than in the data, as in Stockman (2001). The counter-cyclicality of
51Specically, this literature emphasizes on the unobservability of idiosyncratic labour
productivity, which then generates wage inequality. In this chapter we make the assump-
tion that skills are observable, since they depend on the level of education.
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the taxes is also driven from the balanced budget restriction because under a
negative shock to the economy, output decreases and also capital and labour
decrease, causing a reduction to labour and capital income and as a result
the tax revenues decrease. Thus, the government needs to increase taxation
to be able to nance its expenditures.
However, there are also important di¤erences between the tax rates.
These result from the trade-o¤ that the government faces when deciding how
to distribute the distortions reected by the higher volatility and counter-
cyclicality of the three tax rates over the business cycle. On one hand, such
distortions have a large impact on hand-to-mouth households, since they are
less able to smooth shocks. There is thus an incentive to minimise the im-
pact of policy for this type of household. On the other hand, tax-induced
distortions to skilled households have the strongest propagation e¤ects in the
economy, given the complementarity of skilled hours with equipment capital.
Therefore, there is also an incentive to minimise distortions to the choices of
skilled households, since this acts to amplify external shocks. Optimal policy
resolves this trade-o¤ by keeping the lowest volatility for the tax rate for
skilled and the lowest counter-cyclicality for the hand-to-mouth households.
In contrast, the middle income group, made up by unskilled households with
savings, receives very volatile and very counter-cyclical taxes. For the case
where we also introduce the consumption tax we can see that most of the
aforementioned results are preserved apart from the volatility of the income
taxes. In this case we nd that the unskilled agents that are able to save
have the most volatile income tax, whereas the hand-to-mouth agents have
the smoothest income tax.
We further analyse the optimal distribution of the tax burden in the
short- and medium-run in response to temporary output-enhancing exoge-
nous shocks. The government nds it optimal to respond to an increase
in the productivity of capital equipment and to public spending cuts by in
creasing the progressivity of income taxes. In the case of capital equipment
technology shocks, in particular, the government nds it optimal to redis-
tribute some of the gains to skilled workers, who are the main beneciaries
of such changes, to the more constrained households in the labour market.
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This is achieved by increasing the high-income tax and reducing the other
two taxes. Public spending cuts allow the government to reduce all income
taxes, but the reduction is higher the lower the income level of the household.
Finally, the response to positive total factor productivity (TFP) shocks im-
plies that the progressivity of the tax system increases after about two years.
The sensitivity of the income of hand-to-mouth households with respect to
TFP shocks implies that the government needs to use a pro-cyclical tax on
impact in this case to help smooth consumption. As a result, income taxes
to low income agents increase immediately after positive TFP shocks so as to
smooth consumption. The aforementioned results and behaviour of the in-
come taxes after a temporary shock remain unchanged with the introduction
of the consumption tax.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a
description of the structure of the model. Sections 3 presents the cyclical
properties of the data. Section 4 outlines the calibration of the model. Sec-
tion 5 analyse the results of the exogenous scal policy case study. Section 6
provides a description of the cyclical properties of the model under optimal
scal policy. Section 7 presents the optimal distribution of the tax burden
over the business cycle. Section 8 presents a robustness analysis and section
9 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model
Our model is developed to capture the key business cycle features of an
economy characterised by imperfections that limit participation in labour
and capital markets. We rst consider a fragmented labour market, so that
there exist separate markets for "skilled" and "unskilled" labour, dened
as workers with and without college education, and assume that there exist
socio-economic barriers that do not allow mobility between the two types
of labour.52 This is motivated by empirical evidence which suggests that in
52Under a setup with longer horizons it is logical to let the agents move between the two
types of labour through human capital investment and/or university education (i.e. He
(2012) and Angelopoulos et al. (2013d)). In that case, the social mobility is essential for
assessing the long-run equilibrium together with the transition path (see e.g. Matsuyama
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business cycle frequencies the share of college educated population in the data
has low volatility and is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output. In particular,
using the data in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we nd that the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the skilled population share, relative
to that of output, is 0.27, while its correlation with output is -0.18.53 These
ndings suggest that the imperfections (in the form of, e.g. socio-economic
barriers relating to access to education) which determine participation in
labour markets are indeed more restrictive in shorter, business cycle horizons.
Then we follow Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011),
who examine the relation between skill premium and wage inequality, and
we introduce two labour inputs in the production process, skilled and un-
skilled labour. In addition, we also introduce two types of capital, structures
and equipment. Specically, we make the assumption that skilled agents are
complements with capital equipment and that the unskilled agents are sub-
stitutes with both capital equipment and skilled labour. This way the skill
premium is sensitive to changes in the productivity of capital equipment, i.e.
it will increase with positive shocks to capital equipment productivity.
Furthermore, following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Aghion and
Howitt (2009, ch. 6) and Benigno (2009) we introduce a transaction cost
for participating in capital markets. Given inequalities in asset ownership,
and in particular, evidence that suggests higher wealth for skilled relative
to unskilled workers54, we distinguish these costs between skilled and un-
skilled households. This leads to di¤erent asset holdings across workers, and
in particular, implies that a subset of the population is excluded from the
asset markets (see e.g. Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch. 6) for capital market
imperfections and agent heterogeneity). Excluded agents are thus not per-
(2006) and Aghion and Howitt (2009, ch. 6)). However, in this chapter we focus on
business cycle frequencies and we take the barriers that lead to the split in the labour
force to skilled and unskilled workers as given.
53We obtained those results using annual data for the period 1962-2008 from Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) for the share of college educated population and GDP data for the same
period from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Then we calculated
the cyclical component of those series using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of
100.
54Data from the 2010 U.S. Census show that agents with at least a bachelor degree are
two and half times wealthier than those without a bachelor degree.
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mitted to accumulate capital stock to smooth consumption, as they consume
all their (labour) income (see e.g. Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw
(2000) and Galí et al. (2007) for hand-to-mouth consumers). We also assume
that hand-to-mouth households o¤er unskilled labour services.
Taking the above into consideration we have an economy with agents that
are heterogeneous with respect to capital holdings and skills. In particular,
we have three types of households: (i) skilled households, s, that supply
skilled labour and have access to asset markets; (ii) unskilled households, u,
that supply unskilled labour and have access to asset markets; and (iii) hand-
to-mouth households, h, that supply unskilled labour and do not have access
to asset markets. Moreover, we assume that the shares of the population
for each type of household are constant and exogenous. For simplicity, we
also assume that the total size of the population, N , is constant. Setting as
Ns the number of the skilled households, as Nu the number of the unskilled
households and as Nh the number of the hand-to-mouth households we have
that: N = Ns +Nu +Nh. We further dene the relevant populations shares
as ns = Ns=N , nu = Nu=N , and nh = 1   ns   nu. We further assume that
the economy is populated with N identical rms and a government.
In each period, households act as price takers and make decisions re-
garding how much to consume, work and save. Firms act competitively and
employ two types of capital stock together with the two types of labour to
produce a homogeneous product. The government runs a balanced budget
and imposes di¤erent tax rates on each income level. It also uses the revenue
from these taxes to nance public spending.55
3.2.1 Households
We denote with the subscript j = s; u; h, the three types of households. Each
household maximizes the expected lifetime utility:
Uj = Et
1X
t=0
tu(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t) (98)
55Note that we also provide an experiment where the government can issue a single
consumption tax on every household.
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where Et is the conditional expectations operator at period t; 0 <  < 1 is a
constant discount factor; Cj;t and lj;t denote private consumption and leisure
respectively at period t. In addition, we assume that each type of household
faces external habits in consumption, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), that helps the model replicate the cyclical
moments in the data.56 This is captured by Cj;t 1 that denotes the average
consumption of the j-type household in period t   1. Finally, u() is the
utility function that is increasing, concave and continuously di¤erentiable.
The utility function is given by:
u(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t) =
 
Cj;t   !Cj;t 1

l1 j;t
(1 )
1   (99)
where ! measures the weight attached to external consumption habits within
each type of household;  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion; and
0 <  < 1 is the weight of e¤ective consumption in utility.
A household of type j faces the following time constraint:
1 = lj;t + hj;t (100)
where hj;t is hours worked in period t.
Additionally, skilled and unskilled households face the following budget
constraint:
Cj;t + I
q
j;t + I
e
j;t = (1   j;t)wj;thj;t + (1   j;t)
 
rqtK
q
j;t + r
e
tK
e
j;t
  Tt 
(101)
   j
 
Kqj;t
2
+
 
Kej;t
2
while hand-to-mouth households face the following budget constraint:
Ch;t = (1  h;t)wu;thh;t   Tt. (102)
56Thus, we assume that there is "catching-up with the Joneses in the neighborhood",
since each household compares its consumption level to that of its own socioeconomic
class. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) provide a detailed discussion on several versions of
catching-up and keeping-up with the Joneses and internal versus external habits.
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Note that the superscript i = q; e in capital refers to structures, q, and
equipment, e. In addition, I ij;t is investment for i-type of capital from j-type
of household at period t; Kij;t is the capital stock for i-type of capital from
j-type of household at period t; wj;t is the wage rate at period t for j = s; u
since we only have two types of labour (skilled and unskilled);  j is the
capital transaction cost for j = s; u; and Tt is a lump-sum tax.
Equations (101) and (102) capture several key features of the model.
First, the households di¤er in their labour income, as there are di¤erent
wage rates for skilled and unskilled households. Second, the households also
di¤er in their capital income, since they face di¤erent transaction costs. In
particular, the hand-to-mouth households implicitly face transaction costs
that are innite, so that they are excluded from the capital markets. The
remaining households face nite transaction costs, modelled here as quadratic
functions of the capital stock, following e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992) and
Benigno (2009). These may di¤er so that the households can be di¤erentiated
with respect to their steady state holdings of wealth. Third, there are two
types of capital holdings, in structures and equipment, which pay di¤erent
rates of return. The importance of allowing for the two types of capital is
explained below in the discussion of skill-biased technology in production.
Fourth, for each level of income, as reected by the household type, there is
a di¤erent income tax rate.
Finally the motion of the capital stock for i-type of capital and for j = s; u
type of household is:
Kij;t+1 = (1  i)Kij;t + I ij;t (103)
where, 0  i  1 is the depreciation rate for the i-type of capital.
The optimality conditions Each household j = s; u chooses fCj;t; hj;t;
Kij;t+1; I
i
j;tg1t=0, to maximise (98) subject to (99), (100), (101) and (103), by
taking tax rates, prices, and external consumption habits, Cj;t 1, as given.
Similarly, hand-to-mouth households, j = h, choose fCh;t; hh;tg1t=0, to max-
imise (98) subject to (99), (100) and (102), by taking tax rates, prices, and
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external consumption habits, Ch;t 1, as given.
Optimality conditions skilled households
Consumption at time t:
0 =

(Cs;t   !Cs;t 1) (1  hs;t)1 
(1 )
Cs;t   !Cs;t 1 + 
1
t (104)
Labour at time t:
0 =  

(Cs;t   !Cs;t 1) (1  hs;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Cs;t   !Cs;t 1   
1
t (1   s;t)ws;t (105)
Capital structures at time t+ 1:
0 = 2t + 

Et
1
t+1

( s;t+1   1) rqt+1 + 2 sKqs;t+1

+ Et
2
t+1 (
q   1)	 (106)
Capital equipment at time t+ 1:
0 = 3t + 

Et
1
t+1

( s;t+1   1) ret+1 + 2 sKes;t+1

+ Et
3
t+1 (
e   1)	 (107)
Investment in capital structures at time t:
0 = 1t   2t (108)
Investment in capital equipment at time t:
0 = 1t   3t (109)
Capital structures evolution equation:
0 = Kqs;t+1   (1  q)Kqs;t   Iqs;t (110)
Capital equipment evolution equation:
0 = Kes;t+1   (1  e)Kes;t   Ies;t (111)
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where 1t , 
2
t and 
3
t represent the Lagrange multipliers associated to the bud-
get constraint, capital structures and capital equipment evolution equations
of the skilled agent.
Optimality conditions unskilled households
Consumption at time t:
0 =

(Cu;t   !Cu;t 1) (1  hu;t)1 
(1 )
Cu;t   !Cu;t 1 + 
4
t (112)
Labour at time t:
0 =  

(Cu;t   !Cu;t 1) (1  hu;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Cu;t   !Cu;t 1   
4
t (1  u;t)wu;t (113)
Capital structures at time t+ 1:
0 = 5t + 

Et
4
t+1

(u;t+1   1) rqt+1 + 2 uKqu;t+1

+ Et
5
t+1 (
q   1)	 (114)
Capital equipment at time t+ 1:
0 = 6t + 

Et
1
t+1

(u;t+1   1) ret+1 + 2 uKeu;t+1

+ Et
6
t+1 (
e   1)	 (115)
Investment in capital structures at time t:
0 = 4t   5t (116)
Investment in capital equipment at time t:
0 = 4t   6t (117)
Budget constraint:
0 = Cu;t + I
q
u;t + I
e
u;t   (1  u;t) rqtKqu;t   (1  u;t) retKeu;t  (118)
  (1  u;t)wu;thu;t + Tt +  u
h 
Kqu;t
2
+
 
Keu;t
2i
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Capital structures evolution equation:
0 = Kqu;t+1   (1  q)Kqu;t   Iqu;t (119)
Capital equipment evolution equation:
0 = Keu;t+1   (1  e)Keu;t   Ieu;t (120)
where 4t , 
5
t and 
6
t denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
budget constraint, the capital structures and capital equipment evolution
equations of the unskilled agent.
Optimality conditions hand-to-mouth households
Consumption at time t:
0 =

(Ch;t   !Ch;t 1) (1  hh;t)1 
(1 )
Ch;t   !Ch;t 1 + 
7
t (121)
Labour at time t:
0 =  

(Ch;t   !Ch;t 1) (1  hh;t)1 
(1 )(1 )
Ch;t   !Ch;t 1   
7
t (1  h;t)wu;t (122)
Budget constraint:
0 = Ch;t   (1  h;t)wu;thh;t + Tt (123)
where 7t is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the budget constraint of
the hand-to-mouth agent.57
3.2.2 Production and rms
Each rm maximises its prots in perfectly competitive markets, by using
labour and capital inputs to produce output, Yt. The production function
follows the specication in Krusell et al. (2000) which has been shown to
57Note that based onWalrass law onlyN 1 constraints are required in the decentralized
competitive equilibrium. Thus, here we drop the budget constraint of the skilled agent.
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match the behaviour of the skill premium in the data.58 Specically, there
are two types of capital used in production, capital structures and capital
equipment, denoted respectively as Kf;qt and K
f;e
t , and two types of labour,
skilled and unskilled, denoted respectively as hfs;t and h
f
u;t. The production
function is given by a constant returns to scale technology assumed to take
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication, where it is further
assumed that skilled labour, hfs;t, is relatively more complementary to cap-
ital equipment, Kf;et , than unskilled labour, h
f
u;t. This is captured by the
following production function:
Yt = At

Kf;qt







n
(Aet )


Kf;et
o
+ (1  )

hfs;t
'=
+ (1  )

hfu;t
' 1 a'
(124)
where,
0 < a; ;  < 1;  1 < ';  < 1;
At denotes the total factor productivity (TFP) and Aet denotes the e¢ ciency
level of capital equipment. In addition, ' and  are the parameters deter-
mining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1=(1   ') is the elasticity of substitution
between capital equipment and unskilled labour and between skilled and un-
skilled labour, whereas 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution between
equipment capital and skilled labour. Moreover, the parameters a; ;  de-
note the factor shares.
Under this specication, capital-skill complementarity is obtained if 1=(1 
) < 1=(1   '). Appendix C analytically conrms that the skill premium,
dened as the skilled wage rate over the unskilled wage rate, is increasing
in capital equipment, Kf;et , and decreasing in the relative supply of skilled
labour,
hfs;t
hfu;t
, for the parameter restrictions considered.
Moreover, we assume that TFP, At, and the e¢ ciency level of capital
58Similar studies that also incorporate the same specication of the production function
are: Lindquist (2004), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012).
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equipment, Aet , follow a stochastic exogenous AR(1) process:
At+1 = (1  A)A+ AAt + "At (125)
Aet+1 = (1  Ae)Ae + AeAet + "Aet (126)
where "At and "
Ae
t are independently and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero means and standard deviations given respectively
by A and Ae .59
Under this specication, when capital equipment productivity, Aet , in-
creases the productivity of skilled workers will be enhanced more compared
to the productivity of unskilled workers. This e¤ect is called the skill-biased
technology. Hence, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence that
points to rising productivity of capital equipment and a rising skill premium
over the recent decades (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al. (2000),
Hornstein et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011)).
Taking prices and taxation as given, rms maximise their prots:
t = Yt   ws;thfs;t   wu;thfu;t   retKf;et   rqtKf;qt (127)
subject to the technology constraint in (124). Note that in equilibrium,
prots are zero.
Optimality conditions Here we present the optimality conditions of the
rms that choose fhfs;t; hfu;t; Kf;et ; Kf;qt g1t=0 to maximise (127) subject to
(124), taking tax rates and prices as given.
Capital structures at period t:
0 =
Yt
Kf;qt
  rqt (128)
59We assume that TFP and the e¢ ciency level of capital equipment follow exogenous
processes due to the signicant role attached to them in the literature on the skill premium
and economic uctuations (see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)).
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Capital equipment at period t:
0 =   K
f;e
t Yt
Kf;et 

1
t (

1
t )
 1
'
h
(Aet )


Kf;et

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i   ret (129)
where 
1t  
n

h
(Aet )


Kf;et
i
+ (1  )

hfs;t
o'=
+ (1  )

hfu;t
'
.
Skilled labour at period t:
0 =
At

Kf;qt

 (1  ) (1  )

hfs;t


2t
hfs;t

1
t (

1
t )
 1
'
h
 (Aet )


Kf;et

+ (1  )

hfs;t
i   ws;t (130)
where 
2t 
n

h
(Aet )


Kf;et
i
+ (1  )

hfs;t
o'=
.
Unskilled labour at period t:
0 =
At

Kf;qt

(1  ) (1  ) (nuhu;t + nhhh;t)'

1t (

1
t )
 1
' (nuhu;t + nhhh;t)
  wu;t: (131)
3.2.3 The government budget constraint
The government runs a balanced budget in every period given by:
Gct = ns s;tws;thst + nuu;twu;thu;t + nhh;twu;thh;t+ (132)
+  s;tns
 
rqtK
q
s;t + r
e
tK
e
s;t

+ u;tnu
 
rqtK
q
u;t + r
e
tK
e
u;t

+ Tt
where Gct is the average government consumption per agent.
In this chapter we pay attention only to the revenue side of the budget
constraint. Therefore, we assume that government consumption is wasteful
and follows an exogenous AR(1) process. Thus its uctuations act as ex-
ogenous spending shocks which require a change in the tax revenue collected
(for a similar approach regarding Gct , see e.g. Chari et al. (1994), Stockman
(2001) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)):
Gct+1 = (1  Gc)Gc + GcGct + "G
c
t (133)
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where "G
c
t is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
able with zero means and standard deviations given by Gc .
Regarding the tax rates, we consider below policy regimes where they are
exogenously set or they are optimally chosen by the government. Following
Arseneau and Chugh (2012), when we consider how the model economy be-
haves in response to exogenous scal policy, we use lump-sum taxes as the
residual variable in the government budget constraint, since for this exper-
iment we are not studying government nancing issues. However, for the
optimal policy analysis, again as in Arseneau and Chugh (2012), lump-sum
taxes are xed to zero.
In the literature that examines the optimality or not of tax smoothing
(see e.g. Chari et al. (1994) and Arseneau and Chugh (2012)), the gov-
ernment budget constraint includes debt. In contrast, here we focus on the
optimal allocation of the tax burden over the business cycle given the revenue
requirements of the government. Hence we do not allow the government to
issue debt to balance the budget (see also Stockman (2001), who considers
optimal capital and labour taxes with and without access to debt, albeit in
a di¤erent setup).
3.2.4 Resource constraint and market clearing conditions
The labour and capital market clearing conditions are given by:
hfs = nshs (134)
hfu = nuhu + nhhh (135)
Kit = nsK
i
s;t + nuK
i
u;t. (136)
which means that skilled and unskilled labour demanded by rms is equal to
skilled and unskilled labour supplied by households in each period. Also, the
supply of capital by households is equal to the capital demanded by rms.
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The aggregate resource constraint is given by:
Yt = G
c
t + nsCs;t + nuCu;t + nhCh;t + ns
 
Iqs;t + I
e
s;t

+ nu
 
Iqu;t + I
e
u;t

+
+ ns s
h 
Kqs;t
2
+
 
Kes;t
2i
+ nu u
h 
Kqu;t
2
+
 
Keu;t
2i
(137)
where Yt = At

Kf;qt





n

h
(Aet )


Kf;et
i
+ (1  )

hfs;t
o'=
+ (1  )

hfu;t
' 1 a'
.
3.3 Exogenous policy
In this section we examine the cyclical properties of our model when the tax
rates are not optimally chosen by the government but instead they follow
an exogenous stochastic process. Therefore, we calibrate our model so that
it generates empirically relevant business cycle uctuations. We concentrate
on the key labour market dimension that determines inequality, i.e. the skill
premium, when driven by the empirically relevant government spending and
income tax rate processes. Thus, we further assume that the three income
tax rates follow an exogenous AR(1) processes given by:
 j;t+1 =
 
1  j

 j + j j;t + "
 j
t (138)
where j = s; u; h and " jt are independently and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero means and standard deviations given by  j .
3.3.1 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Taking into account the starting values for the stock of capital structures,Kq0 ,
and capital equipment, Ke0 , the three policy instruments ( s;t; u;t; h;t) and
the stationary stochastic processes fAt; Aet ; Gctg1t=0, the decentralized compet-
itive equilibrium system of equations is characterized by a sequence of allo-
cations fCs;t; Cu;t; Ch;t; hs;t; hu;t; hh;t; Kqs;t+1; Kes;t+1; Kqu;t+1; Keu;t+1; Iqs;t; Ies;t;
Iqu;t; I
e
u;tg1t=0, prices fws;t; wu;t; rqt ; retg1t=0, and the residual policy instrument
fTtg1t=0 such that: (i) households maximise their welfare taking policy, prices
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and aggregate variables as given; (ii) rms maximise their prots taking pol-
icy, prices and aggregate variables as given; (iii) the government budget con-
straint is always balanced; (iv) market clearing conditions are satised and
(v) the external consumption habit satises the following: Cj;t 1 = Cj;t 1.
Therefore, the full decentralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) system
of equations is given by equations (104)-(138).
3.3.2 Data analysis and targets
We aim for the exogenous-policy model to replicate the long-run great ratios
and key labour market averages as well as explaining the cyclical volatilities
and correlations with output of key variables in the economy. We use quar-
terly data for U.S. economy, which are obtained from datasets constructed by
Lindquist (2004), Piketty and Saez (2007), Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008),
Pourpourides (2011), Arseneau and Chugh (2012) as well as data series from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).60
Table 3.1: Business cycle statistics of main endogenous variables
Variable Correlation with output Standard deviation
Y 1 0.013-0.014
C 0.83 0.011-0.012
I 0.76-0.91 0.037-0.063
ws
wu
0.09-0.19 0.006-0.013
hs 0.42-0.69 0.008-0.010
hu 0.59-0.73 0.006-0.012
Sources: The data ranges are constructed using the results reported in
Lindquist (2004), Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and Pourpourides (2011).
Table 3.1 reports the data volatilities and correlations with output from
existing studies for variables which correspond with key endogenous variables
in our model. These are quarterly data for the period 1979-2002 (Lindquist
(2004)) and 1979-2003 (Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) and Pourpourides
60At this point I would like to mention my gratitude to Matthew Lindquist and Daniele
Coen-Pirani for sharing their datasets.
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(2011)). Their cyclical component has been obtained by taking the loga-
rithms of the series and then using an HP-lter with a smoothing parameter
of 1600.61 As can be seen in Table 3.1, these studies document some in-
teresting results regarding the labour market statistics. In particular, they
point out that the skill premium is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output and
smoother than output in business cycle frequencies. Moreover, the cyclical
properties of the labour supply of skilled and unskilled workers do not di¤er
qualitatively, both having a positive correlation with output, while being less
volatile than output. The statistics regarding consumption, investment and
capital are similar to those commonly obtained in macroeconomic research.
Table 3.2: Data averages and business cycle statistics of policy variables
Gc  60 100  20 60  0 20
Averages - 0.247 0.180 0.144
Autocorrelations 0.770 0.950 0.920 0.890
Correlations with Y -0.066 0.587 0.654 0.198
Standard deviation 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.004
Sources: The statistics are obtained using the data from Piketty
and Saez (2007), Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and BEA.
Moreover, Table 3.2 presents the averages, autocorrelations, volatilities
and correlations with output of the government consumption and the three
income tax series. The government spending series is obtained using quar-
terly data from the BEA for the period 1979 to 2002.62 The income tax data
61The skill labour supply in those studies is obtained by dividing the labour force into
two groups according to their education. For instance, the agents with 14 or more years of
education form the skilled workers. This criterion makes an underlying assumption that
workers with a college degree will be employed in high returns or high skilled occupations,
Acemoglu and Autor (2011). However, it should be noted that Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
have used annual data for the supply of skilled and unskilled labour and the associated
skill premium, whereas in our analysis we use quarterly data. Even show the results
of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) about the average skill premium and its volatility and
correlation with output does not di¤er signicantly from our results. Specically, using
their data we nd that the mean value of the skill premium is 1.60, while its cyclical
standard deviation and correlation with output are 0.49 and -0.13 respectively.
62The data we have used refer to government consumption expenditures and gross in-
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are obtained using the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset, which reports an-
nual data on income tax rates per income group (in quantiles) for the period
1966-2001.63 As we explain below, we calibrate the share of hand-to-mouth
agents to be 20%, the share of unskilled workers who also have savings to
be 40% and the share of skilled workers to 40%. Since our model predicts
that the income levels of these three groups increase in the order mentioned
above, we use the Piketty and Saez (2007) dataset to obtain three income tax
rates, the rst for the lowest quantile, the second as the average for the two
middle quantiles, and the third as the average for the two top quantiles. We
use these series of tax rates as proxies for  j;t, for j = h; u; s, in our model.
In Table 3.2 we can see that the income tax of the hand-to-mouth agent,
 0 20 (bottom quantile), is 14.4%, the income tax rate of the unskilled agent,
 20 60, is 18.0% and the income tax of the skilled agent,  60 100, is 24.7%.
This also suggests that the income taxation is progressive in our setup.64
Regarding the business cycle statistics of the tax series, the results suggest
that, as expected, these are highly persistent and have low volatility. The
spending process is less persistent and more volatile. The correlations with
output suggest that all the tax rates are pro-cyclical and the government
spending is essentially uncorrelated with output. Finally, using data on the
productivity of capital equipment from the BEA for the period 1988-2011, we
estimate the autocorrelation of HP-ltered series to be 0.975 and its standard
deviation to be 0.007.65
vestment as they are reported in NIPA Table 1.1.5. In order to obtain the statistical
properties of the cyclical component of the series, we transform the series into logarithm
and then we apply the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
63These tax rates refer to average tax rates by income groups. To obtain quarterly series
from the annual data, so that the cyclical statistics from the tax series are comparable to
the remaining data used in the analysis, we follow the interpolation method in Litterman
(1983). We use as an indicator variable the quarterly time-series of labour income tax
rates from Arseneau and Chugh (2012). To obtain the cyclical component of the series we
again use the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
64Piketty and Saez (2007) pay particular attention on several aspects of the progressivity
of income taxation. However, in our chapter we focus mainly on income taxation for the
three income groups that best correspond to the household disaggregation in our model.
65We also used annual series for the three income taxes and we found that the main
statistical results are qualitatively similar.
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3.4 Calibration
The calibration of the parameters of the model is either based on data or by
targeting the long-run values and cyclical properties (correlation and stan-
dard deviation) of the key endogenous variables to be consistent with the
data. Table 3.3 summarises the calibrated parameters.
3.4.1 Population shares
Regarding the population shares we assume that ns = 0:4, nu = 0:4, nh =
0:2. The share of skilled households is calibrated according to the data in
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where the share of the population with a college
degree is about 45%. Then we split the unskilled households into those who
can access the asset market and those that cannot (hand-to-mouth agents).
The share of the hand-to-mouth population has been shown by the empirical
evidence of Traum and Yang (2010) to be equal to 18%. In addition, Cogan
et al. (2010) estimate the share of the hand-to-mouth population to be equal
to 26.5%. Our calibration of 20% for the share of the hand-to-mouth agents
falls within that range. The split in those population shares is also consistent
with data from the 2010 U.S. Census, where the share of the population with
a college degree is equal to 43%, whereas the share of the population without
asset holdings is 18.7%.66
3.4.2 Tax-spending policy
As we mentioned earlier, the population shares we have assumed are helpful
for approximating the e¤ective income tax rate for each group using the
income tax data per income quantile from Piketty and Saez (2007). As a
result, under exogenous scal policy, where we assume that the three income
tax rates follow an exogenous AR(1) process, we set their constant term equal
to the average value of  0 20,  20 60 and  60 100, for hand-to-mouth, unskilled
and skilled agents respectively, as they are presented in Table 3.2. Moreover,
we set accordingly, following the results in Table 3.2, the autocorrelation
66These data are obtained from Table 4 of the Census Bureau, Survey of Income and
Program Participation.
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parameters of the AR(1) processes, j, and the standard deviation of the
cyclical components, j for each type of income tax. Similarly we set the
autocorrelation and standard deviation parameters of the AR(1) process for
government consumption. We also calibrate the long-run value of government
spending targeting a public spending to output ratio of 19%, consistent with
the data discussed above.
3.4.3 Production and capital and labour markets
For the calibration of the elasticities of substitution between skilled labour
and capital equipment, (1=1  '), and between unskilled labour and capital
equipment (or skilled labour), (1=1   ), we follow Krusell et al. (2000)
and we set: ' = 0:401 and  =  0:495. For the rest of the parameters
in the production function we follow Lindquist (2004), He and Liu (2008),
Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012) so as our calibration is within the range
of values they suggest and we also target the long-run values of our model
in asset and labour markets to be consistent with the data. Therefore, we
calibrate the income shares  and  aiming a skill premium of about 1:65 and
a labour share of income of 69%. Both of these values are consistent with the
U.S. data. Specically, the value of the skill premium is obtained from U.S.
Census data and is within the range of estimates in Table 3.1.67 Also, the
data for the labour income share as a percentage of GDP are obtained from
BEA data on personal income for the period 1970-2011. The productivity of
capital structures, , is set as in Lindquist (2004). The calibrated parameters
in the production function are generally very similar to those estimated or
calibrated in the literature.
67The source is the Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic Sup-
plement from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table 3.3: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0  q 1 0.016 depreciation rate of capital structures calibration
0  e 1 0.028 depreciation rate of capital equipment calibration
0 <  < 1 0.990 time discount factor calibration
0  ! < 1 0.580 habit persistence parameter calibration
0 <  < 1 0.225 weight attached to consumption in utility calibration
 > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion assumption
0    1 0.130 income share of capital structures assumption
1
1  0.669 capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity assumption
1
1 ' 1.669 capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity assumption
0 <  < 1 0.560 share of composite input to output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.580 share of capital equipment to composite input calibration
0 <G
c
Y
< 1 0.190 government spending calibration
 s> 0 0.0002 transaction cost for skilled agents calibration
 u> 0 0.0018 transaction cost for unskilled agents calibration
 s 0.247 average income tax rate, skilled data
u 0.180 average income tax rate, unskilled data
h 0.144 average income tax rate, hand-to-mouth data
Stochastic processes
A 0.004 standard deviation of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP data
Ae 0.007 standard deviation of cap. equipment data
Ae 0.975 AR(1) coe¢ cient of cap. equipment data
s 0.006 standard deviation of income tax, skilled data
s 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, skilled data
u 0.005 standard deviation of income tax, unskilled data
u 0.920 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, unskilled data
h 0.004 standard deviation of income tax, hand-to-mouth data
h 0.890 AR(1) coe¢ cient of income tax, hand-to-mouth data
Gc 0.014 standard deviation of public spending data
Gc 0.770 AR(1) coe¢ cient of public spending data
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The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment are
calibrated to obtain a quarterly capital to output ratio equal to 6:95 in the
steady state. This is within the range presented in Table 3.1 and is con-
sistent with an annual capital to output ratio of 1:74, obtained using BEA
annual data on capital stocks from 1970 to 2011. In particular, we set the
depreciation rate of capital equipment as e = 0:028, which is within the
range of the values that Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011) have used
and then we calibrate the depreciation rate of capital structures residually
as q = 0:016.68
We set the transaction cost parameters as  s = 0:0002 and  u = 0:0018.
There are two targets for these parameters. The rst is that the total capital
holdings for skilled households in the deterministic steady state is 2:5 times
higher than for unskilled households. This ensures that the models steady
state matches data from the 2010 Census,69 which indicate that the wealth
of the population with at least a bachelor degree is two and half times more
than those without a bachelor degree. The second target is that in the steady
state the transaction costs cohere with a real return to capital (that excludes
depreciation and taxes) of about 1% per quarter.70
3.4.4 Utility function
As far as the utility function is concerned, we set the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion,  = 2, following previous studies (e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2007). The time discount factor,  = 0:99, is calibrated so as to replicate the
investment to output ratio observed in the data. The weight of consumption
to utility,  = 0:225, is calibrated targeting a steady state value of labour
time for each household equal to one third of its time. For the consumption
habit parameter, !, we follow Christiano et al. (2005) that suggest a value
68For example, Krusell et al. (2000) use the following depreciation rates q = 0:0125
and e = 0:031; whereas Pourpourides is using: q = 0:014 and e = 0:027; and Lindquist
sets q = 0:014 and e = 0:031.
69The specic information is obtained using Table 1 from the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau,
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
70The real return to capital at an annual frequency is 4%, using data from the World
Bank.
126
within the range of (0:52   0:71) and we also target the models predicted
volatility of consumption to be similar to the data presented in Table 3.1.
3.4.5 Technology
The two technological processes, TFP and productivity of capital equipment,
are assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process. We normalize the con-
stant terms of those processes to be equal to unity, A = 1 and Ae = 1. We
also used a time series on the productivity of capital equipment as it is re-
ported by BLS for the period 1988-2011, and we estimated its autocorrelation
and standard deviation, after we HP-ltered the series, to be Ae = 0:975
and Ae = 0:007 respectively, and these are the values we use for the re-
spective exogenous process.71 In addition, following Lindquist (2004) and
Pourpourides (2011), we set the autocorrelation parameter of TFP equal to
0:95, while A is calibrated to match the volatility of output observed in the
data (see Table 3.1).
3.5 Solution and results
Table 3.4 compares the steady state solution of the decentralised competitive
equilibrium (DCE) system of equations presented earlier for the key variables
with the respective data averages. To study dynamics, we compute a rst-
order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic
steady state, by implementing the perturbation methods in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2003).72 We use the rst-order accurate decision rules to simulate
time paths of the equilibrium under shocks to total factor productivity, capi-
tal equipment augmenting technology, government spending, and income tax
realizations, that are obtained from the distributions specied above. We
conduct 1000 simulations, each 296 periods long. We drop the initial 200
71The time-series on the productivity of equipment capital is obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics and refers to annual data. The respective quarterly series is obtained
using the methodology in Litterman (1983), where the indicator variable is the quarterly
time-series of total investment for the same period. The series is then logged and HP-
ltered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
72Note that the results we present in this chapter are rst-order approximations. Using
a second-order approximation doesnt change our conclusions.
127
periods so that the remaining series length of 96 periods corresponds with
the number of observations in the data, i.e. 1979:1-2002:4. For each simula-
tion, we then compute the required moments and report the means of these
moments across the simulations in Table 3.5. This table also reports for com-
parison the predicted business cycle statistics from the studies of Lindquist
(2004) and Pourpourides (2011).
Table 3.4: Steady state of the exogenous policy model
Variable Model Data Variable Model Data
K
Y
6.946 6.550 hs 0.362 0.317
I
Y
0.151 0.159 hu 0.364 0.348
C
Y
0.653 0.659 hh 0.398 -
Gc
Y
0.189 0.195 ws
wu
1.649 1.659
rnet 0.010 0.010
wh
Y
0.699 0.686
In Table 3.4 we can see that the steady state values of the model are
quantitatively similar to those observed in the data. At this point we need
also to mention that in our model the ratio of average hours worked by
unskilled workers over that of skilled workers is equal to 1:027, and is similar
to the 1:099 suggested in the data (using U.S. data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS)).73 The implied Frisch labour supply elasticities from
our model are: 1:08 for skilled, 1:07 for unskilled and 0:93 for hand-to-mouth
workers. These values are also consistent with the related literature (i.e.
Browning et al. (1999), Chetty et al. (2011), and Keane and Rogerson
(2012)). Finally, Table 3.4 indicates that the income share from labour is,
wsnshs+wunuhu+wunhhh
Y
= 0:699, which is similar to the value of 0.686 obtained
in the data.74
73Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) using quarterly U.S. data from 1979-2003 gets an
unskilled to skilled labour supply ratio equal to 1.030. Our model prediction of 1.027 for
the weighted ratio of unskilled to skilled labour coheres well with this gure.
74See, BEA Table 2.1 for the period 1979-2002.
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Table 3.5: Business cycle statistics of the exogenous policy model
Correlation with Output Standard deviation
Variable Model Lindquist Pourpourides Model Lindquist Pourpourides
(2004) (2011) (2004) (2011)
Y 1 1 1 0.014 0.013 0.014
C 0.89 0.81 0.93 0.012 0.006 0.012
I 0.80 0.96 0.76 0.048 0.053 0.040
ws
wu
0.15 0.06 -0.09 0.005 0.003 0.005
hs 0.68 0.81 0.95 0.005 0.006 0.007
hu 0.28 0.95 0.54 0.004 0.006 0.012
hh -0.42 N/A N/A 0.007 N/A N/A
Turning to the business cycle statistics in Table 3.5, the overall t is
comparable to existing research on business cycle models with the skill pre-
mium (see e.g. Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)). In particular,
the model matches the key stylized facts of the skill premium in the data,
i.e. that it is e¤ectively not correlated with output and that its volatility
is less than that of output (refer to Table 3.1). In addition, the model pre-
dictions regarding the second moments of the hours worked are generally
consistent with the data both qualitatively and quantitatively. However, the
model quantitatively under-predicts the correlation of unskilled hours with
output. The model also matches the second moments of consumption and
investment. Overall, the models predictions regarding the key endogenous
variables are empirically relevant.75
75Note that the data sources for the series in Table 4 include: (i) BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.5
for output, investment and consumption; (ii) BEA, NIPA Table 1.1 (line 3 plus line 21
minus line 7) and Tables 7.1A (line 30) plus Table 7.2B (line 32) for the capital stock; (iii)
BLS, Current Employment Statistics survey for hours worked; (iv) World Bank for the real
rate of return; (v) BEA, NIPA Table 2.1 for labours share in income; and (vi) U.S. Census
Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation for the skill premium. Comparable
averages are obtained using the dataset in Lindquist (2004), for those variables that are
similar in both studies.
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3.6 Optimal taxation over the business cycle
Having established the empirical relevance of the calibration, we now discard
the exogenous processes for the income tax rates in (138) and instead assume
that the paths of these tax rates are optimally chosen by a government that
seeks to maximise a utilitarian objective function under commitment, taking
the revenue requirements as given.
3.6.1 The problem of the government
The government chooses optimally the paths of the income taxes so as to
maximise the aggregate welfare taking into account the decentralised system
of equations, presented earlier, under the following assumptions:76 (i) the
government takes spending as given. Specically, government expenditures
will still follow an exogenous stochastic process as presented in equation
(133); (ii) the government is able to tax only the total income of each agent
and as a result the government is restricted to implement an incomplete tax
system;77 and (iii) the government is not able to issue debt. Treating the
spending side of the budget as given is a common assumption in the analysis
of optimal taxation and allows us to focus on the revenue side of the budget.
The assumption of having an incomplete set of taxes, via allowing only for
income taxation to be present, is motivated from the current scal policy
framework where governments are not able to tax each source of income
di¤erently. Finally, the assumption of no debt is again driven from the current
economic framework where most of the developed economies have high levels
of debt and as a result they are not able to use it as a smoothing instrument
against economic uctuations.
Given the imperfections in labour and capital markets and the aforemen-
76We also keep lump-sum taxes xed to zero, as is common for optimal taxation analysis.
We note, however, that our results do not change qualitatively if we keep the lump-sum
instrument xed to its steady-state value obtained from the model under exogenous scal
policy.
77We do not allow the government to has a complete tax system at its disposal (see
e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1999), for the denition of a complete tax system) motivated from
the practical policy implementation and the fact that the governments are restricted to
impose a single tax rate on capital and labour income.
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tioned restrictions on scal policy, the key question is: what is the optimal
income taxation and how the government distributes the distortions over
the business cycle? The requirements imposed on the tax system certainly
dictate some properties that optimal income taxation must satisfy over the
business cycle. In particular, we would expect income taxes on average to
be more volatile compared to the data since tax smoothing via public debt
or expenditure management is not an option. We would also expect them to
be generally counter-cyclical, given that negative shocks that reduce the tax
bases necessitate a rise in the tax rates to make up for the loss in the tax
revenue (see Stockman (2001) for a similar result). However, allowing the
government to choose di¤erent tax rates for each income group, implies that
the government still has to decide on whether these tax rates should have the
same volatility and co-movement with output over the business cycle and, if
not, how to set these cyclical properties for each tax rate.
We examine the problem of a government that has Utilitarian preferences,
so that its objective function is given by the expected lifetime utility of the
weighted average of the welfare of the three types of households, where the
weights attached to each type are equal to the population share of that type,
nj. Thus, in our setup, the government chooses the three income tax rates
f s;t; u;t; h;tg1t=0 and the following variablesfCj;t; hj;t; Kij;t+1; I ij;t; wj;t; ritg1t=0,
for i = s; u and j = s; u; h, to maximise:
U g = Et
1X
t=0
t
hX
j=s;u;h
nju(Cj;t; Cj;t 1; lj;t)
i
(139)
subject to the decentralised competitive equilibrium system of equations as
they have been presented earlier in equations (104)   (137). Note that fol-
lowing Arseneau and Chugh (2012) we set fTt  0g1t=0. In addition, the
government takes into account the externalities that appear through the con-
sumption habits, when implementing its optimal policy. Finally, we assume
that the government commits to its policy.
As in the exogenous-policy baseline, we rst compute the determinis-
tic steady state equilibrium under optimal policy and next approximate the
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dynamic equilibrium paths using the rst-order approximation of the equilib-
rium conditions under optimal policy for time t > 0 around the deterministic
steady state of these conditions. As is common in the literature (see e.g. Ar-
seneau and Chugh (2012)), when characterizing asymptotic policy dynamics,
we also make the auxiliary assumption that the initial state of the economy
at t = 0 is the steady state under optimal policy. We use the rst-order ac-
curate decision rules to simulate the optimal policy equilibrium under shocks
to TFP, equipment capital e¢ ciency and government consumption spending
that are obtained as in the exogenous policy experiments in the previous
section.78
3.6.2 Properties of optimal taxes over the business cycle
Table 3.6 presents the optimal properties of the tax system under shocks to
all stochastic processes. As it can be seen by the steady state income taxes,
optimal tax policy is progressive and, in fact, relatively more progressive
compared with the data averages. In particular,  s >  60 100, u <  20 60,
h <  0 20.79 This is noteworthy since the progressivity of the tax system as
captured by the three tax rates considered here has indeed increased since
the mid-1960s (see e.g. the data in Piketty and Saez (2007)).80 Therefore,
the assumed imperfections and inequalities in our model justify progressive
income taxation.
78The business cycle statistics are calculated in this case as in the exogenous policy
case. Thus, we perform 1000 simulations under shocks to the exogenous processes, each
simulation is 296 periods long and then we drop the initial 200 periods. Afterwards, we
get the business cycle statistics for each simulation and we calculate the averages across
the simulations.
79Note that we observe the largest di¤erence between the optimal income tax and the
data in the case of the hand-to-mouth households. In practice, though, subsidies that
are targeted to a specic group of agents alleviate part of the tax burden for that group,
leading to a more realistic distribution of the tax burden in our model that is closer to
reality. However, we do not discuss further about the targeted subsidies since for the
optimal taxation case we do not include any lump-sum transfers.
80Using the dataset of Piketty and Saez (2007) we nd that for the period 1966-2001
the income tax of the high income earners has increase 5 percentage points, whereas the
income tax of the middle income group agents has decreased 4 percentage points and for
the low income groups agents has decreased 5 percentage points, similar to our results.
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Table 3.6: Optimal tax policy
 s u h
Steady state 0.285 0.143 -0.041
Autocorrelations 0.754 0.832 0.891
Correlations with Y -0.461 -0.732 -0.110
Standard deviation 0.012 0.070 0.173
These results in Table 3.6 further suggest that the volatility and co-
movement of optimal taxes with output di¤er signicantly with each other
and with the data reported in Table 3.2. As discussed above, the policy
problem we consider implies that the tax rates need to be generally more
volatile and more counter-cyclical, compared with the data. However, Table
3.6 also reveals important di¤erences between the tax rates. These result
from the trade-o¤ that the government faces when deciding how to distrib-
ute the distortions reected by the higher volatility and counter-cyclicality
of the three tax rates over the business cycle. On one hand, such distortions
have a larger impact on hand-to-mouth households, since they are less able
to smooth shocks. There is thus an incentive to minimise the impact of pol-
icy for this type of household. On the other hand, tax-induced distortions
to skilled households have the strongest propagation e¤ects in the economy,
given the complementarity of skilled hours with equipment capital. There-
fore, there is also an incentive to minimise distortions to the choices of skilled
households, since this acts to amplify external shocks
Delving deeper into the cyclical properties of each income tax rate under
optimal scal policy we can see that the volatilities are higher than those ob-
served in the data. This is expected given the balanced budget restriction we
imposed together with the restricted set of scal instruments. Note that the
volatilities observed in the data are similar across the three income tax rates
with the income tax for the high income earners having the highest volatility
and the income tax for the lowest income earners the lowest volatility. How-
ever, under the optimal taxation the volatilities of the three income taxes
have signicant di¤erences. In this case the income tax of the lowest income
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group is the most volatile and the income tax of the highest income group is
the smoothest.81
A smoother income tax creates fewer distortions in the households op-
timisation problem. Since income taxes are the only choices for the policy-
maker in this framework, implying that smoothing is not possible for all tax
rates, the government nds it optimal to keep the tax rate which distorts
incentives the most, the smoothest. Given the higher complementarities of
skilled hours with equipment capital, implying that tax-induced uctuations
in skill supply propagate more in the economy via the equipment capital
channel, the government nds it optimal to keep the tax to skilled house-
holds the least volatile. In contrast, since hand-to-mouth households do not
own capital stock, their choices a¤ect the endogenous propagation mecha-
nism in the economy the least, so that their taxes are optimally the most
volatile.
Regarding the cyclicality of the tax rates over the business cycle, we
found in the data (Table 3.2) that taxes are positively correlated with out-
put. Specically, the data indicate that the correlation of the income taxes
with output are: 0.587 for skilled income tax; 0.654 for unskilled income
tax; and 0.198 for hand-to-mouth income tax. As expected, the results in
Table 3.6 conrm that the correlations become negative when the tax instru-
ments are the only optimally chosen instruments in the governments budget
constraint. However, the results also indicate that the optimal correlations
of the tax rates are symmetrically opposite to the data correlations. For
example, the strongest pro-cyclical tax in the data becomes optimally the
strongest counter-cyclical, while the least cyclical in the data becomes the
least counter-cyclical. Hence, the requirement of the government to make the
tax system generally counter-cyclical, is not translated into a proportional
reduction of the correlation coe¢ cients of all tax rates.82
81The results we obtain regarding the magnitude and range in volatilities of the three
income tax rates are within the range of the optimal volatilities for tax instruments con-
sidered in the model with search frictions and government debt in Arseneau and Chugh
(2012) and the neoclassical model with a balanced budget restriction in Stockman (2001).
82The literature has not examined the behaviour of di¤erent income taxes under opti-
mal scal policy, like in our chapter. However, it has been shown that market frictions
are important for dening the optimal cyclicality of the tax rates. For example, under
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Counter-cyclical taxes intensify uctuations in income, as they amplify
the e¤ects of exogenous productivity shocks. Therefore, a government that
needs to make use of counter-cyclical taxes over the business cycle, does so
with a view to minimise the distortions that they cause. In this setup, it
is optimal to minimise such policy distortions to the income of the hand-to-
mouth households, by making their tax rate to be the least counter-cyclical.
This is because these agents are the most exposed to economic uctuations.
Comparing skilled and unskilled households, it is optimal to least distort the
choices of skilled, given the higher complementarities of skilled hours with
equipment capital. As a result, the unskilled workers face the most counter-
cyclical income tax.
Finally, the persistence of the income taxes (autocorrelation) is optimally
chosen to be similar across the three taxes. Compared with the data, the
persistence of the income taxes is slightly lower under optimal scal policy,
especially the skilled income tax.
3.6.3 Changing the set of scal instruments
In this section we extend the set of scal instruments and we allow for the
government to optimally choose a consumption tax that is the same for each
type of household, together with the three income tax rates. Through that
experiment we assess the properties of optimal income taxes over the business
cycle and especially the di¤erences compared to the previous case where we
had a more restricted scal policy menu. Note that in this case we keep the
same calibration presented earlier.83
Table 3.7 presents the results of the optimal taxation under the di¤erent
set of scal instruments. The optimal long run value of consumption tax
is 27.8%, leading to a reduction of the optimal income tax rates compared
to the previous case, with the unskilled income tax rate becoming also a
a neoclassical model the labour income taxes are generally pro-cyclical, while in model
with labour marker frictions, like Arseneau and Chugh (2012), the labour income tax is
optimally counter-cyclical.
83In other words, we make the assumption that under the exogenous scal policy the
consumption tax was zero.
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subsidy.84 Moreover, the progressivity of the income taxation has increased
even further. Now the di¤erence between skilled and unskilled income tax
is 20.7% from 14.2%, also the di¤erence between skilled and hand-to-mouth
income taxes is approximately 50% from 32%.
The persistence of the three income taxes is similar with the previous
case study. In addition, the autocorrelation of the consumption tax is on the
same range with the income taxes and it is also similar with the data (0.813).
As in the case with a more restricted set of scal instruments, we still
observe that the correlation with output and volatility of the income tax
rates is di¤erent compared to the data reported in Table 3.2 and they are also
di¤erent compared to each other. Specically, the correlation of the income
tax rates with output remains on the same level as in the case without the
consumption tax. The correlation of the consumption tax with output is
optimally chosen to be procyclical.
However, we observe signicant di¤erences in the volatility of the tax
rates compared to the previous case. In this case the income tax rate for the
hand-to-mouth agents becomes the smoothest (it was the most volatile in
the previous case) because now those agents face an additional distortion in
their income coming from the volatility of the consumption tax. Therefore,
the government nds it optimal to smooth out their income tax rate since
those agents are more exposed to shocks, due to their exclusion from the
asset markets.
Regarding the skilled and unskilled income tax, we can see that in this
case again the skilled labour income tax is the least volatile because the
government has an incentive to minimise tax-distortions to their income.
That happens because under the capital-skill complementarity channel the
volatility of skilled labour supply, driven from tax uctuations, can propagate
more in the economy than the unskilled labour supply, and thus it can amplify
the e¤ect of the shocks to the economy. Finally, the optimal consumption
84At this point we should mention that we used quarterly data from 1970-2012 on
sales taxes, so as to create a time series for the consumption tax. The data have been
downloaded from FRED. Then we have HP-ltered the data and we found that the mean
is 4.7%, the standard deviation is 0.018, autocorrelation is 0.813 and the correlation with
output is equal to 0.76.
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tax is set to be the least volatile of all scal instruments because of its direct
e¤ect to householdsutility.
Table 3.7: Optimal tax policy with consumption tax
 s u h 
c
Steady state 0.142 -0.065 -0.361 0.278
Autocorrelations 0.794 0.797 0.869 0.827
Correlations with Y -0.375 -0.712 -0.112 0.385
Standard deviation 0.019 0.150 0.017 0.011
3.7 The optimal distribution of the tax burden over
the business cycle
3.7.1 The case with three income taxes
In this section we analyse how optimal income taxes and the key macro-
economic variables behave following a temporary standard deviation shock
to total factor productivity, productivity of capital equipment and govern-
ment spending. Figure 3.1 presents the impulse responses (IRs) from an
output-enhancing shock.85 This allows us to evaluate how the government
optimally distributes the tax burden in the short- and medium-run in re-
sponse to output-enhancing exogenous shocks.
85Note that Figure 3.1 plots the percent deviations from the steady state for every
variable.
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A positive shock to total factor productivity will lead to higher immediate
income tax rate for the hand-to-mouth agents (h). The increase of the
income tax of the hand-to-mouth agents is only present in the short-run
because the government wants to smooth out their consumption. In addition,
in the short-run the income taxes of the other two types of agents decrease,
as the government can reduce these taxes and maintain the same level of
tax revenue, given the rise in tax bases. The income tax of the unskilled
agents exhibits the highest reduction compared to the skilled income tax. As
a result, the progressivity of the income taxes is mixed after a TFP shock,
since the income tax of the low income agents increases, whereas the income
tax of the middle income agents decreases more compared to that of the high
income agents.
In the medium-run we can see that the income tax of skilled agents in-
creases above its steady state. As the economy returns to the steady state,
it is optimal for the government to generate the tax revenue required by
increasing faster the tax rate for the largest income source, so that it can
maintain a low tax rate for unskilled and hand-to-mouth for a longer time.
Figure 3.1 also shows that the increase in equipment capital and decrease
in relative skill supply induced by the changes in TFP and income taxation
increase the skill premium. As a result, the skill premium is procyclical.
The impulse responses of the optimal income taxes are di¤erent under
a positive shock to the productivity of capital equipment. In particular,
this shock creates an increase in wage inequality, reecting the rise in the
productivity of skilled labour via capital-skill complementarity, to which the
government responds, by increasing the tax for skilled workers and decreasing
the tax for unskilled workers.86 Hence, in this case, the government nds
it optimal, given the exogenous productivity gains for skilled households, to
redistribute the tax burden in favour of the unskilled households. As a result,
86However, the stock of capital equipment decreases following the positive shock to its
productivity. That happens because of the important income gains of skilled workers as a
result of the increase in the returns to capital equipment. This e¤ect causes a reduction
of the investment in capital equipment, leading to an increase in consumption. Lindquist
(2004) gets a similar reaction of equipment capital although in a model without optimal
taxation.
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income taxation becomes more progressive.
After an output-enhancing temporary reduction to government spending
all taxes can fall, since the government needs to generate less tax revenue.
However, driven by the incentive to support the households who are most
constrained in the asset market, the reduction is bigger for the income tax of
the hand-to-mouth agents, followed by that of the unskilled agents. There-
fore, a temporary spending cut is followed by an increase in the progressivity
of income taxes. The reductions in the income tax rates lead to a propor-
tionately larger increase for the supply of unskilled labour, relative to skilled,
which in turn increases the skill premium.
3.7.2 The case with di¤erent scal policy menu
In this section we present the reaction of the optimal income taxes and the key
macroeconomic variables following a temporary standard deviation shock to
total factor productivity, productivity of capital equipment and government
spending. Note that, as we presented in the previous section, the shock
to government spending is an output-enhancing shock (negative shock to
government spending). Figure 3.2 presents the impulse responses under each
shock.87
Comparing the responses of the model with the consumption tax and
the model without, we can see that there are no qualitative di¤erences in the
reaction of the optimal income taxes after a temporary shock to the economy.
Regarding the reaction of the optimal consumption tax, we can see that under
a TFP shock it increases in the short-run so as for the government to smooth
out shocks to consumption. In the medium-run the optimal consumption
tax decreases and falls below its steady state and then it converges slowly
to its long run value. Under a capital equipment productivity shock the
consumption tax has a similar reaction with the TFP shock but with a smaller
magnitude. Finally, under an output-enhancing government spending shock
the optimal consumption tax decreases in the short-run below its long-run
value, as the rest of the income taxes.
87Note that again Figure 3.2 plots the percent deviations from the steady state for every
variable.
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3.8 Robustness of results
In this section we analyse the robustness of the optimal reaction of the income
taxes under the exogenous shocks we assumed in the previous sections and
for our benchmark case study (without consumption tax). In Figure 3.3, we
show, for each exogenous shock, the optimal path of the three income tax
rates starting from the non-stochastic steady state. For comparison, we also
present the optimal paths under the benchmark case analysed above.
Specically, we consider three alternative calibrations and present the op-
timal taxes in each case, in response to exogenous output-enhancing shocks.
In Model 1, we set the transaction costs to be ve times higher, for both
skilled and unskilled workers, compared to their benchmark calibration (see
Table 3.3 for the benchmark calibration). In Model 2 we impose a higher
capital-skill substitutability compared to the benchmark case, by setting the
parameter  equal to  0:40.88 Finally, in Model 3 we impose a lower capital-
skill substitutability compared to the benchmark case, by setting the para-
meter ' equal to 0:30.89
The general message from Figure 3.3 is that the responses of optimal pol-
icy are quantitatively very similar across the di¤erent model variants. Hence,
our results regarding the optimal reaction to exogenous shocks are robust to
changes in the magnitude of transaction costs and production function elas-
ticities.
88Following Cantore and Levine (2012), in Model 2 we re-calibrate the following para-
meters in the production function,  = 0:5676 and  = 0:5243, so as the factor shares
remain the same and the production function is uniquely identied.
89In Model 3 we re-calibrate  = 0:5727 and  = 0:5808.
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3.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the optimal progressivity and cyclical properties
of the income tax system over the business cycle in a model with capital-
skill complementarity, a wage premium to skilled workers and labour and
asset market imperfections. In particular, we assumed that a share of the
population provides skilled labour services, whereas the rest of the population
provided unskilled labour services. In addition, we assumed that a subset
of the population did not have access to asset markets due to participation
premia. It was shown that the model was able to replicate the empirical
characteristics of the key macroeconomic variables over the business cycle as
well as the key features of wealth inequality and labour markets.
Our analysis considered the problem of a government that chose the paths
of income tax rates to maximise aggregate welfare. For that reason we con-
strained the set of scal instruments of the government and we focused only
on income tax rates. In a di¤erent experiment, we also introduced a sin-
gle consumption tax to the scal policy menu. Afterwards, we assessed the
cyclical properties of the optimal income taxes under this setup and their op-
timal short-run and medium-run behaviour under several temporary output-
enhancing exogenous shocks.
With respect to business cycle properties, we found that each optimal
income tax had a di¤erent correlation with output and a volatility that was
also di¤erent from the data. In particular, the optimal scal policy results
indicated that the income tax rate of the high income agents had the lowest
volatility and the income tax rate of the low income agents exhibited the
lowest counter-cyclicality. Moreover, the optimal income tax rate of the
middle income agents was the most countercyclical and volatile. In addition,
we examined the e¤ects on optimal income taxation under a di¤erent scal
policy menu that also included a consumption tax. In this case we found
that the progressivity of the income tax rates was even higher and that the
results regarding the volatilities of the income taxes were overturned.
Finally, we found that, in both of the case studies, the progressivity of the
income tax rates was optimally increased immediately after a positive shock
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to capital equipment e¢ ciency and a reduction to government expenditures,
whereas it optimally increased after two years with a positive shock to total
factor productivity.
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Appendix C
C Chapter 3
C.1 The skill premium
Using equations (130) and (131) implies the following expression for the skill
premium:
ws;t
wu;t
=
 (1  )
(1  )

hfs;t
 1

hfu;t
' 1  1t '= 1 (C1)
where 1t  
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
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
.
The skill premium is increasing with respect to capital equipment as
long as the equipment-skill complementarity is present, i.e.  < 0, and
the unskilled agents are substitutes to both of them, i.e. 0 < ' < 1. Also,
for the
@

ws;t
wu;t

@(Kf;et )
> 0 condition to hold it is necessary that 0 < ;  < 1 which
is satised through our calibration as in Krusell et al. (2000):
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Moreover the skill premium is decreasing to skilled labour supply,
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where the terms that dene the sign are: (1 )
(1 ) > 0 and the term inside the
squared brackets +(  ') (1  )

hfs;t
 1
< 0 (due to the fact that  < 0
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and 0 < ' < 1).
Also, the skill premium is increasing to unskilled labour supply,
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now the crucial terms are: (1 )
(1 ) (1  '), where (1 )(1 ) > 0 and also (1  ')
since 0 < ' < 1.
The last two derivatives, (C3  C4), imply that the skill premium is
decreasing with respect to the relative labour supply of skilled over unskilled
agents, i.e. @

ws;t
wu;t

=@

hfs;t
hfu;t

< 0.
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Chapter 4: Tax smoothing in a business cy-
cle model with capital-skill complementarity
Abstract: This chapter undertakes a normative investigation of the quan-
titative properties of optimal tax smoothing in a business cycle model with
state contingent debt, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill forma-
tion and stochastic shocks to public consumption as well as total factor and
capital equipment productivity. We also examine the properties of optimal
taxation under a restriction on the debt to output ratio. Our main nding
is that, an empirically relevant restriction which does not allow the relative
supply of skilled labour to adjust in response to aggregate shocks, signi-
cantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes. This result
remains valid even in the presence of a budget rule that restricts the debt to
output ratio. We show that the key to understanding this result is that the
government nds it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates to alter the
average net returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours.90
4.1 Introduction
The celebrated labour tax smoothing result of Barro (1979) in a partial equi-
librium setting has lead to a number of important studies on optimal s-
cal policy over the business cycle in representative agent general equilibrium
models. For example, Lucas and Stokey (1983) formalised labour tax smooth-
ing within a complete markets neoclassical setup without capital when the
government has access to state-contingent debt. Chari et al. (1994) gener-
alised this result in a model with capital taxation and showed that Ramsey
policy dictates that the labour income tax uctuates very little in response
to aggregate shocks and the ex ante capital income tax is approximately zero
in each period.
The literature has also examined the implications of policy frictions and
incomplete asset markets for optimal tax and debt policy, through a variety
90The CESifo 2014 working paper (4744) by Angelopoulos, Asimakopoulos and Malley
entitled "Tax smoothing in a business cycle model with capital-skill complementarity" is
based on this Chapter.
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of restrictions to the policy instrument set, government debt and capital in-
come taxation (see e.g. Stockman (2001), Aiyagari et al. (2002), Angeletos
(2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004) and Farhi (2010)). In contrast, assuming
complete asset markets, Arseneau and Chugh (2012) consider labour market
frictions which imply a division of the labour force into employed and un-
employed workers. Their model, with state-contingent debt but no capital,
suggests that optimal labour tax volatility depends on whether wages are set
e¢ ciently.
Another important division of the labour force is with respect to the type
of labour services workers provide and, in particular, how these complement
capital in the production process. This is especially pertinent given the
empirical relevance of the wage premium accruing to skilled labour and the
roles attributed to capital-skill complementarity, the relative supply of skilled
labour and capital augmenting technical progress (see e.g. Katz and Murphy
(1992), Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005)). In an important
related contribution, Werning (2007) establishes the conditions under which
optimal labour tax smoothing holds in a model with redistribution under
complete asset markets when workers di¤er with respect to their productivity.
However, since the distinct types of labour are treated as perfect substitutes
in production, this setup does not capture how labour may exhibit di¤erent
degrees of complementarity with capital as in e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)
and Krusell et al. (2000). Moreover, since the distribution of productivity
di¤erentials is taken as exogenous, this approach also does not explain how
di¤erences in employment type can be endogenously determined (see e.g.
Matsuyama (2006), who also reviews this literature).
In this chapter we aim to contribute to the tax smoothing literature by
focusing on the above two features of an economy where the labour force
is divided into skilled and unskilled workers. In particular, we examine the
importance of di¤erences in the complementarity between capital and skilled
and unskilled labour as well as the endogenous determination of the rela-
tive skill supply for Ramsey tax policy over the business cycle. In contrast
to Werning (2007), we focus on aggregate outcomes and abstract from re-
distribution incentives, by following the literature that examines a division
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of the labour force into two types of workers. To this end, we work with
a representative household which guarantees its membersthe same level of
consumption (see e.g. Arseneau and Chugh (2012)). We thus stay as close as
possible to the representative agent Ramsey analysis of Chari et al. (1994)
and extend their model to allow for capital-skill complementarity and en-
dogenous skill formation.91
Our goal is thus to undertake a normative investigation of the quanti-
tative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour income, as well
as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total
factor productivity (TFP), capital equipment productivity and government
spending. We assume complete asset markets, however, to capture the im-
portance of endogenous versus xed relative skill supply, we also consider a
labour market distortion that restricts the ratio of skilled to total workers to
remain constant. This assumption is supported by empirical evidence sug-
gesting that the share of college educated or skilled workers in the data has
low relative volatility and is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output over the
business cycle. For example, the standard deviation of the cyclical compo-
nent of this share relative to the standard deviation of output is 0.27 and its
correlation with output is -0.18.92
In our setup, the government can borrow, tax skill acquisition expen-
diture, capital, skilled and unskilled labour income separately, to nance
exogenous public spending. All policy instruments are allowed to be state-
contingent. In this environment, the optimal taxes on labour income and
skill acquisition expenditure are uniquely determined. However, as is well
known, when the government has access to both state contingent debt and
state contingent capital taxation, the second-best Ramsey allocations do not
uniquely pin down optimal debt and capital taxes (see Chari et al. (1994)).
Hence, following the literature, in this instance we discuss the properties of
91Given that employment in skilled jobs is observable, we also abstract from issues
related to Mirrleesian taxation.
92These calculations are based on annual data for the share of college educated to total
working population measured in e¢ ciency units (1963-2008) from Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) and GDP data from the US NIPA accounts (1963-2008). The cyclical component
of the series is obtained using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
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the ex ante capital tax rate. Moreover, we also examine the case where debt
is restricted to be state uncontingent, which allows us to calculate the ex post
capital tax or, if we also allow for state-contingent taxation of income from
bonds, the private assets tax.93
Our main nding is that under capital-skill complementarity, a friction
that does not allow the relative supply of skill to adjust in response to aggre-
gate shocks, signicantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. In particular, we rst show that under endogenous relative skill sup-
ply, the optimal labour taxes for both skilled and unskilled labour income are
very smooth, with the volatility of the unskilled income tax being marginally
higher. We also nd that the skilled tax moves pro-cyclically with output
and the unskilled tax is mildly counter-cyclical. These results are largely
consistent with the literature and extend previous ndings to a setup with
capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill supply.
However, when the relative skill supply is constrained to remain con-
stant over the business cycle, the prescriptions for optimal policy markedly
change. In particular, we nd that the volatility of taxes increases signi-
cantly, so that the standard deviation of the e¤ective average labour income
tax is about twelve times higher than the perfect labour markets case, while
the volatility of the skilled labour income tax is about two-and-a-half times
higher than that of the unskilled labour income tax. Moreover, both taxes
become strongly counter-cyclical. We show that the key to understanding
these changes is that the government nds it optimal to minimise the ef-
fects of the relative labour supply distortion by keeping the marginal rates
of substitution between leisure and consumption for the two types of labour
at roughly the same levels as under a fully exible labour market. In other
words, the government adjusts labour income tax rates to alter the average
net returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours.
Compared with the extension of Chari et al. (1994) undertaken by Wern-
ing (2007), our extension does not allow for redistribution. However, our
93As shown by Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994), state-contingent capital income taxes
allow the government to implement the complete asset markets outcome, despite the lack
of access to state-contingent debt.
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results add to the ndings in Werning (2007) in the following way. Wern-
ing (2007) shows that exogenous skill heterogeneity does not alter the basic
optimal tax smoothing results for a large class of utility functions, when the
assumption regarding the neoclassical production function is maintained and
the di¤erent skill-adjusted labour inputs are perfect substitutes in the pro-
duction function. In contrast, we analyse a case where skill-adjusted labour
inputs have di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital and nd that
whether this skill heterogeneity is endogenous or exogenous does indeed mat-
ter for the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes.
Our results further show that the skill heterogeneity considered, irrespec-
tive of the presence of the labour market friction, does not a¤ect the results
obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset taxes. In
particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital is around zero for every period,
the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes are near zero
and are the most volatile of the non-asset tax instruments. We also nd
that the skill-acquisition tax is the least smooth of the non-asset tax instru-
ments when debt is state-contingent and uctuates nearly as much as output.
Finally, irrespective of the model variant examined, all of the policy instru-
ments, except for the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax inherit
the persistence properties of the shocks.
When we introduce a budget rule, where the government is not able to
issue debt but needs to satisfy a given level of debt to output ratio over
the business cycle instead, we nd that the main results remain valid. In
particular, we nd that again under an empirically relevant restriction to
relative skill supply, the volatility of the labour income tax rates increases
signicantly and the e¤ective labour income tax volatility becomes almost
nine times higher compared to the exible relative skill supply case study.
Moreover, under the budget rule all the scal instruments become counter-
cyclical and they inherit the persistence properties of the shocks.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follow. Sections 2 and 3
present the theoretical model and the Ramsey problem respectively. Section
4 contains the quantitative results. Section 5 presents the results under a
xed debt to output ratio and Section 6 draws the conclusions.
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4.2 Model
We develop a model that extends the complete markets neoclassical setup
in Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994) by allowing for a division of the
labour force into skilled and unskilled workers, an endogenous skill supply
on the household side and capital-skill complementarity on the production
side. This setup implies a wage premium for skilled labour, the relative
supply of which can be increased by a cost to the household in the form of
earmarked training expenditure.94 As in Chari et al. (1994) households save
in the form of physical capital and state-contingent government bonds.
The household is modelled as an innitely-lived representative dynasty.
The head of the household makes all choices on behalf of its members by
maximising the aggregate welfare of the family, ensuring that each household
member experiences the same level of consumption irrespective of individual
labour market status. This is a commonly employed assumption since Merz
(1995), given that it allows for tractability when studying aggregate uctu-
ations under heterogeneities in the labour market (see e.g. Arseneau and
Chugh (2012) for an example with optimal tax policy).
Firms use capital, skilled and unskilled labour to produce a homogeneous
product. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al. (2000) and Horn-
stein et al. (2005), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to
capital than unskilled labour. Hence, capital accumulation as well as techno-
logical developments and government policies that are capital augmenting,
increase the skilled wage premium. In contrast, increases in the relative sup-
ply of skilled labour reduce the skill premium. Finally, the government can
borrow, tax skill acquisition expenditure, capital, skilled and unskilled labour
income separately, to nance exogenous public spending.
4.2.1 Notation
The notation employed throughout follows Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012).
In particular, we assume that in every period t  0, there is a realization
94This is consistent with the literature on upward professional mobility, where there is a
cost associated with achieving the higher professional status (see e.g. Matsuyama (2006)
for a review of several models).
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of shocks (stochastic events) st 2 S. Therefore, at each period t there is a
history of events st = [s0; s1; s2; :::; st] which is known. The unconditional
probability of observing a specic history of events st is dened as t (st).
For t >  , the conditional probability of having st sequence of events given
the realization of s is dened as: t (st j s ).
4.2.2 Households
A representative household is comprised of two types of members who provide
skilled and unskilled labour services.95 The household can invest in capital
and in state-contingent sequentially traded government bonds that mature
fully within a period. The objective function of the representative household
is given by:
1X
t=0
X
st
tt
 
st

u

ct
 
st

;  t(s
t)lst
 
st

;

1   t(st)

lut
 
st
	
(140)
where u(:) is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously dif-
ferentiable with respect to its inputs; ct (st) is average consumption of all
household members at time t given the history of events st;96 lst (s
t) and
lut (s
t), denote, respectively, per skilled and unskilled member leisure time;
and  t(s
t) is the share of skilled to total household members or the rela-
tive skill supply. Thus  t(s
t)lst (s
t) and [1   t(st)] lut (st) represent average
skilled and unskilled leisure time respectively. The time constraints facing
each type of member are given by:
hst
 
st

+ lst
 
st

= 1 (141)
hut
 
st

+ lut
 
st

= 1 (142)
where, hst (s
t) and hut (s
t) denote, respectively, skilled and unskilled labour
hours per member. The household can determine its relative skill supply
95Note that the unit mass of household members is equal to the sum of its skilled and
unskilled members.
96Since consumption is the same for all members of the household, average and per
member consumption are the same.
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by incurring an average (over all its members) skill-acquisition cost, et (st),
according to the following relation:
 t(s
t) = eg et  st (143)
where eg(:) is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously di¤er-
entiable with respect to et (st).
The household also faces a sequence of budget constraints given by:
ct (s
t) + kt+1 (s
t) +
P
st+1
pt (st+1 j st) bt+1 (st+1 j st) +
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] = [1   st (st)]wst (st)
 t(st)hst (st) + [1  ut (st)]wut (st) [1   t(st)]hut (st) +
+ (1  ) kt (st 1) +

1   kt (st)

rt (s
t) kt (s
t 1) + bt (st j st 1) 8t
(144)
where pt (st+1 j st) is the pricing kernel for government bonds in terms of t
goods and bt+1 (st+1 j st) is the state st+1 contingent payout value of bonds
bought per member at period t;97 et (st) has been substituted out of equation
(143) using the inverse function of eg dened as g [ t(st)] = et (st);  st (st) ;
ut (s
t) ;  kt (s
t) ; at (s
t) are the tax rates on skilled and unskilled labour, cap-
ital income and skill-acquisition expenditure respectively; wst (s
t) and wut (s
t)
are the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour respectively; rt (st) is the
return to capital; kt (st 1) is the per member stock of capital at time t given
the history of events st 1; and 0 <  < 1 is the capital depreciation rate.
4.2.3 First order conditions for households
Substituting the constraints (141)-(142) into the utility function u(:), the
household maximises the resulting objective function subject to the sequence
of constraints in (144), by choosing fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st)
8stg1t=0 and fbt+1 (st+1; st) ; 8stg1t=0, given initial values for b0; k0. In each
time period t and given history st, fbt+1 (st+1; st)g1t=0 is a vector of govern-
ment bonds with one element of the vector for each possible realisation of
97Given the period t state st j st 1 (or else the history st), the income side of the
household budget includes revenue from bonds dated bt
 
st j st 1

.
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st+1. This yields six rst-order conditions which are reported in the Appen-
dix.
Combining the rst-order conditions for consumption, skilled and un-
skilled labour supply as well as the relative skill supply gives the following
a-temporal equilibrium conditions:
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t)
uc(st)
=  t(s
t)wst
 
st
 
1   st(st)

(145)
 uhu(s
t)
uc(st)
=

1   t(st)

wut
 
st
 
1  ut (st)

(146)
 u (s
t)
uc(st)
= hst
 
st
 
1   st
 
st

wst
 
st
  (147)
  hut
 
st
 
1  ut
 
st

wut
 
st
  1 + at  st g  st .
Conditions (145)-(146) equate the marginal rates of substitution between
consumption and each type of labour with the wage rates net of taxes. The
nal relation given by (147) states that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and the relative skill supply is equal to the net mar-
ginal benet of increasing the households share of skilled workers. The
latter includes the post-tax labour income from an additional skilled mem-
ber, hst (s
t) [1   st (st)]wst (st), less the post-tax labour income from one less
unskilled member, hut (s
t) [1  ut (st)]wut (st), less the post-tax cost for an
additional skilled member, [1 + at (s
t)] [g (s
t)].
Substituting the rst-order condition for consumption and its one-period
lead into the rst-order conditions for the two assets gives the following
inter-temporal conditions equating the current cost of investing in bonds and
capital to the future state-contingent and expected benets respectively:
uc(s
t)pt
 
st+1 j st

= t+1
 
st+1 j stuc(st+1) (148)
uc(s
t) = Et

uc(s
t+1)
 
1   kt+1(st+1)

rt+1
 
st+1

+ 1  	 (149)
where
t+1(st+1)
t(st)
= t+1 (s
t+1 j st) and Et is the expectation conditional on in-
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formation available at time t (i.e. history st), Etxt+1(st+1) =
P
st+1jst
t+1(st+1)
t(st)

xt+1(st+1), and the summation over st+1 denotes the sum over all possible
histories est+1 such that est = st.
By combining the inter-temporal conditions we obtain:
1 =
X
st+1
pt
 
st+1 j st
 
1   kt+1
 
st+1

rt+1
 
st+1

+ (1  )	 (150)
which ensures no-arbitrage between the investment opportunities in bonds
and capital.
4.2.4 Firms
Firms rent capital as well as skilled and unskilled labour from households to
maximize their prots using a production function F () that exhibits constant
returns to scale in its three inputs:
t = F
h
(hs;ft (s
t); hu;ft (s
t); kft (s
t 1)
i
  (151)
  wst (st)hs;ft (st)  wut (st)hu;ft (st)  rt(st)kft (st 1).
This yields the standard rst-order conditions:
wst (s
t) = Fhs;f (s
t) (152)
wut (s
t) = Fhu;f (s
t) (153)
rt(s
t) = Fkf (s
t): (154)
4.2.5 Government budget and market clearing
Given a history st, the government nances an exogenous stream of expenses
get (s
t) and its debt obligation bt (st j st 1), by taxing capital and labour in-
come and skill acquisition expenditure, and by issuing state-contingent debt.
157
Hence, the within-period government budget constraint is given by:
get (s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t(s
t)hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t) [1   t(st)]
hut (st) +  kt (st)rt(st)kt(st 1) + at (st) g [ t(st)] +
+
P
st+1
pt (st+1 j st) bt+1 (st+1 j st)  bt (st j st 1).
(155)
Finally, the aggregate consistency condition and market clearing conditions
for skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital are given respectively by:
F () = ct(st) + get (st) + g

 t(s
t)

+ kt+1(s
t)  (1  ) kt(st 1) (156)
 t(s
t)hst
 
st

= hs;ft (s
t) (157)
1   t(st)

hut
 
st

= hu;ft (s
t) (158)
kt(s
t 1) = kft (s
t 1). (159)
4.3 The Ramsey problem
To solve the Ramsey problem we follow the primal approach and rst de-
rive the present discounted value (PDV) of the households lifetime budget
constraint using the Arrow-Debreu price of the bond and the transversality
conditions for bonds and capital. Second, we derive the implementability con-
straint by substituting out prices and tax rates from the households present
value budget constraint using the rst-order conditions for the household and
rm. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey allocations by maximising the
planners objective function subject to the implementability constraint and
the aggregate resource constraint.
4.3.1 Present value of budget constraint
Starting from period 0 and by repeatedly substituting forward one-period
budget constraints for the household, we obtain the PDV of the households
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lifetime budget constraint:
1P
t=0
P
st

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)

ct(s
t) =
1P
t=0
P
st

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)


f[(1   st (st)]wst (st) t(st)hst
 
st

+ [(1  ut (st)]wut (st)
 [1   t(st)]hut
 
st
  [1 + at (st)] g [ t(st)]g+ b0+
+

(1   k0 (s0)

r0 (s0) + (1  )
	
k0 (delete dot)
(160)
where we have imposed the series of no-arbitrage conditions (150) 8t and the
following transversality conditions for any s1:
lim
t!1
 
t 1Y
i=0
pi
 
si+1 j si
!
kt+1
 
st

= 0 (161)
lim
t!1
X
st+1
 
t 1Y
i=0
pi
 
si+1 j si
!
pt
 
st+1 j st

bt+1
 
st+1jst

= 0 (162)
which specify that for any possible future history the household does not hold
positive or negative valued wealth at innity. Dening

t 1Q
i=0
pi (si+1 j si)


q0t (s
t), 8t  1, with q00(s0)  1, where q0t (st) is the Arrow-Debreu price, we
can re-write (160) as:
1P
t=0
P
st
q0t (s
t)ct(s
t) =
1P
t=0
P
st
q0t (s
t)f [(1   st (st)]wst (st) t(st)hst
 
st

+
+ [(1  ut (st)]wut (st) [1   t(st)]hut
 
st
  [1 + at (st)] g [ t(st)] g+
+ b0 +

(1   k0 (s0)

r0 (s0) + (1  )
	
k0. (163)
Notice that the Arrow-Debreu price satises the recursion:
q0t+1(s
t+1) = pt
 
st+1 j st

q0t (s
t). (164)
Using the rst-order condition from the sequential equilibrium for pricing
contingent claims (148) and noting that 0 (s0) = 1, since, at period 0 the
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state s0 is known, the above recursion can be written as:
q0t+1(s
t+1) = t+1t+1
 
st+1
 uc(st+1)
uc(s0)
. (165)
4.3.2 Implementability constraint
First, notice that (165) implies:
q0t (s
t) = tt
 
st
 uc(st)
uc(s0)
. (166)
Substituting (166) for q0t (s
t); the rst-order conditions of the rm, (152),
(153) and (154) for wst (s
t), wut (s
t) and r0, respectively; and the rst-order
conditions of the household, (145), (146), and (147) for  st (s
t), ut (s
t) and
at (s
t), respectively; into the present value budget constraint (163), we obtain
the implementability constraint:98
1P
t=0
P
st
tt (s
t) [uc (s
t) ct (s
t) + uhs (s
t)hst (s
t) +
+uhu (s
t)hut (s
t) + 
t (s
t)]  A = 0
(167)
where
t (st) 
h
u (s
t)  hst (st) uhs (s
t)
 t(s
t)
+ hut (s
t) uhu (s
t)
1  t(st)
i
g [ t(s
t)] [g (s
t)]
 1
;
A  A(c0 (s0) ; hs0 (s0) ; hu0 (s0) ;  0(s0); b0; k0;  k0) = uc (s0) fb0+[(1  k0) eFk(s0)+
(1  )]k0g and eFk(s0) is obtained by substituting the market clearing con-
dition (159) into Fkf (s0).
4.3.3 Pseudo value function
Substituting the constraints (141)-(142) into the utility function u(:), the
government maximises the resulting objective function subject to the imple-
mentability constraint (167) and the aggregate resource constraint (156) by
98Note that the inter-temporal rst-order condition (150) has been used already in
deriving (163), while the government budget constraint is redundant, since it is a linear
combination of the households budget constraint and the aggregate resource constraint.
Therefore, (167) and (156) summarise all the constraints that the government needs to
respect.
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choosing fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st)8stg1t=0, given

b0; k0; 
k
0
	
:99
To achieve this, we follow Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) and rst specify the
following within-period pseudo value function:
V [ct (s
t) ; hst (s
t) ; hut (s
t) ;  t(s
t); ] = u[ct (s
t) ; 1  hst (st) ;
1  hut (st) ;  t(st)] + [uc (st) ct (st) + uhs (st)hst (st) +
+uhu (s
t)hut (s
t) + 
t (s
t)]
(168)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the implementability
constraint.100 The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner is dened as:
J =
1P
t=0
P
st
tt (s
t) fV (ct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); ) +
+t (s
t) [ eF ()  ct (st)  get (st)  g [ t(st)]  kt+1(st)+
+(1  )kt(st 1)]g   A
(169)
where eF () is obtained by substituting market clearing conditions (157)-(159)
into F (); ft (st) ; 8stg1t=0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers attached to
the aggregate resource constraint. For a given level of

b0; k0; 
k
0
	
, J is max-
imized with respect to fct (st) ; hst (st) ; hut (st) ;  t(st); kt+1 (st) ;8stg1t=1 and
c0 (s
0) ; hs0 (s
0) ; hu0 (s
0) ;  0(s
0) yielding the following rst-order conditions
respectively:
Vc
 
st

= t
 
st

; t  1 (170)
Vhs
 
st

=  t
 
st
 eFhs  st ; t  1 (171)
Vhu
 
st

=  t
 
st
 eFhu  st ; t  1 (172)
V 
 
st

= t
 
st
 
g 
 
st

; t  1 (173)
t
 
st

= Ett+1
 
st+1
 h eFk  st+1+ 1  i ; t  0 (174)
Vc
 
s0

= 0
 
s0

+ Ac (175)
99Note that following the literature we do not examine the problem of initial capital
taxation and thus do not allow the government to choose k0 .
100Note that the multiplier  is non-negative and measures the disutility of future tax
distortions.
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Vhs
 
s0

=  0
 
s0
 eFhs  s0+ Ahs (176)
Vhu
 
s0

=  0
 
s0
 eFhu  s0+ Ahu (177)
V 
 
s0

= 0
 
s0
 
g 
 
s0

+ A . (178)
where f eFhs (t) ; eFhu (t) ; eFk (t) ; 8stg1t=0 are obtained by substituting market
clearing conditions (157)-(159) into fFhs (t) ; Fhu (t) ; Fk (t) ; 8stg1t=0 respec-
tively. The rst-order conditions derived in (170)-(178) imply that the system
of equations to be solved will be di¤erent for t = 0 and for t > 0. These
conditions in a non-stochastic environment are presented in the Appendix.
4.4 Quantitative implementation
In this section we quantitatively solve both the non-stochastic and stochastic
optimal policy models. Our solution approach follows Arseneau and Chugh
(2012). In particular, we rst calibrate the non-stochastic model with ex-
ogenous policy. Next, we solve the deterministic Ramsey problem, starting
from the exogenous policy steady state, using non-linear methods. Since we
are interested in tax smoothing over the business cycle, we then approximate
around the steady state of the deterministic Ramsey problem to solve the
stochastic problem and obtain near steady state dynamics.
4.4.1 Functional forms
Following Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001), we use a CRRA utility
function:
u() =
n
[ct (s
t)]
1 1 2 [ t(s
t)lst (s
t)]
1 [[1   t(st)] lut (st)]2
o3
3
(179)
where, 1 and 2 are the weights to leisure in the utility function and 3 is
the relative risk aversion parameter.
The production side is given by a CES production function that allows
for capital-skill complementarity, since the latter has been shown to match
the dynamics of the skill premium in the data (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000),
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Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)):
F () = At



hu;ft

+ (1  )
h


Akt k
f
t

+ (1  )

hs;ft
i 1
(180)
where, At is total factor productivity; Akt is the e¢ ciency level of capital
equipment;  < 1, and  < 1 are the parameters determining the factor
elasticities, i.e. 1=(1 ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1 ) is
the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled labour;
and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters. In this specication,
capital-skill complementarity is obtained if 1=(1  ) > 1=(1  ).
The above functional form implies that the skill premium, dened as
ws(st)
wu(st)
, can be obtained as:
ws(st)
wu(st)
=
eFhs(st)eFhu(st) = (1  ) (1  ) [ (s
t)hst(s
t)]
 1
f[1   (st)]hut (st)g 1
(t)


 1 (181)
where t  
 
Akt (s
t)

(kt(s
t 1))

+(1  ) ( (st)hst(st)) . The restrictions
placed above on the parameters of the production function imply that the
skill premium is decreasing in  (st) and increasing in kt(st 1), see Appendix.
The functional form for the relative skill supply is:
eg [] = 	 et  st (182)
where 	 > 0 is the productivity of skill-acquisition; and 0   < 1 is the
elasticity of the relative skill supply with respect to skill-acquisition expen-
diture.
Finally, we calculate the e¤ective labour tax rate as the ratio of total tax
revenues from both skilled and unskilled sources as a share of total labour
income:
nt (s
t) =
st(st)wst(st) t(st)hst(st)+ut (st)wut (st)(1  t(st))hut (st)
wst (s
t) t(s
t)hst (s
t)+wut (s
t)(1  t(st))hut (st) :
(183)
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4.4.2 Exogenous policy and calibration
We next present the calibration and steady state for the exogenous policy
model under both endogenous and exogenous relative skill supply. In par-
ticular, we obtain the steady state of the following decentralised competitive
equilibrium (DCE):
Denition 1. Non-stochastic DCE with exogenous policy
Given initial levels of k0 and b0, and the ve policy instruments f st ; ut ;  kt ;
at ; g
e
t g, the non-stochastic DCE system is characterized by a sequence of
allocations fct; hst ; hut ;  t; kt+1g1t=0, prices fwst ; wut ; rt; ptg1t=0, and the residual
policy instrument fbt+1g1t=0 such that: (i) households maximise their welfare
and rms maximise their prots, taking policy and prices as given; (ii) the
government budget constraint is satised in each time period and (iii) all
markets clear. Thus, imposing the market-clearing conditions (157)-(159),
the non-stochastic DCE is comprised of the non-stochastic version of the rst-
order conditions of the household (145)-(149), the three rst-order conditions
of the rm (152)-(154), the government budget constraint (155) and the
aggregate resource constraint (156).
4.4.3 Calibration
The non-stochastic model with exogenous policy is calibrated so that its
steady state is consistent with the annual US data for 1970-2011.
Utility Table 4.1 below reports the models quantitative parameters along
with an indication of their source. Starting with the share of leisure for each
skill type in utility, 1 and 2, we calibrate these to 0:35 each so that, in the
steady state, the household devotes about one third of its time to labour. The
relative risk aversion parameter, 3 =  2 is commonly employed in business
cycle models.
Production The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and
capital and between unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have
been estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g.
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Lindquist (2004), and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates, to
set a = 0:401 and  =  0:495. The remaining parameters in the production
function are calibrated to ensure the steady state predictions of the model
in asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. More specically,
the unskilled labour weight in composite input share  = 0:272 is calibrated
to obtain a labour share of income of approximately equal to 70% and the
capital weight in composite input share,  = 0:518, is calibrated to obtain a
skill premium of about 1:64. Both of these targets are consistent with the
U.S. data for the period 1970-2011. The target value for the skill premium
is obtained from U.S. Census data and the share of labour income in GDP
is from the BEA data on personal income.101 We also normalize the steady
state values of TFP and capital equipment to unity (i.e. A = Ak = 1).
Depreciation and time preference The depreciation rate of capital  =
0:07 is calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio of about 1:94,
which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA on capital
stocks.102 The time discount factor,  = 0:96, is set to obtain a post-tax
post-depreciation annual real rate of return on capital of roughly 4:17%,
which coheres with the 4:19% obtained in the data from the World Bank.103
Relative skill supply To match  , the share of skilled workers in total
population of roughly 44% in the data, we set the elasticity of relative skill
supply with respect to skill-acquisition, , equal to 0:2334. This share is
consistent with the data from the 2010 U.S. Census which indicates that
43% of the population has a college degree.104 It also coheres with a related
data set by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) which implies that the average share
of the labour force with a college degree is approximately 45%. We normalise
101The data source is the Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement from the U.S. Census Bureau.
102Specically, the BEA Table 1.1 on xed-assets has been used to obtain the time series
for capital stock for 1970-2011.
103The data refers to the annual real interest rate from World Bank Indicators database
for the period 1970-2011 (i.e. FR.INR.RINR).
104This information is obtained from Table 4 of the Census Bureau, Survey of Income
and Program Participation.
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skill-acquisition productivity, 	 to unity.
Table 4.1: Model parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0 < 1< 1 0.350 weight to skilled leisure in utility calibration
0 < 2< 1 0.350 weight to unskilled leisure in utility calibration
3< 0 -2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion assumption
1
1 > 0 1.669 cap. equip. to unskilled labour elasticity assumption
0 < 1
1 <
1
1  0.669 cap. equip. to skilled labour elasticity assumption
0 < 1   < 1 0.728 share of composite input to output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.518 share of cap. equip. to composite input calibration
A > 0 1.000 TFP assumption
Ak> 0 1.000 capital equipment productivity assumption
0    1 0.070 depreciation rate of capital calibration
0 <  < 1 0.960 time discount factor calibration
0   < 1 0.189 relative skill supply elasticity calibration
	 > 0 1.000 productivity of skill-acquisition assumption
 k 0.310 capital income tax rate data
u 0.200 unskilled labour tax rate data
 s 0.250 skilled labour tax rate data
n 0.220 e¤ective labour tax rate data
a 0.000 skill-acquisition expenditure tax rate assumption
ge> 0 0.047 government spending calibration
Tax rates and government spending Finally, we use the ECFIN e¤ec-
tive capital and labour tax rates from Martinez-Mongay (2000) to obtain an
average tax rate for capital and labour.105 Therefore, we set the tax rate
for capital income  k = 0:31 and the two labour income tax rates u = 0:20
and  s = 0:25.106 Given that it is di¢ cult to obtain data which cohere well
105In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for e¤ective average labour and capital
taxes respectively for 1970-2011, as they treat self-employed income as capital income in
the calculations.
106Note that the calculation of the e¤ective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22.
But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed di¤erently we
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with the skill-acquisition expenditure tax rate, a, we set it to zero for the
exogenous policy model. We nally set the steady state value ge = 0:0469,
to obtain a steady state debt to output ratio, b=Y = 53%, which is equal to
the average debt to GDP ratio obtained in the data.107
Steady state The steady state of the DCE dened and calibrated above
is presented in Table 4.2. The results indicate that the models predictions
for the great ratios match those implied by the data quite well. For example,
in the data for 1970-2011: k
y
= 1:895, c
y
= 0:640, i
y
= 0:146, g
e
y
= 0:203 and
b
y
= 0:530.108 Moreover, the share of skill acquisition expenditure in GDP, e
y
,
roughly coheres with US total expenditures for colleges and universities as a
share of output equal to 6% for 1970-2010. This data is obtained from the
U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics.
As pointed out above, the remaining steady state variables in the exogenous
model, have been calibrated to match their values in the data.
Table 4.2: Steady state of exogenous policy
c
y
k
y
i
y
e
y
b
y
ge
y
ws
wu
rnet  
0.5613 1.9444 0.1361 0.0659 0.5272 0.2367 1.6344 0.0417 0.4400
4.5 Deterministic Ramsey
The deterministic version of the Ramsey problem in (170)-(178) is sum-
marised in Appendix D, (D7-D22) and is solved iteratively, conditional on
the calibration described in the previous section. In particular, we rst
guess a value for  and solve equations (D7-D21) for an allocation fct; hst ;
hut ;  t; kt+1gTt=0. Then we test whether equation (D22) is binding and we
increase or decrease the value of  if the budget is in decit or surplus re-
spectively.
decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so as the weighted average
of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
107The source of that time series is: FRED Economic Data on Gross Federal Debt as a
percentage of GDP, 1970-2011.
108Note that if model prediction for the cost of becoming skilled, ey = 0:0659, is added
to the cy ratio from the model, the sum is very close to the
c
y ratio in the data.
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The initial conditions for the models state variables are given by the non-
stochastic exogenous steady state (see Table 4.2). For the terminal values
of the forward looking variables, we assume that after T years the dynamic
system has converged to its Ramsey steady state. This implies that the
appropriate terminal conditions are obtained by setting the values for these
variables equal to those of the preceding period.
The nal system is given by [(5 T ) + 1] equations, which is solved non-
linearly using standard numeric methods (see, e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010),
Adjemian et al. (2011), and Angelopoulos et al. (2013b)). This gives the
dynamic transition path from the exogenous to the optimal steady state.
We set T = 250 to ensure that convergence is achieved. Our results show
that this occurs for all endogenous variables within 150 years.109 After we
nd the optimal allocation for fct; hst ; hut ;  t; kt+1gTt=0 we obtain wst = eFhs (t),
wut =
eFhu (t) and rt = eFk (t). Additionally, we solve for  st , ut , at ,  kt and
nt using the non-stochastic versions of (145), (146), (147), (149) and (183)
respectively.
The Ramsey steady state is reported in Table 4.3. The results are consis-
tent with the messages from the literature initiated by Chamley (1986) on dy-
namic Ramsey taxation in a deterministic environment (see e.g. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012), ch. 16 for a review of this literature). As expected, al-
lowing the government a complete instrument set results in a zero capital tax
rate in the long-run. Compared with the steady state of exogenous policy, a
Ramsey government would increase capital accumulation in the steady state,
by eliminating the inter-temporal wedge. Moreover, since skilled labour is
complementing capital more than unskilled, the Ramsey government would
nd it optimal to encourage an increase in the relative skill supply, since a
higher relative quantity of skilled labour increases the returns to, and thus
the accumulation of, physical capital. This is achieved by a small subsidy
to skill acquisition expenditure. The fall in the skill premium under Ramsey
policy suggests that the increase in the relative skill supply has a relatively
stronger quantitative impact than the increase in the capital stock. The
Ramsey equilibrium also implies a mild regressivity regarding the long-run
109See Figure 1 below for an illustration of convergence using the tax policy instruments.
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labour income taxes, revealing an incentive to encourage the labour supply of
skilled hours, consistent with the discussion above. Finally, the government
is able to reduce the overall burden of taxation, since it can nance part of
the required public spending from accumulated assets.
Table 4.3: Steady state of optimal policy
c
y
k
y
i
y
e
y
b
y
ge
y
ws
wu
0.5444 2.6413 0.1849 0.0719 -0.7212 0.1987 1.5002
 s u n  k a rnet  
0.2432 0.2591 0.2475 0.0000 -0.0644 0.0417 0.4624
We further study the transition dynamics associated with Ramsey policy.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the dynamic paths implied by optimal policy for the
capital tax, the two labour taxes, the skill-acquisition expenditure tax and
debt to output as the economy evolves from the exogenous steady state to
the Ramsey steady state. The rst row of Figure 4.1 shows that in period
1 skilled and unskilled labour are subsidised at rates of 30.1% and 23.7%
respectively; and skill-acquisition expenditure is taxed at a rate of 47.3%. In
period 2, skilled and unskilled labour taxes are 26.9% and 27.6% respectively
and eventually converge to their steady state values reported in Table 4.3.
Also in period 2, skill-acquisition is subsidised at a rate of 4.1% and converges
to 6.4% in the steady state.
The second row of Figure 4.1 shows that in period 1, since capital already
in place, capital income is taxed at a conscatory rate (approximately 318%).
In period 2, the capital tax is 0.85% and then converges slowly to zero. The
high capital taxation in the rst period allows the government to create a
rst period stock of assets of approximately the size of GDP, by lending
to the household. Government assets increase in future periods, after an
immediate drop in the second period due to the decrease in capital income
tax, and their income is used to subsidise skill-acquisition expenditure and
to compensate for the losses from foregone capital income taxation, without
the need to resort to high labour income taxes. These transition paths are
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Figure 4.1: Transition paths of the policy instruments
consistent with previous research.
4.6 Stochastic processes
To move to the analysis of the stochastic Ramsey problem, we need to dene
the stochastic processes that drive economic uctuations. In what follows we
designate a stochastic state st at time t that determines exogenous shocks to
both the rms production technologies, (At, Akt ), and to government expen-
ditures (get ). Therefore, the optimal allocation of households will depend on
the history of events st at time t. Following the literature, At, Akt and g
e
t are
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assumed to follow stochastic AR(1) processes:
At+1 = (1  A)A+ AAt + "At+1 (184)
Akt+1 = (1  Ak)Ak + AkAkt + "Akt+1 (185)
get+1 =
 
1  ge

ge + geg
e
t + "
ge
t+1 (186)
where "At , "
Ak
t and "
ge
t are independently and identically distributed Gaussian
random variables with zero means and standard deviations given respectively
by A, Ak and ge .
The values for the AR(1) coe¢ cients and the standard deviations for the
government expenditures and capital productivity exogenous processes are
data based and are estimated to be: Ak = 0:90, ge = 0:70, Ak = 0:007 and
g = 0:012.110 The autocorrelation parameter of TFP is set equal to 0:95,
following Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011), while A is calibrated to
match the volatility of output observed in the BEA data.111 More specically,
the standard deviation for TFP is set A = 0:8% to obtain a volatility for
output from 1970-2011 equal to 1:2%.
Table 4.4: Parameters for stochastic processes
Parameter Value Denition Source
A 0.008 standard deviation of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP data
Ak 0.007 standard deviation of capital equipment data
Ak 0.900 AR(1) coe¢ cient of capital equipment data
ge 0.012 standard deviation of public spending data
ge 0.700 AR(1) coe¢ cient of public spending data
110The government spending series refers to government consumption expenditures and
gross investment from NIPA Table 1.1.5 (1970-2011). The capital series refers to produc-
tive capital stock and is from the Bureau of Labour Statistics Table 4.1 (1988-2011). Note
that there is no data available prior to 1988 for the productivity of capital. To calculate
the statistical properties of the cyclical component of the series, we take logs and apply
the HP-lter with smoothing parameter equal to 6.25.
111The time series for GDP from 1970-2011 is obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.5. Cyclical
output is again calculated using the HP-lter as above.
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4.7 Stochastic Ramsey
We next approximate the dynamic equilibrium paths due to three exogenous
shocks using rst-order accurate decision rules of the equilibrium conditions
under optimal policy in (170)-(174), around the optimal deterministic steady-
state of these conditions described above.112 As is common in the literature
when characterizing policy dynamics, we also make the auxiliary assumption
that the initial state of the economy at t = 0 is the steady state under optimal
policy.
As is well known (see e.g. Zhu (1992), Chari et al. (1994) and Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012)), the Ramsey problem with state-contingent debt cannot
uniquely pin down the capital tax rate. Hence, we follow the literature and
calculate the optimal ex-ante capital income tax rate (see Appendix D for
details):
 kt+1(s
t) =
Etuc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) + 1  i  uc(st)
Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1) : (187)
Alternatively, by assuming that government debt is not state-contingent, we
can calculate the ex post state contingent capital tax (see Appendix D for
the derivation):
e kt (st) =  1rt(st)kt(st 1) fgt(st)  at (st) g [ t(st)]  bt+1(st)Rt(st) + bt (st 1) 
   s(st)wst (st) t
 
st

hst(s
t)  u(st)wut (st)

1   t
 
st

)

hut (s
t)g (188)
where Rt (st) is the state uncontingent return to holding government debt.
Alternatively, assuming the government employs a state-contingent tax on
income from government bonds, we can calculate the private assets tax,
 (st+1jst) that applies to taxing jointly the income from assets as (see Ap-
112We use the perturbation methods in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) to solve the
dynamic model.
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pendix D for the derivation):
t (s
t+1jst) =

1
Fk(st+1)kt+1(st)+bt+1(st)

 fgt+1(st+1) + bt+1 (st)  bt+2(s
t+1)
Rt+1(st+1)
 
  s(st+1)wst+1(st+1) t+1 (st+1)hst+1(st+1)  u(st+1)wut+1(st+1)
 1   t+1  st+1hut+1(st+1)  at+1  st+1 g  t+1(st+1)g. (189)
To calculate the business cycle statistics of the relevant quantities of the
model under optimal policy, we conduct simulations by shocking all of the
exogenous processes, obtain the required moments for each simulation and
then calculate their mean value across the simulations. We undertake 1000
simulations, each 242 periods long and drop the rst 200 periods to ensure
that the initial conditions do not a¤ect the results. We retain 42 periods in
our analysis to match the number of years between 1970 and 2011 used in
the calibration.
4.8 Cyclical properties
We rst present the results regarding the key second moments of the stochas-
tic optimal policy problems, under di¤erent scenaria regarding the policy set
available to the government and an endogenous or exogenous relative skill
supply. This is followed by an impulse response analysis, which allows to
investigate the channels through which tax policy works over the business
cycle.
4.8.1 Second moments
We start with the cyclical properties of Ramsey taxation under endogenous
relative skill supply. The results on standard deviations and correlations with
output, for the endogenous variables of the model as well as the various tax
rates that were explained above are summarised in Table 4.5. The results
regarding optimal taxation are largely consistent with the literature and thus
extend previous ndings to a setup with capital-skill complementarity and
endogenous skill supply.
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Table 4.5: Stochastic results
endogenous  exogenous  
xi xi xi  (xi; y) xi xi  (xi; y)
y 0.2358 0.0226 1 0.2358 0.0213 1
c 0.1283 0.0254 0.9777 0.1283 0.0262 0.9778
k 0.6226 0.0201 0.6021 0.6227 0.0185 0.5941
hs 0.3797 0.0021 0.3464 0.3797 0.0018 0.3933
hu 0.1825 0.0099 -0.5724 0.1825 0.0092 -0.5563
 0.4623 0.0034 0.9575 0.4623 0.0000 0.0000
ws
wu
1.5004 0.0041 -0.9740 1.5000 0.0020 0.2942
 s 0.2432 0.0007 0.4642 0.2433 0.0071 -0.9309
u 0.2591 0.0009 -0.3662 0.2591 0.0033 -0.9278
 (1   s)ws 0.2414 0.0257 0.9831 0.2414 0.0266 0.9819
(1   )(1  u)wu 0.1831 0.0237 0.9878 0.1831 0.0247 0.9874
n 0.2475 0.0005 0.1022 0.2476 0.0061 -0.9350
a -0.0645 0.0169 0.0951 -0.0645 0.0000 0.0000
 k -1.8e-5 0.0010 0.5765 -3.6e-5 0.0008 0.6178e k 0.0142 0.1330 -0.2085 0.0152 0.1393 -0.2238
 -0.0125 0.0855 0.2015 -0.0149 0.0943 0.2150
In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital is e¤ectively zero and is
around zero for every period. Moreover, when debt is not allowed to be
state-contingent, the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes
are near zero, have low correlations with output and are the most volatile of
the tax instruments. These results are similar to ndings in the literature to
date. Also consistent with the labour tax-smoothing results in the literature,
both labour taxes have very low standard deviations relative to output, as
the government nds it optimal to minimise the distortions introduced by
labour taxes over the business cycle by keeping them relatively smooth and
letting the remaining state-contingent policy instruments respond to exoge-
nous shocks. However, they exhibit di¤erent correlations with output. The
tax rate on skilled labour income is pro-cyclical, whereas the tax rate on
unskilled labour income is mildly counter-cyclical. The skill-acquisition tax
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is the least smooth of the tax instruments when debt is state-contingent and
uctuates nearly as much as output. Moreover, it is mildly pro-cyclical.
Finally, the labour income taxes and the ex ante capital income tax in
this model inherit the properties of the exogenous processes. As can be seen
in Table 4.6, the autocorrelations of these instruments follow the autocorre-
lations of the exogenous processes, so that when shocks are autocorrelated
as in Table 4.4, so are the tax rates. However, if we assume that the shocks
follow iid processes, the autocorrelation of the tax rates generally becomes
very small.113 On the contrary, the autocorrelations of the ex post capital
tax and of the private assets tax do not follow the autocorrelations of the
exogenous processes. This is again similar to previous ndings.
Table 4.6: Autocorrelations
autocorrelated shocks iid shocks
endogenous  exogenous  endogenous  exogenous  
 s 0.7848 0.9054 -0.0290 0.0778
u 0.9231 0.9213 -0.0068 0.7635
n 0.7738 0.9114 -0.0630 0.1658
a 0.8048 1.0000 0.0462 1.0000
 k 0.7353 0.7441 -0.0436 -0.0388e k -0.1621 -0.1604 -0.5029 -0.4999
 -0.1744 -0.1602 -0.5062 -0.5013
We next examine how the prescriptions for optimal policy are a¤ected by
a friction in the labour market that does not permit changes in the relative
skill supply over the business cycle. As discussed in the introduction, this
restriction is empirically relevant.114 This is also consistent with the litera-
ture on optimal policy under heterogeneity in labour productivity (see e.g.
113Note that under exogenous  , a is constant since skill acquisition expenditure is
constant. Thus a has a unit AR(1) parameter for both the autocorrelated and iid cases.
114Note that the benchmark model developed earlier does not capture this empirical
feature when relative skill supply is endogenously chosen. In particular, when the model is
simulated under the exogenous processes in Section 4.4, it produces an HP ltered series
for  t (s
t), which has a correlation with similarly detrended output of about 60% and a
relative-to-output standard deviation of 50%.
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Werning (2007) for a review of this literature), which typically assumes that
the distribution of labour productivity is exogenously determined.
To analyse the e¤ects of a xed relative skill supply over the business cy-
cle, we obtain the rst-order conditions for optimal policy incorporating this
rigidity and then approximate these conditions around the Ramsey deter-
ministic steady state with endogenous  t (s
t) in Table 4.3. The latter avoids
approximating around the steady state in which the relative skill supply is
restricted over both the short- and long-run. Thus, we set  t (s
t), for each
possible history st, to be equal to the steady state value from the determin-
istic Ramsey problem with endogenous  t (s
t) in Table 4.3. This also means
that skill-acquisition expenditure et (st) and the respective tax rate at (s
t)
are also set to their respective values in Table 4.3.115 The results pertaining
to the business cycle properties of the economy under optimal policy in this
case are presented in the last three columns of Table 4.5.
These results rst suggest that the properties of asset taxation do not
change. However, there are important di¤erences regarding labour income
taxation. In particular, the two labour income taxes become quantitatively
more volatile, so that the e¤ective labour income tax rate, nt (s
t), is about
twelve times more volatile. Also note that the labour tax volatility increases
asymmetrically, so that  st (s
t) is about two-and-a-half times more volatile
than ut (s
t). Finally, both labour taxes become strongly counter-cyclical.
Thus, under capital-skill complementarity, imposing the restriction that the
relative skill supply does not change over the business cycle has important
implications for the business cycle properties of labour income taxation.
The key to understanding these changes is to note that the rigidity of
 t (s
t) over the business cycle creates a distortion in the labour markets that
is reected in the di¤erence between the a-temporal rst-order conditions of
the household given by (145) and (146) and the corresponding conditions
when the relative skill supply is xed,  . This distortion drives a wedge
115Note that at (s
t) needs to remain constant if skill-acquisition expenditure remains
constant. Otherwise it would turn to a lump-sum tax, which is ruled out in Ramsey
second-best analysis. Moreover, if skill-acquisition expenditure remains constant, there is
no margin in the household decision for at (s
t) to a¤ect. Thus there is no reason why it
should change.
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between the average net returns to labour supply in the perfect and imperfect
labour markets, or, alternatively, a wedge between the marginal rates of
substitution between leisure and consumption. Thus these wedges for skilled
and unskilled workers respectively can be dened as follow:116
lwst
 
st

=

1   st
 
st

 t
 
st

wst
 
st
  1  b st  st bwst  st (190)
lwut
 
st

=

1  ut
 
st
 
1   t
 
st

wut
 
st
  1  but  st  1    bwut  st
where hatted variables denote the distorted case.
Our results make clear that the government wishes to minimise these
wedges over the business cycle and this is achieved by setting b st (st) andbut (st) so that paths for the skilled and unskilled average net return under
the market distortion are as close as possible to the paths of the corresponding
quantities without the market distortion. Table 4.5 clearly shows that second
moments of these returns are very similar and this is further conrmed when
we examine the impulse responses below. On the contrary, the inter-temporal
margins are not directly a¤ected by the rigidity in the relative skill supply.
Hence, the optimal policies regarding asset taxation are not qualitatively
di¤erent between the two models.
4.8.2 Impulse responses
To further explain the previous results and examine the optimal response
of taxation to changes in exogenous productivity and government spending,
we plot the impulse responses of key endogenous variables after a temporary
1% shock to the exogenous distributions in "At , "
Ak
t and "
ge
t . These plots are
shown in Figures 4.2-4.4 below.
116Given that in both models considered here (i.e. with exible and rigid relative skill
supply) it is assumed that the government needs to resort to distortionary taxation, the
rst-best cannot be achieved in either case. Hence, the best that the government can do
in the presence of the market friction in the form of rigid relative skill supply is to achieve
the second-best allocations in the labour markets, represented by Ramsey taxation under
exible relative skill supply in (145) and (146). This is reected in the denition of the
labour wedge created by the rigidity in the relative skill supply in (190).
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After a positive TFP or capital equipment shock (see Figures 4.2 and
4.3), the capital stock, kt, increases, since the productivity of capital in-
creases. As shown earlier (see Appendix), this tends to increase the returns
to skilled hours more than the return to unskilled, given capital-skill comple-
mentarity. In the exible labour markets model, the increase in the returns
to skilled labour also leads to an increase in the relative supply of skill,  t,
which, other things equal, tends to decrease the skill premium (see Appen-
dix). These two forces, on balance, lead to a decrease in the skill premium,
wst
wut
shown in the Figures. The government nds it optimal to respond to these
shocks by keeping the labour income taxes ( st and 
u
t ) relatively smooth ,
consistent with the tax smoothing literature. Optimal policy also encourages
the accumulation of skill by decreasing at .
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Under the relative skill supply restriction, the increase in the capital stock
cannot be followed by an increase in  t (see again Figures 4.2 and 4.3). There-
fore, the returns to skilled and unskilled labour, wst and w
u
t , respectively, now
follow di¤erent paths, summarised by the increase in the skill premium. Ce-
teris paribus, this drives a wedge between the average net returns to skilled
and unskilled labour hours under the restricted model, relative to those from
the exible labour markets model. To minimise the e¤ects of the relative
labour supply distortion, by keeping the marginal rates of substitution be-
tween leisure and consumption for the two types of labour at roughly the
same levels as under a fully exible labour market, the government adjusts
the optimal response of the labour income taxes, as can be seen in the plots
for these returns. Indeed, the response becomes more counter-cyclical, to
smooth the response of average net returns to skilled and unskilled labour,
so that these last two quantities exhibit, post shock, e¤ectively identical re-
sponses with their corresponding quantities in the exible labour market.
Note also that the change in  st is larger than 
u
t , since, given capital-skill
complementarity, wst is a¤ected more by the increase in the capital stock than
wut . Thus a larger adjustment in policy is required.
117However, note that the smoothness of the labour income taxes is not due to the skill-
acquisition subsidy, since a version of the model where at (s
t) is xed over the business
cycle provides very similar second moments and impulse responses. These results are not
presented here to save on space but are available on request.
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A temporary reduction in government spending in Figure 4.4, does not
have direct productivity e¤ects in these models. However, it allows the gov-
ernment to temporarily reduce the tax burden on labour income and thus
encourage labour supply. In the model with endogenous relative skill supply,
a small reduction in  st increases the average net return to skilled labour both
directly and indirectly, via the induced increase in  t. The latter happens
because the increase in skilled labour raises the return to capital as well and
thus the returns to investing into skill-acquisition. On the contrary, under
the restricted relative skill supply assumption, the indirect e¤ect is missing
and thus  st needs to be increased by more, to maintain the same average net
return to skilled labour hours. The unskilled labour supply does not a¤ect
capital accumulation as much (given capital-skill complementarity). Hence
it does not need to be changed by as much under endogenous relative skill
supply. In turn, this implies that no big changes are required in the opti-
mal response to ut when relative skill supply is xed, to maintain the same
average net return to unskilled labour hours.
4.9 Imposing a budget rule
Table 4.7 presents the steady state results of optimal scal policy under a
budget rule. In particular, we assume that the government is required to
keep a xed debt to output ratio when choosing optimal taxation. This is an
empirically relevant restriction since in recent years most advanced economies
have had debt targets to respect. The Ramsey steady state with a xed share
of debt to output is reported in Table 4.7 along with the steady state results
from our benchmark model with exible debt.
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Table 4.7: Steady state of optimal policy with xed debt to output ratio
c
y
k
y
i
y
e
y
b
y
ge
y
ws
wu
Benchmark 0.5444 2.6413 0.1849 0.0719 -0.7212 0.1987 1.5002
Fixed b=Y 0.5418 2.6356 0.1845 0.0702 0.5272 0.2036 1.5190
 s u n  k a rnet  
Benchmark 0.2432 0.2591 0.2475 0.0000 -0.0644 0.0417 0.4624
Fixed b=Y 0.2688 0.2820 0.2724 0.0000 -0.0394 0.0417 0.4581
The results are similar with the benchmark model under exible debt.
The main di¤erence is that under a budget rule the labour taxes are higher
and the subsidy to skill acquisition expenditure is lower, in order for the
government to nance a given level of government expenditures without the
use of debt. These results are consistent with Stockman (2001), although he
imposes a xed level of debt instead of a xed debt to output ratio.
We further examine the transition dynamics associated with Ramsey pol-
icy under a budget rule. Figure 4.2 presents the dynamic paths of the scal
policy instruments implied by optimal policy as the economy evolves from
the exogenous steady state to the Ramsey steady state with a xed debt to
output ratio. Figure 4.2 shows that under a budget rule, in period 1 skilled
and unskilled labour are subsidised at rates of 14.1% and 10.4% respectively;
and skill-acquisition expenditure is taxed at a rate of 36.4%. Therefore, the
labour income subsidy in the initial period is almost half under a xed debt
to output ratio compared with the exible debt case study presented earlier.
In the second period, skilled and unskilled labour taxes are 29.3% and 29.7%
respectively and eventually converge to their long-run values. Moreover, in
period 2, skill-acquisition is subsidised at a rate of 2.6% and converges slowly
to its steady state. As a result, the subsidy to skill acquisition is lower under
the budget rule and it exhibits smaller uctuations in the rst two peri-
ods. The capital income tax in the rst period reaches again a conscatory
rate (approximately 278%). However, in period 2, the capital income tax is
subsidised in this case at 0.28% and then converges slowly to zero.
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Figure 4.5: Transition paths of policy instruments under a xed debt to
output ratio
4.9.1 Cyclical properties under the budget rule
Following the same approach as before, we initially present the results regard-
ing the key second moments of the stochastic optimal policy with a xed debt
to output ratio, under two di¤erent cases: endogenous and exogenous relative
skill supply. Table 4.8 presents the cyclical properties of Ramsey taxation
under endogenous and under exogenous relative skill supply and Table 4.9
presents the autocorrelation of the policy instruments.
In particular, we nd that the labour income taxes are higher and the
skill-acquisition subsidy is lower under the budget rule compared to the ex-
ible debt regime on average over the business cycle. This is expected because
under the budget rule and the zero optimal capital income tax, the govern-
ment is not able to borrow to balance the budget and it needs to satisfy its
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expenditures through labour income tax revenues. The capital income and
private asset taxes in this case are again close to zero but larger in absolute
terms compared to the exible debt regime. Moreover, both labour taxes
are again smooth over the business cycle and counter-cyclical to output. The
skill-acquisition and capital income tax are the least smooth of the tax instru-
ments. These results cohere well with the related literature (see e.g. Chari
et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001)).
Moreover, apart from the labour income taxes, we nd that under the
budget rule the capital income tax and the private asset tax also inherit
the properties of the exogenous processes. Thus, the autocorrelations of
these instruments follow the autocorrelations of the exogenous processes and
under iid processes of the shocks the autocorrelation of the policy instruments
generally become very small.
From Table 4.8 we can see again that even under the budget rule the
government wants to minimise the labour wedges over the business cycle
by setting the paths for the skilled and unskilled average net return under
the market distortion as close as possible to the paths of the corresponding
quantities without the market distortion. Therefore, the second moments of
these returns are very similar under exible and xed relative skill supply.
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Table 4.8: Stochastic results under xed debt to output ratio
endogenous  exogenous  
xi xi xi  (xi; y) xi xi  (xi; y)
y 0.2302 0.0220 1 0.2302 0.0206 1
c 0.1247 0.0255 0.9718 0.1247 0.0262 0.9725
k 0.6067 0.0177 0.6112 0.6067 0.0162 0.6044
hs 0.3725 0.0023 0.1536 0.3725 0.0020 0.1381
hu 0.1795 0.0106 -0.5581 0.1795 0.0098 -0.5456
 0.4581 0.0033 0.9601 0.4581 0.0000 0.0000
ws
wu
1.5192 0.0042 -0.9726 1.5188 0.0018 0.2620
 s 0.2688 0.0005 -0.6211 0.2689 0.0061 -0.9569
u 0.2820 0.0009 -0.7595 0.2820 0.0031 -0.9654
 (1   s)ws 0.2318 0.0255 0.9803 0.2318 0.0262 0.9792
(1   )(1  u)wu 0.1773 0.0238 0.9841 0.1773 0.0246 0.9839
n 0.2724 0.0006 -0.8611 0.2725 0.0053 -0.9627
a -0.0395 0.0193 -0.2436 -0.0395 0.0000 0.0000
 k 0.0003 0.0137 -0.8388 0.0004 0.0101 -0.8396
 0.0386 0.0110 -0.6631 0.0307 0.0102 -0.8488
Focusing on the e¤ects of a xed relative skill supply over the business
cycle with given skill-acquisition expenditure et (st) and respective tax rate
at (s
t) on optimal taxation under the budget rule, we nd that the prop-
erties of optimal asset taxes do not change. However, as in the case with
exible debt, there are important di¤erences regarding labour income taxa-
tion. Specically, the two labour income taxes become quantitatively more
volatile, so that the e¤ective labour income tax rate, nt (s
t), is now about
nine times more volatile. In addition, under the budget rule we again obtain
the asymmetric increase in labour tax volatility. The  st (s
t) is about two
times more volatile than ut (s
t). Therefore, the xed relative skill supply
has signicant implications of the business cycle properties of labour income
taxation even under a budget rule.
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Table 4.9: Autocorrelations under xed debt to output ratio
autocorrelated shocks iid shocks
endogenous  exogenous  endogenous  exogenous  
 s 0.3814 0.9114 -0.0388 0.0166
u 0.6866 0.8519 -0.0274 -0.0139
n 0.5083 0.9066 -0.0340 0.0092
a 0.7987 1.0000 -0.0581 1.0000
 k 0.8897 0.8743 -0.0522 -0.0439
 0.5475 0.5810 -0.2513 -0.3934
4.10 Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical relevance of the wage-skill premium and the roles
played by capital-skill complementarity, the relative supply of skilled labour
and capital augmenting technical change, this chapter contributed to the
tax smoothing literature by undertaking a normative investigation of the
quantitative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour income, as
well as skill-acquisition expenditure, under exible or xed debt to output
ration, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total factor productivity (TFP),
capital equipment productivity and government spending.
Our main nding was that under capital-skill complementarity, a friction
that did not allow the relative supply of skill to adjust in response to aggre-
gate shocks, signicantly changed the cyclical properties of optimal labour
taxes. In particular, we rst showed that under endogenous relative skill
supply, the optimal labour taxes for both skilled and unskilled labour in-
come were very smooth, with the volatility of the skilled income tax being
marginally higher. We also found that the skilled tax moves pro-cyclically
with output and the unskilled tax was mildly counter-cyclical. These results
were largely consistent with the literature and extended previous ndings to
a setup with capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill supply.
We also found that, when the relative skill supply was constrained to
remain constant over the business cycle, the prescriptions for optimal policy
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markedly changed. In particular, we found that the volatility of taxes in-
creased signicantly, so that the standard deviation of the e¤ective average
labour income tax was about twelve times higher than the perfect labour
markets case, while the volatility of the skilled labour income tax was about
two-and-a-half times higher than that of the unskilled labour income tax.
Moreover, both taxes became strongly counter-cyclical. We further showed
that the key to explaining these changes was that the government found it
optimal to adjust labour income tax rates to alter the average net returns to
skilled and unskilled labour hours.
Our results further showed that the skill heterogeneity considered, ir-
respective of the presence of the labour market friction, did not a¤ect the
results obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset
taxes. In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital was around zero for
every period, the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes
were near zero and are the most volatile of the non-asset tax instruments.
We also found that the skill-acquisition tax was the least smooth of the non-
asset tax instruments when debt was state-contingent and uctuated nearly
as much as output. Irrespective of the model variant examined, all of the
policy instruments, except the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax
inherited the persistence properties of the shocks.
Finally, we found that the introduction of the budget rule doesnt a¤ect
our key results. However, under a xed debt to output ratio all scal in-
struments are counter-cyclical and inherit the persistence properties of the
shocks.
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Appendix D
D Chapter 4
D.1 Households rst-order conditions
The households rst-order conditions for consumption, skilled labour supply,
unskilled labour supply, debt, capital and the relative skill supply are given
respectively by the following relations:
uc(s
t) = t
 
st

(D1)
uhs(s
t) =  t(st) t(st)

1   st(st)

wst
 
st
	
(D2)
uhu(s
t) =  t(st)

1   t(st)
 
1  ut (st)

wut
 
st

(D3)
t
 
st

t(s
t)pt
 
st+1 j st

= t+1
 
st+1

t+1(s
t+1) (D4)
t (s
t)t(s
t) = 
P
st+1
ft+1 (st+1)t+1(st+1)
 rt+1 (st+1) 1   kt+1 (st+1)+ (1  )g (D5)
u (s
t) =  t(st)fhst (st) [1   st (st)]wst (st)  hut (st)
 1  ut  stwut  st  1 + at  st g  stg: (D6)
D.2 Deterministic Ramsey system
In a non-stochastic environment, the rst-order conditions derived in (170)-
(178) of the main text become:
 for t = 0:
Vhs (0) =   [Vc (0)  Ac] eFhs (0) + Ahs (D7)
Vhu (0) =   [Vc (0)  Ac] eFhu (0) + Ahu (D8)
V (0) = [Vc (0)  Ac] [g (0)] + A (D9)
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Vc (0) = Vc (1)
h eFk (1) + 1  i+ Ac (D10)
eF [ (0)] = c0 + ge + g ( 0) + k1   (1  )k0 (D11)
 for t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1:
Vhs (t) =  Vc (t) eFhs (t) (D12)
Vhu (t) =  Vc (t) eFhu (t) (D13)
V (t) = Vc (t) [g (t)] (D14)
Vc (t) = Vc (t+ 1)
h eFk (t+ 1) + 1  i (D15)
eF [ (t)] = ct + ge + g ( t) + kt+1   (1  )kt (D16)
 for t = T :
Vhs (T ) =  Vc (T ) eFhs (T ) (D17)
Vhu (T ) =  Vc (T ) eFhu (T ) (D18)
V (T ) = Vc (T ) [g (T )] (D19)
1 = 
h eFk (T ) + 1  i (D20)
eF [ (T )] = cT + ge + g ( T ) + kT (D21)
 lifetime implementability constraint:
TX
t=0
t[uc (t) ct + uhsh
s
t + uhuh
u
t + 
t] A = 0 (D22)
where A = uc (0)
n
b0 +
h
(1   k0) eFk (0) + (1  )i k0o, the Lagrange multi-
plier t has been replaced with Vc (t) using (170) and (175) in the main text
and the notation X (t) denotes the time period t quantity of X.
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D.3 The e¤ects of kt and  t on the skill premium
Di¤erentiating the skill premium, given by (181) in the main text,with respect
to kt we have (note that we do not use the st notation to keep the presentation
simpler):
@

wst
wut

@kt
= fAkt 
 
Akt kt
 1
( th
s
t)
 1 (1  ) ( thst) +   Akt kt a 2
 ((1   t)hut )1  (1  ) (1  )
a

  1

g  
This is positive if a > ; a;  < 1; 0 < ;  < 1.
Di¤erentiating (181) with respect to  t gives:
@

wst
wut

@ t
=  hut ( thst) (1  ) (1  )

(1  ) ( thst) + 
 
Akt kt
 a 2

264 (1  ) ( th
s
t)
 + 

Akt kt
   a( thst) 
   Akt kt + a( thst)+
+ t
 
Akt kt
   a t  Akt kt
375
 hst 2t ((1   t)hut )
Focusing on the term in the squared brackets we need to test if that term
is positive. If this is true then the above derivative is negative due to the
negative sign at the beginning of the right hand side.264 (1  ) ( th
s
t)
 + 

Akt kt
   a( thst) 
   Akt kt + a( thst)+
+ t
 
Akt kt
   a t  Akt kt
375
having in the rst row the terms with labour and in the rest the terms with
capital: 264 (1  ) ( th
s
t)
 + a( th
s
t)
   a( thst) 
   Akt kt +  Akt kt +
+ t
 
Akt kt
   a t  Akt kt
375
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264 ( th
s
t)
 [1  + a  a] +
+
 
Akt kt

[  ] +
+ t
 
Akt kt

[   a]
375
264 ( th
s
t)
 [(1  ) (1  a)] +
+
 
Akt kt

[(1  )] +
+ t
 
Akt kt

[(   a)]
375
"
( th
s
t)
 [(1  ) (1  a)] +
+
 
Akt kt

[(1  ) +  t (   a)]
#
The rst row is positive because (1  ) > 0 and (1  a) > 0. Therefore, if
(1  ) +  t (   a) > 0 the term in the squared brackets is positive.
(1  ) +  t (   a) > 0
(1  ) >   t (   a)
(1  ) >  t (  )
(1  )
(  ) >  t
Note that: (1 )
( ) > 1, since 1 >  ) 1    >    . Since 0 <  t < 1 we
nally have that
@

wst
wut

@ t
< 0.
To summarize:
@

wst
wut

@ t
=  hut ( thst) (1  ) (1  )

(1  ) ( thst) + 
 
Akt kt
 a 2

"
( th
s
t)
 [(1  ) (1  a)] +
+
 
Akt kt

[(1  ) +  t (   a)]
#

 hst 2t ((1   t)hut )
is negative if [(1  ) +  t (   a)] > 0 or 1   >  t, which is true because
1 
  > 1, since 1 > ) 1   >    and 0 <  t < 1.
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D.4 Ex ante capital tax
Assume that the government uses a capital tax that is not state-contingent,
so that its value for period t + 1 is decided using the history st. Dene
this uncontingent tax as  kt+1(s
t) and note that it needs to satisfy the Euler-
equation from (149) in the main text, so that the Ramsey allocations are
preserved:
uc(s
t) = Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st+1)+ 1  io (D23)
where we have used eFk(st+1) = rt+1(st+1). Hence,  kt+1(st) needs to satisfy:
uc(s
t) = Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st)+ 1  io . (D24)
By comparing (D24) with (D23), we see that  kt+1(s
t) needs to satisfy:
Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st)+ 1  io = (D25)
= Et
n
uc(s
t+1)
h eFk(st+1) 1   kt+1(st+1)+ 1  io
implying that:
 kt+1(s
t) =
Etuc(s
t+1)
h
 kt+1(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)i
Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1) : (D26)
This gives  kt+1(s
t) the ex ante capital tax interpretation, since, by multiply-
ing both numerator and denominator in (D26) by kt+1(st), this expression
provides the expected tax revenue from capital income as share of the ex-
pected capital income, where the expectation is calculated using information
at period t.
To obtain the ex ante rate stated in equation (187) of the main text, we
rst expand the Euler-equation (D23):
uc(s
t) = Etuc(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)  Etuc(st+1) kt+1(st+1) eFk(st+1)+ (D27)
+ Etuc(s
t+1) (1  )
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and note thatEtuc(st+1) kt+1(s
t+1) eFk(st+1) in (D27) equals  kt+1(st)Etuc(st+1)
 eFk(st+1), using (D26). Substituting this expression back into (D27) we
obtain:
uc(s
t) = Etuc(s
t+1) eFk(st+1)   kt+1(st)Etuc(st+1) eFk(st+1)+ (D28)
+ Etuc(s
t+1) (1  ) :
Finally solving (D28) for  kt+1(s
t) gives the ex ante capital tax rate reported
in equation (187) of the main text.
D.5 Uncontingent debt
D.5.1 Ex-post capital tax
The treatment of state-uncontingent debt and presentation follows Chari et
al. (1994) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, ch. 16). Assume that the
government issues uncontingent debt, bt+1 (st) which has a risk-free return
Rt (s
t). The budget constraint of the government in period t is written as:
gt(s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t
 
st

hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t)

1   t
 
st

hut (s
t)+
+at (s
t) g [ t(s
t)] +  kt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t 1) +
bt+1(st)
Rt(st)
  bt (st 1)
(D29)
The budget constraint of the household in period t is given by:
ct (s
t) +kt+1 (s
t) +
bt+1(st)
_
Rt(st)
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] = (1   st (st) )
 wst
 
st

 t
 
st

hst
 
st

+

1  ut
 
st

wut
 
st
 
1   t
 
st

hut
 
st

+
+ (1  ) kt
 
st 1

+

1   kt
 
st

rt
 
st

kt
 
st 1

+bt
 
st 1

(D30)
which implies that the rst-order condition with respect to holding bonds is
given by:
1
Rt (st)
= Et
uc(s
t+1)
uc(st)
. (D31)
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Note that the right-hand side of (D4) needs to be the same as the right-hand
side of the rst-order condition with respect to bonds in the case of state-
contingent debt, so that the implied allocations from the two problems (i.e.
with and without state-contingent debt) are the same. In turn, this implies
that the risk-free (or uncontingent) return needs to satisfy:
1
Rt (st)
=
X
st+1 pst
pt
 
st+1 j st

. (D32)
To obtain an expression for br+1 (sr) for a given period r, we work as
follows. We multiply the budget constraint of the household in (D30) for
periods r and r+ 1 by r (sr) and r+1 (sr+1) respectively, sum the resulting
budget constraint in r+ 1 over all possible realisations sr+1 and add it to the
budget constraint in period r. We then use the rst-order conditions of the
household to simplify the expression and continue this forward process until
time period T !1. By imposing the appropriate transversality conditions
we obtain an expression for br+1 (sr) as a function of identied equilibrium
paths given in:
br+1 (s
r) =
_
Rr (s
r)
1P
t=r+1
P
st
t rt(st)[uc(st)ct(st)+uhs (st)hst(st)+uhu (st)hut (st)+
t(st)]
r(sr)uc(sr)
 
 
_
Rr (s
r) kr+1 (s
r) (D33)
where, 
t (st) is dened in the main text under equation (167). Hence we
can use (D31) to obtain Rt (st), (D33) to nd bt+1 (st) and nally (D29) to
calculate the ex-post capital tax reported in equation (188) of the main text.
D.5.2 Private assets tax
Assume that the government issues uncontingent debt, bt+1 (st), which has
a risk-free return Rt (st), satisfying (D32), but which is taxed using a state-
contingent tax t+1 (st+1). The budget constraint of the government is now
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written as:
gt(s
t) =  s(st)wst (s
t) t
 
st

hst(s
t) + u(st)wut (s
t)

1   t
 
st

hut (s
t)+
+ at
 
st

g

 t(s
t)

+  kt (s
t)rt(s
t)kt(s
t 1)+ (D34)
+
bt+1 (s
t)
Rt (st)
  1  t  st bt  st 1
while the budget constraint of the household becomes:
ct (s
t) + kt+1 (s
t) +
bt+1(st)
Rt(st)
+ [1 + at (s
t)] g [ t(s
t)] =
= [1   st (st)]wst (st) t (st)hst (st) + [1  ut (st)]wut (st)
 [1   t (st)]hut (st) + (1  ) kt (st 1) +

1   kt (st)

rt (s
t)
kt (st 1) + [1  t (st)] bt (st 1)
(D35)
which implies that the rst-order condition with respect to holding bonds
becomes:
1
Rt (st)
=
X
st+1 pst
t+1
 
st+1 p st
 uc(st+1)
uc(st)

1  t+1
 
st+1

. (D36)
The introduction of the new assets tax has to be such that the equilibrium
allocations obtained without it are respected. Hence the asset tax must be
such that makes the right-hand side of (D4) and (D36) equal. Hence, the
asset tax must satisfy:
Etuc(s
t+1)t+1
 
st+1

= 0 (D37)
which implies that at time period t, the expected value of the asset tax in
period t + 1, valued in terms of utility, has to be equal to zero. Therefore,
(D37) implies that Rt (st) in this case is given by (D31) as well. Moreover,
by working as above, we substitute household budget constraints in (D35)
forward, using the household rst-order conditions, the transversality condi-
tions, the restriction in (D37) and the restriction that the asset tax in the
initial period under consideration is zero (equivalent to the zero capital tax
in the initial period), we can show that debt can be obtained by the same
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expression as (D33).
The private assets tax is dened as the tax revenue from assets over
income from assets. In particular:
t
 
st+1jst =  kt+1(st+1)Fk(st+1)kt+1(st) + t+1 (st+1) bt+1 (st)
Fk(st+1)kt+1(st) + bt+1 (st)
. (D38)
Solving (D34) for t (st) bt (st 1) and substituting this into (D38) we have
the expression for t (s
t+1jst) reported in equation (189) of the main text.
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